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Thailand has all the elements that precipitate a rapid spread of the AIDS epidemic:
a large Intravenous Drug Users (IVDUs) community, a highly mobile population, and an
extensive commercial sex industry frequented by the majority of Thai men and numerous
foreign tourists. At the beginning of 1988, Thailand had only a handful of reported cases,
but by 1994, approximately one percent of all Thais were HIV positive. In fact, Thailand
has experienced the fastest documented spread of the epidemic in the world (Beyrer
1993). The first waves of the epidemic saw infection spread in the IVDUs and
commercial sex workers (CSWs) populations. It then spread to men who frequented
CSWs and today, increasing rates of infection are being discovered in housewives and
their children. All Thais are now considered at risk regardless of their geographic
location, socio/economic status, age or sex. Due to the wide-reaching parameters of the
AIDS epidemic, Thailand is being forced to examine not only health concerns but also
related cultural, economic, religious, gender and legal issues.
At the same time, Thailand has developed the most comprehensive anti-AIDS
campaign in Asia and one of the most progressive in the world. In 1988, Thailand was the
first country in Asia to develop a national AIDS prevention program and in 1991, the first
to have its Prime Minister (Anand Panyarachun) chair the National AIDS Committee. By
1994, AIDS policies have become an intricate part of the nations social and economic
development plans and funding for the national AIDS program exceeds US $50 million.
The participants involved in the national AIDS campaign include all government
ministries and provincial governments, and numerous government agencies, non-
government organizations (NGOs) and international organizations.
Through the efforts of the participants, the national AIDS campaign reaches every
part of Thailand. AIDS education is now taught in schools, neighborhoods and
businesses, and commercials are broadcast throughout the day on television and radio.
The educational messages have promoted abstention from high-risk behaviors and
condom use. As a result, condom use has increased and sexually transmitted diseases
(STD) have decreased. 1 There are also signs that the frequency which some Thai men
visit brothels is on a downward trend. Although the rate of infection remains high, these
prevention efforts have limited the growth of the epidemic.
In addition to the prevention and control efforts, there have been vast
improvements in the manner which infected persons are treated. Measures, including
quarantining infected persons, and legislation, such as the "AIDS-bill," were rejected
because of their discriminatory nature. In contrast, anonymous testing, counseling
mechanisms and measures to protect HIV infected persons in the work place are being
implemented. 2 Additionally, the present national program, labeled "Living With AIDS,"
places more emphases on care and human rights. The government, which is unable to
care for the hundreds of thousands of persons that will soon be sick with AIDS-related
diseases, is now investigating alternatives including temple-based hospices and home care
initiatives. Finally, there have been on-going efforts to limit the spread of HIV by
controlling the commercial sex industry.
These impressive accomplishments have stemmed from Thailand's ability to pull
together both financial and human resources to address the epidemic. Thailand's success
has also benefited from various national attributes such as a well-established bureaucracy,
sustained economic growth, a far-reaching health infrastructure, relatively high literacy
rates and a well-developed communications system. However, without high-level
1 Condom use is considered one of the most effective ways to halt the spread of HIV infection.
There is a strong correlation between the presence of a STD and the chance of acquiring HIV.
2 In spite of the progress in protecting HIV/AIDS infected persons, discriminatory practices, such
as forced testing, abound. Enforcement of the legislation has been deficient.
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political commitment, the policies and their implementation would not have been
possible. To reach this level of commitment required the Thai government and key
leaders to overcome an environment characterized by denial and relative inactivity.
Therefore, the primary question to be addressed in this study is: How and why did the
AIDS issue develop into a high-level government priority?
This research reconstructs and describes the development process for AIDS
policies in Thailand from the appearance of the first few cases, in 1984, to the present. It
demonstrates how the political environment, characteristics of the AIDS disease, and the
role of government and outside participants are all important factors in the policy
development process. The analysis concludes that the nature of the political system is the
single greatest variable to account for the manner that the development of policy has
occurred. Within the political environment, the participants and issue characteristics
largely determine the shape and nature of the policy developments.
Historical Presentation of Policy Development
This research includes a historical presentation of AIDS policy development
which is divided into four periods according to political administrations: Prem
Tinsulanonda (1984-88), Chatichai Choonhaven (1988-91), Anand Panyarachun (1991-
92) and Chuan Leekpai (1991-94). Within this framework the process that enabled the
AIDS issue to reach the government's decision agenda is presented. This research exhibits
the differences between each government and how these variations affected policy
development. In general, the policy progressed from being non-existent in 1984 to the
comprehensive national AIDS prevention and control program that it is today. To many
this progression seems quite natural but, in fact, various elements were responsible for the
pace and intensity that the policy matured. The demands for policy development had to
weather a complicated policy making process. Factors such as system variables,
participants' involvement and issue characteristics which at times stalled or diverted
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policy development had to be overcome. This research reveals that during the Anand3
period many of these obstacles to policy making were eliminated or bypassed because the
administration operated in an extraordinary political environment. As a result, the AIDS
issue was placed high on the government's decision agenda and, consequently, the Anand
government was able to develop policies more rapidly than the other administrations.
Each of the administrations operated in dissimilar political environments.
However, this thesis reveals that the leading politicians had much greater impact on
policy during the less democratic periods of Prem and Anand, because they were not
excessively constrained by democratic obstacles. In the Prem period, the government's
primary role was to keep the AIDS issue off the government agenda. Anand, on the other
hand, was able to swiftly place the AIDS issue on the highest level of the government
agenda. In contrast, the elected governments of Chatichai and Chuan were multi-partied
coalitions which faced many obstacles in policy making.
Early in the Prem period, development of policy was in its infant stage because
the AIDS epidemic had not begun to spread rapidly.4 As evidence surfaced which
indicated that the epidemic was taking root in Thailand, there was external pressure on
Prem to respond to the AIDS threat. However, the participants who sought to keep the
AIDS issue off the political agenda had great influence within the government and
blocked AIDS policy from significant development. The business community, and the
tourism industry in particular, did not want the AIDS issue to reach the government
agenda for fear that the publicity would adversely affect tourism receipts, the Thai
economy, and Thailand's international reputation. In a period when the Thai economy was
going through structural adjustments, Prem was dependent on careful management of the
3 Thais are referred to by their first name, not their family name. Hence it is Prime Minister
Anand, not Prime Minister Panyarachun.
4 In 1987, some dramatic events were publicized in the media. Then in the first half of 1988,
shortly before the Prem period ended, evidence that the epidemic was spreading rapidly in the
IVDUs community came to light. For an in depth discussion see Chapter III.
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economy and the support of the business community. Perhaps more importantly,
members of the government and the military--who formed Prem's power basehad strong
relationships with the business community. Many of these influential leaders also had
direct business interests to protect. Therefore, those who stood to benefit from keeping
the AIDS issue off the government agenda were not only businessmen but also military
and government leaders.
Prime Minister Chatichai's Government was a multi-party coalition in which
divergent views of numerous political parties had to be considered. Furthermore, the
process of transforming legislation into law was lengthy and difficult. Within this
process, there were many possibilities for the fragmentation of policy making. The
division of authority not only included the different political parties but also two houses
of parliament. In this semi-democratic period, a growing number of participants both
inside and outside the government began to gain influence and prominence while pushing
for more progressive AIDS policies. However, those with business interests continued to
stall the development of policy at various stages. Moreover, Prime Minister Chatichai and
some of his closest political allies had extensive business interests to protect.
Anand's governments were extraordinary in that they were unelected and
temporary. The Anand I government (March 1991 to April 1992) was empowered by the
army after Chatichai was overthrown in the February 1991 coup de tat. Anand received
strong support from the military and was given much latitude in policy making by
General Suchinda, the most powerful army general of that period. Then, after the
occurrences of April and May 1992, 5 Anand was chosen to lead the interim government,
named Anand II, until new elections were held in September 1992.
5 The Anand period was interrupted from March to May 1992, by the short-lived government
headed by General Suchinda Krayapoon. Elections were arranged for March 22,1992. Suchinda
was able to manipulate himself into the position of prime minister after he had vowed not to seek
any political positions. In the aftermath, mass protest occurred which cumulated in bloody
confrontations between the army and demonstrators from May 16-20, 1992.
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The Anand governments were able to maneuver without having to contend with
the arduous checks and balances that a government operating within the parliamentary
system normally encounters. 6 Although the administration's highly publicized approach to
handling the AIDS issue was unpopular with many Thai leaders, the government was able
to proceed largely un-hindered. The change in the political environment during the Anand
period fulfilled the final condition necessary for placing the AIDS issue on the
government's decision agenda.
The Chuan government has been able to normalize the AIDS issue as a high
priority item. Most leaders have accepted that the issue will be handled in a frank manner.
Furthermore, since the Anand government placed the AIDS issue on the highest level of
the government agenda, opponents of AIDS policy development have been deprived of
their strongest weapon; to stop policies at one of the many stages in the legislative
process. Nonetheless, the development of AIDS-related policies and choosing from
alternatives is once again slowed by the diverse interests that prevail in a parliamentary
government headed by a weak coalition.
Participants' Involvement in Policy Making
Within the context of the political environment, influential participants, both
inside and outside the government, have had a great deal of impact on the development of
AIDS policies. This research identifies the different individuals, factions, alliances and
organizations who are responsible for making Thailand's anti-AIDS struggle as open and
progressive as it is today. In addition, the groups and individuals who for a number of
reasons attempted to keep the AIDS issue off the political agenda and consequently held
back the policy development process are named. Particular attention is paid to their
relative influence during each period.
6 For example, political parties were not a factor because of the apolitical nature of the Anand
governments. Also, the legislative process was in flux because the MPs were busy campaigning
for the next election.
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Participants within the government include the prime minister, political
appointees, members of parliament and bureaucrats. Prime Minister Anand's
administration provides the best examples of participants within the government actively
developing AIDS-related policies. With favorable political conditions, Anand and
members of his administration were able to greatly influence the development of policies
and choosing of policy alternatives. Anand has been portrayed as a pragmatic
businessman who was not interested in furthering his political interests. His policy
making was considered reasonable and progressive. Not being tied to a political party also
allowed him the freedom to listen to members of his administration. In addition, those
appointed to the government were not politicians, but rather technocrats, bureaucrats and
activists. Therefore, they were less likely to have political ambitions and were not
accountable to political parties. Foremost were Ministers Mechai Veravaidya, a leading
anti-AIDS activist, and Minister Sairusee Chutikul, a female rights activist.
On the other hand, Prime Minister Chatichai was faced with various demands
from politicians as well as bureaucrats. The ministers were political appointees many of
whom had little knowledge of the issues at hand and public health concerns often became
subordinate to political concerns. The politicians in Chatichai's government were also
more concerned with the negative impact that AIDS publicity may have on business
interests than the technocrats and bureaucrats under Anand. An exception during the
Chatichai government was the Minister of Public Health, Chuan Leekpai, who staunchly
promoted more progressive AIDS policies. During the Chatichai period, technocrats and
bureaucrats had less impact on agenda setting, although they were still vital participants
in generating and choosing policy alternatives.
Since the AIDS issue has been considered primarily a public health problem, the
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) has been the most active ministry in the national
AIDS program. Except during the Anand period, the MOPH has been the central
government agency responsible for controlling and coordinating the national AIDS
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program, allocating budget and implementing programs. Although, many bureaucrats
have advocated higher agenda status for the national AIDS program, the MOPH's primary
role has been in generating and choosing alternatives rather than agenda setting.
The main outside participants that promoted policy development include the
media, academicians, activists, doctors, non-government organizations and international
organizations. These groups have been instrumental in forcing the government to address
the issues, educating the public and policy makers, fighting against complacency and
generating policy alternatives. The media was the primary medium for raising awareness.
In addition, it has been used as an open forum for other participants to voice their
opinions. Academics, activists, and NGO leaders have been most influential when they
have had access to key politicians or were included in the government. Academicians also
fill an important need by providing credible information. Activists have attempted to
pressure policy makers into action, publicly, by raising awareness, and privately, by using
their own resources and connections. NGO participation has been most noticeable in
efforts to protect human rights and in implementing programs at a grass-roots level.
Other important outside participants are international organizations which
contribute financial and technical support. The impact of the international organizations
was greatest before the Thai government had politically committed to fighting AIDS and
many of the anti-AIDS activities were dependent on external support. In particular, the
World Health Organization (WHO) has been working closely with the MOPH since 1987
to develop policies which are consistent with WHO guidelines. Presently, international
organizations attempt to influence the choosing of policy alternatives. They strongly
advocate policies which adhere to internationally accepted human rights principles.
Although fewer in number, the participants who sought to keep the AIDS issue
from becoming a top level priority were extremely influential due to their prominence and
systematic factors. As previously mentioned, many in the business community, and
particularly in the tourism industry, were the leading detractors against an open,
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progressive AIDS campaign. They felt that publicity over AIDS would adversely affect
tourism receipts and foreign direct investment. Moreover, this group had the ability to
influence policy because of its central role in the economy. 7 Politicians' success is largely
dependent on the fortunes of the economy and the support of the business community. In
addition, many influential Thai leaders, including politicians and military officers, have
significant business interests.
Systematically, participants seeking to keep an issue from becoming a top
government priority are advantaged because the issue can be blocked from the agenda at
any point in the policy making process. On the other hand, to establish an issue on the
agenda needs support at each step of the process. During the Anand period, when policy
makers were able to sidestep many of the normal channels, those opposed to AIDS policy
development found it more difficult to apply pressure.
Issue Characteristics of AIDS Affect Policy Development
The issue characteristics of AIDS have also shaped responses to the epidemic. The
lag that occurs between HIV infection and the onset of AIDS-related disease and eventual
death is six to ten years. As a result of this long latency period, during the 1980's there
was very little evidence or impact from the AIDS epidemic in Thailand. The "invisible"
nature of the epidemic contributed to inactivity and non-recognition by leaders.
Additionally, Thais denied that AIDS was a threat to themselves or Thailand.
On the other hand, the release of information which indicated that the disease was
spreading rapidly became an important factor for stimulating anti-AIDS activities. In
particular, Thailand established a sentinel surveillance system that tracks the spread of
HIV infection and has been lauded as the most comprehensive in the world (World Bank
1993). Participants have been able to use the epidemiological information to warn and
pressure policy makers into action.
7 According to the Bank of Thailand, tourism has been the largest earner of foreign exchange
since 1982.
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Mechai Veravaidya is a prime example of a participant skilled at using the nature
of the epidemic to pressure leaders into supporting the AIDS prevention and control
efforts. Mechai was well aware that leaders were afraid to acknowledge the AIDS threat
because of fears that the economy would be adversely affected. Therefore, in order to
influence political and business leaders, he presented startling projections of the
economic devastation that the epidemic would cause if continually ignored.
Nonetheless, an increase in AIDS/HIV incidence, by itself, is insufficient in
promoting significant changes in policy as evidenced in numerous African nations. It is
useless as a tool to raise the AIDS issue unto the government agenda if the information is
not available and if key participants are not committed or apt at utilizing the knowledge.
Moreover, the political system must provide an atmosphere of openness and acceptance
before policies that dictate the development of mechanisms, such as the sentinel
surveillance system, can be passed.
Significance of this Research
This research is significant in a number of ways. (1) Since the development of
policies is an ongoing process, lessons learned may lead to more efficient use of the
process. (2) The methods utilized by the various participants such as NGOs, the media,
academics and bureaucrats, which have affected the development of AIDS policies, may
have implications for other movements. (3) A history of AIDS in Thailand from 1984 to
1993 which emphasizes the factors influencing policy development is a useful reference
material for other researchers. (4) The validity of John Kingdon's agenda setting model,
the Revised Garbage Can Model (Kingdon 1984), is tested in the Thai case. (5) This
research sets a foundation for additional research that must be conducted before reaching
a more comprehensive understanding of the policy making process in Thailand. (6)
Important lessons can be learned by neighboring Asian countries, which are a few years
behind Thailand in the AIDS policy development process.
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Research Conducted on AIDS in Thailand
To date, the research on AIDS in Thailand has been conducted by government
officials, academicians and foreign participants. The research has progressed through
three stages. First, epidemiology studies were conducted to identify the nature and degree
of the spread. Research included case studies of AIDS infected persons and charting the
spread of infection in particular risk groups and geographic locations. Secondly,
knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) studies were conducted. For example, some
studies targeted samples of the male population and investigated their knowledge about
AIDS, attitudes towards the epidemic, and practices of frequenting CSWs and condom
use. The third type of research is social research which began in 1992. Social research
studies focus on more complex issues while expanding upon the knowledge gained in the
epidemiology and KAP studies. Examples include studies of sexual behavior, sexual
networking, political economy and methods of coping (Chayan 1993). Professor Bencha
Yoddamnern of Mahidol University estimated that 300 hundred researchers in Thailand
were doing AIDS-related work in 1992, but the majority of those were KAP studies
conducted on different groups, particularly CSWs. Concentration on KAP studies may be
attributed to the relative ease of conducting these studies in comparison to research which
attempts to understand the behavioral aspects (Bencha 1993).
This research is unique in that there have not been any comprehensive studies
done on AIDS policy development. Nor has there been a historical study on AIDS which
covers the period from 1984 to the present and focuses on policy development. Various
sources have chronicled the development of policies over short periods of time. However,
there has been very little policy analysis accompanying these historical presentations.
Furthermore, there are not any studies that evaluate the relationship between the political
system and AIDS policy development or any that focus on the efforts of the various
participants involved in the policy making process.
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Research Methods
My thesis is based on primary research that was conducted in the Summer of 1993
in Thailand. I collected information through interviews with 37 key policy makers
including: Thai government officials, representatives of non-government organizations,
academicians, researchers and businessmen. In addition, I attended seminars, participated
in workshops, and observed outreach programs that focused on anti-AIDS efforts.
The secondary sources include materials focusing on AIDS in Thailand, AIDS in
general and theoretical works on public policy making. The Thai case is represented by
government documents, reports by various GOs and NGOs, and newspaper and magazine
articles--both foreign and Thai. More general information on the nature of AIDS and
policy making is sourced by books, studies and reports, primarily Western in origin.
Chapter Layout
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following the introduction is a
presentation of the theoretical background used to support this research. It defines
concepts related to the policy development process and outlines John Kingdon's revised
garbage can model which will be applied to the case of AIDS policy development in
Thailand. Chapters III through VI consist of a chronological presentation and analysis of
the AIDS policy development process in Thailand from 1984 to 1993. The material is
organized by prime ministerial administrations. This basis of division not only serves
organizational efforts but roughly estimates a transformation of policy through the stages
of denial, transition, recognition and normalization. 8 The changing nature of the AIDS
epidemic, the involvement of key participants, and the major AIDS-related events, are
presented within this chronological framework.
Chapter III covers the Prem period (1984-1988). This period was characterized by
relatively few cases of infected persons and denial that Thailand was threatened by the
8 While seemingly a natural progression, this process was dependent on many of the factors mentioned
previously such as the type of government and orientation of the leaders.
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AIDS pandemic. Powerful factions sought to protect their economic interests at the
expense of recognizing the AIDS dilemma. Consequently, the AIDS issue remained an
issue on the systematic agenda until the end of the period. Chapter IV examines the
Chatichai period (1988-1991). At this time, Thailand experienced a rapid increase in
AIDS/HIV prevalence. Simultaneously, the policies being developed reflected the
transformation of attitudes from denial towards recognition and action. The AIDS issue
was placed on the government agenda, but the Chatichai government was overthrown
without giving the issue top-level commitment. Chapter V presents the development of
AIDS policies during the Anand period (1991-1992). Over this period, the epidemic
continued to spread quickly. The leaders, however, fully recognized the AIDS threat, and
the AIDS issue was placed high on the government's decision agenda. Chapter VI exhibits
how the AIDS issue was normalized as a high-level government priority under the Chuan
administration (1992 to the present). In 1994, AIDS continues to spread and policies are
continually evolving. There is, however, no longer any question that Thailand will
continue to combat the AIDS epidemic on many fronts, and AIDS will remain a top-level
priority.
In Chapter VII, a presentation of each participant's role and impact in policy
development is provided. It discusses their relative degree of input in both the agenda
setting and choosing of alternatives stages of policy making during the different
administrations. Participants inside the government include prime ministers, political
appointees, members of parliament and bureaucrats. Outside participants include the
business community, academics, NGOs, doctors, international organizations and the
media.
The conclusion in Chapter VIII begins by applying Kingdon's process model. It
provides framework for understanding how the different factors interact and for
demonstrating how the AIDS issue progressed on the political agenda in Thailand. For
each government, it shows how the AIDS issue progressed to successively higher levels
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of the political agenda. It also supports the assertion that the nature of the political
environment was the most determinant factor in AIDS policy development.
Next, the implications that this research has for other nations, that have not made
fighting the AIDS dilemma a national priority, is briefly mentioned. It indicates the
usefulness of applying Kingdon's model and the manner that examples from the Thai case
may be applied to other situations. Finally, the limitations to the present research and the




In this thesis, policy development refers to the general expansion of AIDS
legislation, the measures taken to deal with the epidemic and the implementation of the
prevention and control programs. The level that the AIDS issue reaches in the agenda
setting process is used to measure the progress of policy development. Evaluation of the
programs that are actually implemented is not attempted. Rather, analyzing policy from
an agenda setting point of view is based on the premise that to have an open and
progressive national AIDS program needs support at the highest level of government.
Nonetheless, the actions and measures taken to cope with the AIDS dilemma are
presented in order to show the relationship between agenda setting and implementation of
policy.
To set the theoretical framework, concepts related to policy development
including policy, the policy making process and the policy cycle are defined. In addition,
discussion concerning the agenda setting process is covered. Then the theoretical models
used in the analysis of the policy development process are outlined. I have chosen John
Kingdon's public policy making model on the agenda setting process as the primary
model to be applied and tested. It is supplemented by Lindblom and Woodhouse's work
on participants in the parliamentary system.
Defining Policy
According to Palumbo, policy is neither a set of government documents nor
something that can be captured by pointing out a single event or decision. Rather, policy
is a process, or a historical series of intentions, actions, and behaviors of many
participants. Policy must be inferred from the series of intended actions and behaviors of
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the many governmental agencies and officials involved in the making of policy over time
(Palumbo 1988, 8). Eulau and Prewitt explain that since policy emerges through time, "...
it [policy] can for this reason only be observed through observing the behavior of
governors and governed in time. What the observer sees when he identifies policy at any
one point in time is at most a stage or phase in a sequence of events that constitute policy
development" (Eulau and Prewitt 1977, 477).
The policy making process is composed of all the actions, decisions, and
behaviors of the people who make and implement policy. Policy is the output of the
policy making process. For the most part, the policy making process follows a policy
cycle even though the stages are often skipped or overlap. The policy cycle is commonly
divided into five stages: agenda setting, policy formation, implementation, evaluation,
and termination. Throughout the policy cycle, policy is always being formed and
reformed. Therefore, policy is never a single, clear, and non-contradictory set of
objectives and behaviors (Palumbo 1988, 18-19).
Agenda Setting
This thesis focuses primarily on the agenda setting stage. However, since the
stages are not mutually exclusive, the activities may also affect other stages in the policy
cycle. For example, this study also discusses the participants' contributions to the
choosing of policy alternatives--part of the policy formation stage--which usually occurs
once the issue has reached the government agenda.
Agenda setting is the process of deciding which problems will be addressed by
governmental agencies. Although each stage in the policy making process is important in
its own way, agenda setting may be the most crucial. Agenda setting is analogous to gate
keeping; the gate keepers decide which issues will get onto the public agenda and which
will be shut out. If an issue is shut out, then there is no chance for the legislature,
executive agencies, or courts to influence policy in regard to that particular issue. Hence,
being able to keep important items off the government agenda and the decision agenda is
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a key source of power. The determination of what does and what does not become a
matter of governmental action is, therefore, the supreme instrument of power (Palumbo
1988, 36).
The agenda is the general set of political controversies that take place in society.
The agenda is not written down anywhere, nor is it a book in which things are entered.
Rather, the agenda is the set of problems to which policy makers give their attention
(Palumbo 1988, 34). More specifically there are different types and levels of agendas.
The likelihood that an issue will result in government policy is dependent on the type and
level of agenda that an issue reaches. Cobb and Elder have identified two types of
agendas: the systematic agenda and government (or institutional) agenda. The systematic
agenda is the broad set of issues that potentially can become the subject of public policy.
"The systematic agenda consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by members of
the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the
legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority" (Cobb and Elder 1972, 85).
The government agenda is more concrete than the systematic agenda; it consists of the
issues that actually are subjects for public policy. For an issue to reach the government
agenda, strong support from authoritative government representatives is required.
Generally, most issues on the government agenda have progressed from the systematic
agenda.
Kingdon adds an additional level to the government agenda, the decision agenda,
or the list of subjects within the government agenda that are up for active decision making
(Kingdon 1984, 4). This distinction is important because some issues reach the
government agenda but are given only superficial recognition, while no serious actions
are taken. Nonetheless, rising onto the government agenda is an important step. It
indicates that there is recognition, although at times nominal, that the issue can no longer
be ignored. At this stage, however, the government does not allow the issue to become a
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top priority. On the other hand, the decision agenda is the highest agenda level that an
issue can reach.
This research measures agenda setting quantitatively, by the government's
financial commitment. The annual budget allocation for the national AIDS program is
used as the instrument of measurement. Agenda setting is also measured qualitatively, by
the degree of recognition given to the AIDS issue by the top-level of the government. The
degree of recognition is determined by the public commitment and actions taken by
government leaders. The concepts of systematic agenda, government agenda and
government's decision agenda are used as labels to describe agenda status.
In the Thai case, the AIDS issue remained on the systematic agenda for over three
years after the first case was discovered in 1984. In the late 1980's, the issue was placed
on the government agenda. It was not until after Anand was placed in power in 1991, that
AIDS was firmly established on the government's decision agenda.
Theoretical Models
For this research, the purpose of using a theoretical model is to make sense of the
Thai case and to test the validity of a particular agenda setting model, John Kingdon's
Revised Garbage Can Model (Kingdon. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies.
1984). This public policy making model is based on analysis of political processes in
"democratic" western nations, and there has been little comparative research on the policy
process in Thailand. Even though the form of democracy in Thailand is different from in
the West,9 this model has implications for the politics and processes of agenda setting in
Thailand. Although the policy making process in the West is at times ideally defined as
representing a truly democratic process, in reality, much research suggests that various
participants, such as politicians and interest groups, wield an inordinate amount of power
9 Since the establishment of a constitutional government in 1932, democratically-elected
governments have held power for only a few brief periods. Even in those periods, "democracy"
has not flourished as defined in the West.
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and often do not represent public opinion. In Thailand, there has been a domination of
public policy making by an elite consisting of military officers, politicians, businessman
and bureaucrats. Since many aspects of the policy making process in Thailand and the
West evidence similar patterns, Kingdon's theoretical model can be used to analyze AIDS
policy development.
Kingdon's Process Model
I have chosen to test John Kingdon's process model, the Revised Garbage Can
Model. It is a very comprehensive model and accounts for many of the key factors in the
Thai case. The process of AIDS policy development in Thailand is very complex; it is
greatly affected by political change, and involves numerous participants and problem
definitions. Kingdon's model not only considers the issue and the participants, but also
proposed solutions and political variables. His description of the "window of opportunity"
and the role of the "policy entrepreneur" are particularly fitting for the Thai case. As an
analytic tool, this model indicates the conditions which must be met for agenda setting to
occur. Testing Kingdon's model on agenda setting will indicate its appropriateness in a
single case, the AIDS epidemic in Thailand, but will not prove or disprove the model.
Other applications must be studied before conclusions over the validity of the model can
be ascertained.
It is difficult to determine empirically if a group or individual has been successful
in keeping an issue off the agenda as it is to trace the actual origins of an item that gets
onto the agenda. This is because at any point in time there is a plethora of ideas floating
around on the systematic agenda, and there are many places where they may have
originated. Most often a combination of factors is responsible for getting an issue onto or
keeping it off the agenda. The process is usually not rational either. Palumbo explains that
rationally, the process of agenda setting should be as follows: First, a major problem is
recognized to exist by a number of individuals and groups; Second, the problem is
discussed and information about it is disseminated to larger groups; Third, government
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officials--that is, legislators, governors, and administrators--are involved in the process
and a national debate ensues about various ways of solving the problem (Palumbo 1988,
55-6).
Instead of this neat logical scenario, Kingdon's model provides an alternative
explanation by expanding on the original Garbage Can Model by Cohen, March and
Olsen (1972). Their model proposes that decision-making in political organizations is not
a deliberate and systematic process. Rather, the process is rarely orderly or manageable,
especially in the organizations that hold the characteristics of "organized anarchies."
Organized anarchies are characterized by (1) fluid lines of participation in decision-
making; (2) multiple preferences often not well defined or agreed upon; (3) poor
understanding of how to best accomplish goals (Cohen, March and Olsen 1973, 1-25).
Kingdon has described how one such organized anarchy, the government, makes
decisions:
"People do disagree about what they want the government to
accomplish, and are often obliged to act before they have the luxury of
defining their preferences precisely. They often don't know how to
accomplish what they want to accomplish, even if they can define their
goals. Participation is definitely fluid. Even within a relatively
hierarchical bureaucracy, some people take on an importance.that is
not commensurate with their formal role, and others are impotent
despite considerable powers on paper. Both the legislature and the
executive branch are in the act, further clouding organizational
boundaries. And various categories of people outside the government
drift in and out of decision making. Participation changes from one
time to the next. Turnover of personnel adds to fluidity." (Kingdon
1984, 90)
Kingdon presents three "streams of processes"--problem recognition, the
formation and redefining of policy proposals, and politics--which when joined together
can raise issues on to the decision agenda.
The problem stream consists of various conditions that public policy makers
believe are sufficiently troublesome to warrant attention and possible action by the
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government. Kingdon suggests that various "conditions" are more likely to be viewed as
problems when (1) indicators of a problem bring the issue to decision makers' attention;
(2) a dramatic event seizes their attention; (3) feedback from an existing program
suggests changes need to be made; and (4) conditions become defined as problems
because they are classified into categories that are generally agreed to warrant attention
(Kingdon 1984, 95, 115).
The policy stream consists of ideas or proposals that have been developed to solve
different problems. The generation of policy proposals normally originates from
specialists in a variety of ways: bill introductions, speeches, testimony, papers and
conversation. The proposals come in contact with each other and are revised until the
selection system narrows the set of proposals to those up for consideration. Proposals that
survive to receive serious consideration are (1) technically feasible; (2) compatible with
the dominant values of members of the policy community; and (3) relatively free of
constraints.
The political stream is characterized by such factors as the partisan and
ideological distribution of members of parliament, the priorities and concerns of the
administration, the national mood, and the activities and demands of interest groups.
Potential agenda items that are congruent with above factors are more likely to rise on the
agenda than items that do not meet such conditions. The turnover of key participants,
such as a change in the administration, has powerful effects on policy agendas. When the
arrival of a new administration also signals changes in the political system, as was the
case in Thailand, the effects are particularly acute.
The separate streams of problems, policies, and politics come together at certain
critical times. The streams can be coupled, argues Kingdon, when either a major change
in the political stream occurs, or a sensational event takes place which may briefly open a
"window of opportunity." Thus agendas are set by politics or problems, and alternatives
are generated in the policy stream. Policy entrepreneurs are the critical participants who
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take advantage of the window of opportunity and join the streams. They are willing to
invest their resources in order to raise awareness for a particular issue. Policy
entrepreneurs must have multiple skills. They must not only persuade the leading policy
makers in the government; they also must be effective brokers, negotiators and make
critical couplings among the media, politicians, interest groups, and the public (Kingdon
1984, 192). The government agenda is set in the problem or political streams, but as a
consequence of coupling the streams at the appropriate time, the chance that an item will
rise to the decision agenda is enhanced.
Kingdon's Work on Participants
Kingdon also describes the potential impact that each participant can have on the
policy making process which is partly dependent on the resources available to the
participant and whether the participant affects the agendas, alternative choices or both
(Kingdon 1984, 23). His discussion of participants is helpful to the present research
because it stresses the importance of considering the array of actors involved in agenda
setting activities. In the case of AIDS policy development in Thailand, there are numerous
parties that need to be examined and Kingdon provides helpful tools that assist in this
investigation.
Kingdon separates the participants into those inside the government and those
outside the government. He describes how and why each participant may affect the
process. Kingdon concludes that cutting across the processes are two general groupings of
participants. One is the visible cluster--those participants who receive a lot of press and
public attention--including the president and his high-level appointees, prominent
members of congress, the media, and such elections-related actors as political parties and
campaigns. The relatively hidden cluster includes such specialists as academics and
researchers, career bureaucrats, congressional staffers, and administration appointees
below the top level. Interest groups were found to be active in both clusters, with some of
their activities very public and others hardly visible at all. Kingdon concludes that agenda
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setting was found to be affected by the visible cluster of participants, while the generation
of alternatives occurs more in the hidden cluster (Kingdon 1984, 72).
Lindblom and Woodhouse's Research
Although Kingdon's model provides the primary theoretical framework, additional
research is also included to strengthen the analysis of this study. An obvious limitation to
applying Kingdon's research on participants to the Thai case is the fact that it is based on
the presidential system while Thailand has a parliamentary political system. Therefore,
Kingdon's work is supplemented with research by Charles E. Lindblom and Edward J.
Woodhouse. In their book, The Policy-Making Process (1993), they analyze both
conventional governmental institutions and the broader social forces constraining policy
making, particularly the political role of business. Its value to this research is enhanced by




THE PREM PERIOD (1984 to August 1988)
INTRODUCTION
The first case of AIDS was recorded in 1984 while Prime Minister Prem
Tinsulanonda was in power. 1 Due to the long latency period of the AIDS infection and
limited HIV testing, from 1984 to 1987 only a handful of AIDS infected persons were
discovered. Many of these first cases were identified as homosexuals and foreigners.
Once AIDS became associated with these groups, it has been very difficult to alter these
perceptions. In spite of the mounting evidence that the epidemic was spreading in
Thailand, denial was rampant during the Prem period. Most Thais refused to believe that
AIDS could be a Thai disease or infect "normal" Thais.
During the initial stage, apart from some individual researchers and officials in the
MOPH, few in the government acknowledged the coming epidemic. However, these early
proponents of policy development were able to establish the AIDS issue on the systematic
agenda. Members of the MOPH began taking some basic measures that set the foundation
for future programs and policies. The foremost accomplishments were establishing a
national advisory committee on AIDS, implementing a short-term program on the
prevention and control of AIDS, and initiating the design of a national medium-term plan.
Nonetheless, the prevention and control activities were primarily limited to periodic
testing and educating IVDUs and CSWs.
Nineteen Eighty Seven was a pivotal year for the AIDS epidemic in Thailand
because of the discovery of an increasing number of infected persons and because it was
1 Prem was in power from 1981 to 1988. In August 1988, his government was replaced by the
Chatichai Choonhaven led government.
"Visit Thailand Year." As evidence that the epidemic was spreading began to surface,
there was strong pressure to suppress such information from those concerned with the
loss of tourist revenues. Pressure was exerted not only by members of the business
community, but also by politicians--many who were dependent on the support of the
business community and many who had business interests as well.
Government representatives publicly reacted by underestimating the threat of the
epidemic and dismissing the relevance of the testing results. Moreover, neither top-level
commitment on the part of the government or significant financial support was given.
Prime Minister Prem never publicly recognized the threat of the epidemic which is vital
for policy development. Consequently, many believe that the development of policies was
delayed and that "Thailand emerged from this period with the seeds of an epidemic firmly
planted" (The Nation, 10-13-91).
Participants outside the government, including the media, academicians, the royal
family and activists such as Mechai Veravaidya, all advocated more thorough anti-AIDS
measures. As established and respected members of society, these participants lent
credibility to the anti-AIDS battle. The WHO also became very instrumental in providing
financial and technical support at the end of the period.
During the first half of 1988, testing of IVDUs in Bangkok revealed an
exponential increase in the number of HIV infected persons. However, it would not be
until the start of the Chatichai administration in August 1988, that the government
intensified policy development efforts.
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THE EARLY STAGES OF THE EPIDEMIC
Initial Cases
The first case of full-blown AIDS was reported in Thailand in August 1984
(Praphan 1985). In 1985, the AIDS Registrar recorded eleven cases: one AIDS, five ARC
and five HIV. In 1986, there was a slight increase of reported cases to 18: eight ARC and
ten HIV (Vichai 1990).2 From 1984 to 1986 almost all of the identified AIDS cases, and
most of the HIV cases, were foreigners or homosexual/ bisexual Thai males who had
relationships with foreigners. 3
In early 1985 and 1986, small scale pilot surveys were conducted by the Venereal
Disease Control Division among the expected high risk groups at two tourist locations:
the beach resort of Pattaya and the Patpong area in Bangkok. The assumption was that the
female and male CSWs in those areas would acquire HIV from infected foreigners. At the
same time, the Division of Epidemiology also surveyed homosexual men, CSWs,
prisoners, intravenous drug users, and thalassemic patients (Prasert 1989).
The results of HIV testing in the tourist areas, however, revealed very few cases.
Eight serosurveys were conducted on male CSWs in Patpong and Pattaya in 1985-86.
Testing revealed 19 HIV infected persons or 0.8 % of those who were tested (Khanchit
1991). Female CSWs were also tested in those locations; in 1985-86 no cases were
identified and only one case in 1987 (Suwanagool 1988). Dr. Praphan Phanaphak, an
AIDS expert from the Thai Red Cross, stressed that HIV testing in Pattaya of several
thousand female prostitutes failed to identify a single positive testing (Inter Press Service,
9-11-87). Among IVDUs, the AIDS Registrar recorded only five HIV cases in 1985-86.
2 The government established the AIDS Registrar in 1985. Medical personal were required to report all
cases of infected persons to the registrar.
3 In 1984 a bisexual Thai male was the first recorded case. Also in 1984, a homosexual foreigner
was identified as an AIDS carrier. In 1985, one AIDS infected person was identified as a bi-sexual
Thai and three as foreigners. During 1985 and 1986, six IVDUs were found to be HIV positive but
none with full-blown AIDS. From May to August 1987, six more AIDS cases were reported in
Thailand. They were all classified as homosexual Thai males and the infections were mostly
acquired abroad.
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Furthermore, a nation-wide serosurvey of IVDUs was conducted from 1985 to 1987 and
found one percent of those tested to be HIV infected (Ramasoot 1989). In addition, by
1987, approximately 50,000 Thai blood donors were tested and none were found to be
infected (Prasert 1988).
Complacency and Denial
By early 1987, there had only been a handful of AIDS cases observed,
predominantly IVDUs and men who had homosexual sex. Throughout 1987 officials
continued to reassure the public, tourists and themselves that AIDS was not a threat.
Officials stated that very few cases were found and none recently. In addition, those
seeking to quell rising fears in Thailand often relied on comparisons with western nations
where the epidemic was much more severe. Dr. Tira Ramasoot, Deputy Chief of CDC
Department, observed that AIDS cases in Europe and the United States were doubling
every year, but reiterated: "The AIDS situation in Thailand is under control because no
new cases have been reported in the past two years" (Bangkok Post, 1-20-87). These
announcements reinforced the belief that Thais should not be concerned with the 'foreign'
disease.
What they conveniently failed to recognize was that AIDS came late to Asia.
While the first case of AIDS was discovered in Thailand in 1984, AIDS had been
spreading in the United States years before. Many also neglected to acknowledge that due
to the long latency period--from six to twelve years between the time of HIV infection
and the onset of AIDS--the number of AIDS cases did not truly represent the actual
spread of the epidemic. What this lag provided, however, was a sense of well being for
Thais at a time when the epidemic was spreading rapidly and many Thais were at risk.
While it is true that the number of infected persons was still relatively few, there
were clear indications that the government was being less than straight forward in their
reporting. The Asia Magazine reported: "Since the last confirmed case, diagnosed more
than 18 months ago, no new cases have been reported. Some interpret this as good
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fortune; others infer a campaign of disinformation designed to lesson the impact of AIDS
publicity on Thailand's vital tourism industry, which is itself based in part on sexual lure"
(Asia Magazine, 5-3-87).
Officials misled the public and down-played the AIDS threat by discounting the
relevance of ARC and HIV infection. "There were six cases reported in 1985 and those
have been the only cases reported so far," said Dr. Winit Asavena, Director-General of
the CDC Department, MOPH. "There have been more than 20 seropositive [HIV cases]
reported, but none of them can be called a case of AIDS. They have not developed the
disease" (Bangkok Post, 2-8-87). The Inter Press Service (IPS) reported that confusion
over the actual number of AIDS infected reflects the history of the Thai government's
attempts to keep the issue from making headlines. When reports were released in early
1987 revealing that there had been no new cases of AIDS in the last 18 months, a Thai
doctor anonymously told IPS that there had been seven new cases of AIDS-related
Complex (ARC) in 1986-87 (IPS, 9-11-87).
Government Denies Situation as Data Continues to Surface
In spite of the government's attempts to limit publicity related to the AIDS
epidemic, in 1987 testing results began to surface which showed that the disease was
indeed spreading. By the end of 1987, a total of 20 AIDS/ARC and 171 HIV cases were
reported to the AIDS Registrar. Of those 136, or 71%, were IVDUs (Vichai 1990).
Ironically, Dr. Chirayu Isarangkura na Ayuthaya, a politician and member of the
cabinet, was responsible for one of the government's first highly publicized releases of
information which indicated a drastic increase in the spread of the epidemic. Dr. Chirayu,
a Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), announced that Thailand had 81
confirmed cases of AIDS. Dr. Chirayu said he was confirming the figures because the
benefits from tourism could not compensate for public health (Bangkok Post, 7-22-87).
Although Dr. Chirayu believed that by releasing the information he was
responsibly performing his duty, the government opposed the announcement. The
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following day the government issued a statement that AIDS was not prevalent in
Thailand. It qualified Dr. Chirayu's announcement by again arguing that persons with
HIV and ARC should not be considered as part of the AIDS epidemic. According to the
statement, HIV infected persons and those suffering from ARC, were not classified as
full-blown AIDS patients and were under the close supervision of physicians and MOPH
officials. It stressed that the number of people suffering from AIDS-like conditions and
the deadly disease was small. In the government statement, Minister Chirayu's clarified
his previous announcement by emphasizing that the number of people suffering from
AIDS at present was four--all male homosexuals. The statement stressed that the 81
persons that were previously reported as infected with the AIDS virus were, therefore, not
all AIDS patients. The AIDS situation in Thailand at that time was said to be under
control, according to the statement (Bangkok Post, 7-23-87).
Even though Dr. Chirayu's original announcement evidenced a crack in the
government's position, his subsequent remarks were misleading because they implied that
HIV infection was controllable. Shortly before he resigned, Dr. Chirayu explained that of
the 81 AIDS cases, 66 were in the primary stage at which the disease could be controlled.
"If Dr. Chirayu's figures are true, then he meant that we now have 66 asymptomatic
carriers in Thailand, but he was wrong when he said these cases could be controlled," said
one public health academician. "How can we control these asymptomatic carriers if the
public is not made aware of the facts?" (Bangkok Post, 8-4-87).
The MOPH also reported that most of these victims were not foreign tourists or
CSWs. The statement made certain that foreigners were not implicated, to protect
tourism, and CSWs, to avoid panic in the general population since the majority of Thai
males visit CSWs. A senior health academician commented that while Dr. Chirayu said
most AIDS patients found in Thailand were not prostitutes of either sex, "This is the first
stage of the disease in Thailand, and the disease is only at the incubation period. But only
a few cases involving prostitutes are sufficient to cause wide-spread disease. Many health
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officials still insist that we need to educate these people who we call service girls and
gays" (Bangkok Post, 8-4-87).
High HIV Prevalence in Bangkok IVDUs Community
In August 1987, front page articles were again filled with reports of another
discovery of AIDS infected persons; this time in a Bangkok jail. The Bangkok Post
published a large front page article that revealed: "Some 49 prisoners including nine
foreigners who were found infected with AIDS have been isolated to prevent the spread
of the deadly disease. The prison officials said that the carriers of AIDS were detected by
blood testing of Bang Khwang's 7,000 inmates" (Bangkok Post, 8-7-87). The
government's reaction was to discard the problem as one confined to the prisons and
initiated by foreign IVDUs. Moreover, since the reported cases were still very low
compared to those in the West, AIDS should not be perceived as a threat to Thailand.
In early 1988, the discovery of an increasing number of HIV infected persons
continued, primarily in the IVDUs community. The Permanent Secretary of Public
Health, Pairote Ningsanont announced that HIV carriers among IVDUs in Bangkok had
increased dramatically. He reported just nine AIDS cases and 27 cases of persons with
ARC. He added, however, that there were also 461 HIV infected persons of which 258, or
56%, were IVDUs (Bangkok Post, 3-31-88).
A Diseases of Foreigners and Homosexuals
In 1987, the idea that AIDS only affects marginal populations was promoted by
the government. The disease was blamed on foreigners and homosexuals and activities
carried out by the government were targeted toward these communities. When reporting
new ARC and AIDS cases, Dr. Winit Asavena, Director-General of the CDC Department,
stressed that they were foreigners and "active homosexuals" that contracted the disease
from foreigners (Bangkok Post, 6-6-87).
The CDC department undertook testing, research and prevention activities in
areas with perceived high-risk groups, including Bangkok's Patpong area, Pattaya, Chiang
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Mai, Phuket and Hat Yai (Bangkok Post, 7-23-87). These areas are well-known as being
destinations for sex tourists and employing male commercial sex workers. "It has been
shown that this disease is more easily passed from men to other men rather than men to
women ... all of the cases were homosexuals," said Dr. Winit Asavena. "We considered
the Patpong area high-risk in which there are many gays. And Pattaya where there are
many foreigners" (Bangkok Post, 2-8-87). When the MOPH requested funds from WHO,
Dr. Winit explained that the money was needed to look for people who were HIV positive
in the tourist provinces of Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Chonburi (Pattaya) and Phuket
(Bangkok Post, 7-23-87).
At this point, the Thai government's AIDS educational focus was limited to
CSWs, primarily male; the general public had been excluded from the information
campaign. Furthermore, when questioned over the orientation of the educational
campaigns, Dr. Winit Asavena replied, "I think foreigners are well aware of the need to
use condoms" (Bangkok Post, 2-8-87).
A change of leadership in the CDC in mid-1987 did little to affect the stated
policy which targeted homosexuals and foreigners. The new Director-General of CDC
Department, Dr. Uthai Susak, explained that tests were being conducted on key target
areas such as a Patpong clinic for homosexuals and places of entertainment known to be
frequented by foreigners. He added, "We have covered the main high-risk spots; I think
additional tests elsewhere would not reveal that many more cases. AIDS after all is not
locally originated and thus hardly found in places frequented by Thais" (FEER, 11-5-87).
Even a leading AIDS expert, Dr. Praphan Phanaphak, alluded to AIDS as being a
homosexual disease. The Asia Magazine reported that Dr. Praphan co-authored a paper
which recommended the shutting down of gay bars as a partial measure to control the
spread of the disease in Thailand. Later he became convinced of the futility of such a
gesture because half of the "professional gays"--the bar workers--who tested positive, had
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accepted health department suggestions that they find new forms of employment (Asia
Magazine, 5-3-87).
The belief that AIDS was a foreigner's disease led to attempts at regulating the
movements of tourists. Public Health and Environmental Committee chairman Prasong
Buranapong said an agreement should be established that travelers be certified AIDS-free
before being allowed to leave their countries. The measure, said Dr. Prasong, would not
affect the international tourist industry but could effectively prevent the spread of AIDS
(Bangkok Post, 7-23-87).
Thai society embraced the beliefs as propagated by government officials and the
media. Foreigners and those associated with foreigners were thus stigmatized as being
possible AIDS carriers. Even a famous Bangkok massage went to the extent of banning
Caucasians clients, on the conventional presumption that AIDS was largely a Western
import (FEER, 11-5-87). The male CSWs, who mainly service foreign clientele, were
also labeled as AIDS carriers and many faced added discrimination when returning to
mainstream society.4
Government Against National Campaign to Avoid Panic
In 1987 the government's stated position concerning AIDS was that it recognized
the possible dangers, was taking the appropriate measures and did not want cause an
over-reaction. "We do not use mass education because it might cause the public to panic
as happened in the US," said Dr. Winit Asavena, Director-General of the CDC
Department, MOPH. "We have one (pamphlet) for the people most effected by AIDS like
prostitutes. We will not go to the general public. Not yet. If other cases start appearing,
that is another matter, but right now we have no plan to increase the campaign. We are
4 Kamnuan Ungchusak of the AIDS Division explains that male CSWs are often 'straight'--not
homosexuals--but work as CSWs for primarily economic reasons. They usually work for only a
short period of time (Kamnuan 1993). Khancit Limpakamjanarat Director of the HIV/AIDS
Collaboration added that the male CSWs are preferentially hetrosexual, often having wives or
steady girlfriends (Khanchit 1991).
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concerned about the reaction of the Thai people. The situation is not serious now. We do
not want them to be afraid of something that has not happened, even though it could."
Were the disease to find firmer footing in Thailand, Dr. Winit told the Bangkok Post in
January 1987, the campaign might have to be extended (Bangkok Post, 2-8-87). A
Bangkok-based representative of WHO explained, "I think their main wish is to avoid the
sort of panic and inaccuracies that always attend a major story (AIDS) like this. For our
part, we're getting very good cooperation from Thai authorities" (Asia Magazine, 5-3-
87).5
Nonetheless, in late 1987, the Ministry started to alter its stance. It recognized the
fact that AIDS education campaigns were necessary but still warned that Thais should be
prepared for a reaction of panic similar to that which occurred in the West. Public Health
Under-Secretary Dr. Pairote Ningsonont told a media seminar on October 12th: "Like (the
situation in) most other western countries, the initial period of public shock here is
inevitable. But we want the public to correctly understand the extent and nature of the
problem so that they can take proper preventative measures. We don't want the people to
be overly panicky" (FEER, 11-5-87). Cohen pointed out that only when the government's
policy of "avoiding panic" became counter-productive, and an AIDS scare broke out, did
the authorities reorient their policy towards one which pays more appropriate
consideration to the protection of public health (Cohen 1988).
5 Only a few months later the WHO sources suggested that the public panic over AIDS may
indeed be a very healthy state of consciousness to promote awareness. The rationale being that
only people who are genuinely fearful of dying a horrible death, and passing the virus to their
children would take precautions (Bangkok Post, 7-29-87).
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POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Although there was little evidence that an epidemic was imminent, in 1985, the
MOPH took some initial measures to deal with the AIDS issue. On May 1, 1985, the
MOPH issued Ministerial Announcement Number 2, under the Communicable Diseases
Control Act (1980), to classify AIDS as a reportable disease. The stated aim of this
announcement was to assist in case detection and prevent further transmission of AIDS. It
led to the establishment of the Registrar of Reported AIDS Cases (AIDS Registrar) under
the responsibility of the Division of Epidemiology. 6 All health agencies in Thailand were
required to report AIDS, ARC and HIV positive cases to the AIDS Registrar. The
reporting system was intended to be confidential. Also, in August 1985, a National
Advisory Committee on AIDS was established (Prasert 1989). It was chaired by the
director-general of the CDC.7
Thailand's National AIDS Programme began in 1987 following a cabinet decision
to develop a national response to the AIDS epidemic (Medium Term Programme Review
1991). In October 1987, the MOPH established "The Centre for Prevention and Control
of AIDS" at the division level under the CDC Department. It was responsible for
administrating activities aimed at controlling AIDS. Initially, the Venereal Disease
Division had been the responsible government unit for anti-AIDS activities (Prasert
1989).
The composition of the National Advisory Committee on AIDS was revised in
November 1987 to comprise of health administrators, lawyers and technical experts. The
responsibilities of this committee were to coordinate and cooperate among the institutions
concerned in the prevention and control of AIDS, to give advice on research issues, and
6 The Division of Epidemilogy is located in the Center for Disease Control Department, Minstry
of Public Health.
7 In subsequent years the committee changed its leadership, orientation, size and composition of
committeee members. It would later be chaired by the Permanent-Secretary of Public Health, the
Minister of Public Health and finally the Prime Minister.
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to appoint ad-hoc committees to study specific critical issues (Prasert, 1989) Moreover,
three additional subcommittees were designated: Subcommittee on Public Relations,
Subcommittee on Technical Aspects, and Subcommittee on Data Collection and
Information.
To protect the blood supply the MOPH added the regulation that convicts and
IVDUs must be tested for HIV if they wanted to give blood, said Tira Ramasoot, Deputy
Chief of CDC Department (Bangkok Post, 1-20-87). By mid-1987, additional objectives
aimed at combating AIDS were being advocated by the government including: reducing
the gay community, testing high-risk groups and requiring foreigners entering the country
to have AIDS-free certificates. However, critics such as Bangkok Post columnist, Wan
Buranasutr, argued that these objectives indicated that the government still did not
understand the parameters of the disease or its threat to Thailand (Bangkok Post, 7-29-
87). Henry George wrote in the Bangkok Post that "the screening of foreigners may
respond to the politicians need to be seen doing something, however ludicrously
ineffectual, and it may appease xenophobic nationalism. But it can only give the country a
false sense of security" (Bangkok Post, 8-11-87).
A major development in 1988 was the implementation of a short-term AIDS
program. It received technical and financial support from the WHO. Then on August 27,
1988, the cabinet approved the Medium Term Programme for the Prevention and Control
of AIDS: 1989-91 which the CDC and the MOPH were responsible for developing
(MOPH, January 1991). Other measures that were being implemented in early 1988
included: providing information to IVDUs in drug rehabilitation clinics, discouraging
IVDU use, encouraging condom use, urging AIDS carriers to discontinue giving blood




In July 1987, a parliamentary committee, the Standing Committee on Health and
Environment, first addressed the AIDS issue when the chairman of the committee,
Prasong Buranapong, asked the Director-General of the CDC, Dr. Winit Asavena, and
technical experts from universities to give a brief review on the AIDS situation in
Thailand. Then the MOPH, backed by the house committee, requested a special budget
from the government in order to implement its immediate plan of action on AIDS
prevention and control. In a letter to Budget Scrutiny Chairman Suthee Singsaneh, Health
Panel Chairman Paitoon Mokkamakul said quick and systematic measures against AIDS
needed to be established. The MOPH also stressed to the Budget Scrutinizing Committee
that more money was needed to stem the spread of AIDS (Bangkok Post, 8-22-87).
As a result, the Thai government designated approximately US $1.72 million for
the 1987 to 1990 fiscal years (Prasert 1989). In 1988, however, the government's actual
contribution was only US $180,000.8 In comparison the WHO donated US $500,000 in
support of the short-term plan against AIDS which it helped design (AIDS Division
1993). In fact, until 1991, the majority of funds were from external sources including
international organizations (WHO), bilateral aid (USAID), and non government
organizations (UNICEF).
8 Most often, the budget for the following year is debated and approved in the parliment during
the second half of each year Therefore, the budget reflects the views of the period that it was





Tourism Sector's Importance to the Economy
The Thai government has actively promoted tourism as a leading sector of the
economy since the early 1980s. At that time, the Thai economy was going through a
recessionary period as a result of a world-wide slump in primary product prices.
Consequently, Thailand was forced to undergo major structural adjustments in its
economy. Policies emphasized diversification from the agricultural sector and a greater
role for the manufacturing and service sectors in the economy. The tourism industry was
targeted for growth because of its potential to earn a great deal of foreign exchange in the
short-run. In 1982, tourism surpassed rice exports as the largest earner of foreign
exchange. By 1985 tourism earned approximately US $1.2 billion in foreign exchanged
compared to approximately US $0.8 billion for rice (Bank of Thailand 1986).
Blocking AIDS from the Political Agenda
Even before 1987, when there were only a few reported cases, there was growing
sentiment that AIDS could adversely affect tourism revenues and, consequently, was
potentially debilitating to the economy. In September 1985, as the AIDS hysteria found
vent in press columns, the then health minister--a political appointee--issued a warning
that frequent and unnecessary publicity could irreparably harm tourism. His concerned
had been raised by extensive media coverage given to a government testing campaign
carried out in Pattaya (Asia Magazine, 5-3-87).
By 1987, Visit Thailand Year, the tourism sector's importance to the Thai
economy had multiplied; Tourism accounted for US $1.9 billion in foreign exchange
compared to US $.9 billion for rice exports. As the economic stakes increased and the
AIDS threat became more formidable, leaders in both the private and public sectors began
to realize that they would need to protect economic interests. Key leaders reasoned that
even acknowledging the spread of AIDS could be detrimental to the industry. Professor
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Debanom Muangman, then Dean of Public Health at Mahidol University and an advisor
to the MOPH, said that Prime Minister Prem threatened to expel the Minister of Public
Health from the government if he publicized the growing epidemic (Debanom 1993).
Lack of Government Action
Due to this approach, the government did not act as quick as was evidently
necessary. The media was particularly quick to point out that the development of policy
was delayed through much of 1987. Columnist Wan Buranasutr wrote, "Only six months
ago, government officials were excusing their inaction because they did not want to panic
the public. Those precious months of postponing action to deal with what is rapidly
becoming a national emergency" (Bangkok Post, 7-29-87). Anti-AIDS campaigner
Sommatra Troy also believed that the government was reluctant to launch extensive
testing, fearing that additional discovery would adversely affect the booming tourist trade
(FEER, 11-5-87).
The perception that the government was guilty of not establishing substantial anti-
AIDS programs in 1987 has persisted. An article in the British Medical Journal claimed
that early public education efforts were ignored--some say suppressed--by government
fears about adverse effects on foreign tourism (Anderson, 2-17-90). While the Lancet
later proclaimed:
"During 1987, little was achieved in terms of educating either those in
the tourist industry or the population as a whole about AIDS. It was
"Visit Thailand Year," and although health workers, groups working
with prostitutes, and Mechai's Population and Community Develop-
ment Association (PDA) had tried to begin campaigning work on the
issue, activities were severely restricted by the government's belief
that publicity about AIDS would affect the tourist industry. Tourism is
Thailand's primary earner of foreign currency." (The Lancet, 3-31-
90)
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Others believe that not only did the government fail to acknowledge the potential
crisis, but efforts to promote tourism by selling sex were intensified. 9 The Tourist
Authority of Thailand (TAT), the responsible agency for promoting tourism, has been
frequently blamed for placing financial objectives over social issues. An editorial in The
Nation newspaper reflects the common belief that the TAT was guilty of using sex to
attract tourists:
"1987 was Visit Thailand Year, the government's all-out effort to put
the country on the map for fun and sun seeking holidayers. It was a
veritable public relations orgy, an extravaganza of commercialism,
featuring glossy posters depicted everything up for sale from spotless
white beaches to luscious tropical jungles, from colourful cultural
events to beautiful Thai women in the traditional posture of greeting.
The most infamous attraction, of course was sex, though the TAT
continues to deny vigorously critics' accusation of promoting sex
tourism. TAT has some justification this claim as none of the
literature referred to outright prostitution. But beaches and attractive
beckoning women subtitled with phrases like "the land of smiles
welcomes you," were extremely suggestive." (The Nation, 10-13-91)
Openness as an Option
The belief that a frank, open policy concerning AIDS and sustained growth in the
tourism sector were incompatible was not an unanimous opinion. Mechai Veravaidya
argued that a forthright approach would not scare away foreign tourists because it
demonstrated the commitment in Thailand to fighting the spread of AIDS. Dr. Debanom
agreed:
"I know this is Visit Thailand Year and many agencies do not want to
do anything to spoil it but to give out proper information may be
beneficial to all concerned. We should point out that AIDS cases in
Thailand are still small in number, and we want to do everything
possible to prevent AIDS from becoming widespread. Foreigners
would understand, and may even be appreciative of Thai efforts to try
to protect them because service girls, or even boys, may render their
9 The relationship between tourism and the sex industry is well-documented. There are two
prongs which to promote tourism, explains Srisang; one is to sell the physical and cultural beauty
of the country, and the other, is to sell the "service attraction" of the Thai people. The service
attraction inescapably includes the sex-related services (Srisang 1990).
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services to many tourists. If tourists know that the girls or gays with
whom they are about to be sexually engaged have been properly
informed and equipped with knowledge about AIDS, they may feel a
lot better and safer while in Thailand." (Bangkok Post, 8-4-87)
The Asia Magazine reported that Dr. Praphan had denied that the government was
being less than open with AIDS information and also maintained that if the facts of the
matter were taken at face value, tourism to Thailand would, in fact, be enhanced. "We
haven't had any cases at all for quite some time," he said. "And in our surveys of several
thousand female prostitutes, we failed to find a single positive testing. It seems to me the
that sort of information might well act as a lure to those foreigners looking for a sexual
vacation" (Asia Magazine, 5-3-87).
Women's Groups Become Active
In addition to activists such as Mechai and Troy, women's groups first became
involved in 1987. The Nation would later report that since women's groups were incensed
by the government's tacit acknowledgment of the commercial sex industry during Visit
Thailand Year, they focused their concern over the AIDS issue on the four million-odd
foreigners who arrived in the country (The Nation, 10-13-91). In mid-1987, a group of
Thais and foreigners gathered in front of the TAT offices to protest against tourism
promotion which they claimed was luring AIDS carriers into the country. Accusing the
government of placing tourism before public health, the group said the authorities must
stop covering up the truth about the AIDS situation in Thailand, and promote public
awareness of AIDS (Bangkok Post, 7-23-87). When women's groups linked AIDS to the
commercial sex industry, the government reaction was to dismiss the connection.
Leaders Continue to Down Play the Threat
Even as a few dozen Thai and foreigners died from AIDS in Thailand--including
commercial sex workers and homosexuals--the magnitude of the AIDS threat was
discounted. From the Prime Minister on down, the government and its representatives
continued to diminish its potential impact. Prem responded to inquires about AIDS by
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dismissing it as being "just like any other disease." In defense of the criticism that they
were inactive in their prevention efforts, the government found it convenient to quote past
tests results as evidence that they were doing enough to handle the epidemic. In fact,
elated by the economic gains both for national and private interests, the Prem government
extended the international promotion campaigns of Visit Thailand Year an additional six
months (FEER, 11-2-89).
Media
In 1987 the increase of media coverage reflected, in part, the news worthiness of
the AIDS epidemic. The media became instrumental in publicizing AIDS-related
information including findings on AIDS/HIV prevalence, educational messages, and
demands for mass campaigns against AIDS (Bangkok Post, 1-20-87). Some of these
demands were stimulated by the release of the Panos Dossier, AIDS in the Third World,
which implored nations to take immediate action to ward off the impending epidemic
(Bangkok Post, 1-25-87). The media also served as a mouthpiece for participants both in
and out of the government to voice their opinions.
One of the first AIDS stories presented to the mass public was that of Mr. Cha-on
Suasoom and his wife Mrs. Bang-on who were fired from the Pioneer International
Company because the husband had tested HIV positive. The assistant manager for
Pioneer explained that they were fired because their presence might ruin the firm's image
and create alarm among workers who do not fully understand the disease. The Bangkok
Post ran a front page article on the plight of the two laborers. This story and the
accompanying photo presented an AIDS infected person with a Thai identity for the first
time (Bangkok Post, 9-11-87).
Unfortunately, many of the AIDS-related articles in the press were sensational in
nature. For example, when Ms. Spun Selakhun, a popular model, allegedly tested HIV
positive, the media released numerous related stories and articles. A rumor accompanied
the stories that she was a high-class call girl and she soon became a social outcast. The
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Far Eastern Economic Review reported that the story, "Sent shivers through the ranks of
Bangkok's yuppies and social elite, whose favorite pastimes include chasing models and
beauty queens" (FEER, 11-5-87). Although it was later discovered that she was HIV
negative, this was the first time that a well-known Thai was associated as an infected
person. Similar to the role of Rock Hudson in the United States, this case brought the
AIDS epidemic much closer to home for many people who did not personally know
anyone with the disease.
In late 1987, the Far Eastern Economic Review wrote that after weeks of
sensational AIDS stories and subsequent reaction, "the AIDS scare in Thailand seems to
have reached a point of national panic" (FEER, 11-5-87). The government's response was
to reiterate that it did not want AIDS publicity because it only contributed to fear and
panic. When asked if the government's campaign involved television, radio or
newspapers, Dr. Winit Asavena, Director-General of the CDC Department, said,
"Newspapers put it [articles on AIDS] in themselves. We do not want that" (Bangkok
Post, 2-8-87).
Academics
Academics were some of the first to recognize that the threat of AIDS would not
be limited to homosexuals and foreigners and that the government's response was
insufficient to limit the spread of the epidemic. Bangkok Post columnist, Suporn
Pornsrisuk, wrote that despite attempts by various authorities to play down the
importance of AIDS, it was rapidly becoming an issue of concern among health
academicians. Unfortunately the concern stopped there--among academicians--and was
not shared by the general public who, if properly educated and more aware of the disease,
would have been able to play a vital role in preventing the deadly disease from spreading,
added Suporn (Bangkok Post, 8-4-87). After Minister Chirayu's announcement of an
increase in AIDS cases and the government's subsequent denial, health academicians
spoke out and attempted to clarify the ambiguous messages coming from the government.
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"It is ridiculous that government officials try to play it down and usually keep mum about
the issue when it comes up in discussion. To avoid talking about it doesn't mean it will go
away," commented one senior health academician (Bangkok Post, 8-4-87).
Non-Government Organizations
Nineteen Eighty Seven was also the first year that NGOs became participants. In
particular the Population and Community Development Association (PDA) became
involved. 10 The PDA launched a campaign to educate the public about AIDS. Education
was the most effective weapon, Mechai said. "Even though the number of people with
AIDS is still low, education for the public as well as high-risk groups is essential to
prevent the plague." Mechai had PDA members trained as educators and sent them to
schools, government agencies and businesses to educate teachers, students, officials and
employees on request (Bangkok Post, 8-27-87). At this time, the Anti-AIDS Foundation
was also established to help AIDS patients in Thailand (Bangkok Post, 11-11-87). In
addition, several popular music bands organized an AIDS concert, to help raise funds for
the AIDS Foundation (The Nation, 1-19-88). A dance troupe led by activist, Natee
Teerajjanapongs, began giving performances for the gay community in order to raise
AIDS awareness (Natee 1993).
The Thai Royal Family
Another milestone was public acknowledgment and support for anti-AIDS
measures by the well-respected Thai Royal family. It was Princess Chulabhorn, the King's
youngest daughter, who called for cooperative research efforts to seek ways to protect the
Thai people from the threat of AIDS (Bangkok Post, 7-22-87).
10 The PDA is one of Thailand's largest NGOs and is led by high-profile activist Mechai




THE CHATICHAI PERIOD (August 1988 to February 1991)
INTRODUCTION
During the Chatichai Period, both the AIDS epidemic and policies aimed at
controlling the disease transformed rapidly. Initially HIV infection was limited to the
"marginal" or "high risk" groups, but by the end of the period infection in the general
populace was evident. Policy developments, increased budget allocation and alterations in
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven's public stance also had transitory characteristics.
The government's position shifted from one that denied the threat of AIDS and closely
guarded relevant information towards one of recognition and openness. However, a more
rapid transformation was stalled by key participants who struggled to keep AIDS
publicity at a minimum.
During the Chatichai Administration, a rapid spread of the epidemic occurred: In
1988, IVDUs became the first population to have high rates of HIV infection; In 1989,
there was an exponential spread in CSW industry--first in the North and later throughout
the nation; and By 1990, there was clear evidence that HIV was also being transmitted to
the general populace. Fortunately, policies aimed at combating the epidemic were
developed. Prime Minister Chatichai successfully elevated the AIDS issue from the
systematic agenda to the government agenda. A substantial increase in funding to the
national AIDS program by the government in 1990 reflected the growing commitment.
Nonetheless, the prime minister stopped short of giving his unconditional public support
to fighting the epidemic which is necessary to raise the issue on to the government
agenda.
At this time, the MOPH was the central agency responsible for coordinating the
national AIDS program. It was instrumental in choosing from the various policy
alternatives and in implementing policy. The major policy developments of this period
were the establishment of a medium-term program and implementation of the sentinel
surveillance system. Other significant achievements included: testing blood donations,
educating CSWs and IVDUs, and condom promotion and distribution. There were also
notable improvements in the coordination of efforts between agencies. For the most part,
however, the MOPH's measures were narrow in scope and limited to legal and medical
solutions. The major proposed legislation, the so-called "AIDS-bill," planned to use
classical contagious disease control methods such as confinement of infected persons and
mandatory testing.
The latter half of 1989, marked a turning point in the development of AIDS
policies as key participants joined in publicly promoting more advanced and candid
measures. With the knowledge that the government was becoming more liberal in its
attitude towards the development of policy, Princess Chulabhorn, Public Health Minister
Chuan Leekpai and activist Mechai Veravaidya lent their credibility and prestige to the
anti-AIDS campaign. These well-respected participants were able to raise awareness and
initiate change. They were joined by a growing number of NGOs that became involved
when HIV infection spread into the communities in which they operate and due to
concern over human rights issues. International organizations remained instrumental in
providing technical and financial support--the majority of funds continued to be external
in origin. The media also played a vital role in educational efforts, raising awareness and
as a mouthpiece for other participants to voice their opinions. The media, however, was
still guilty of communicating sensational stories.
During this period, those advocating change continued to be opposed by powerful
interests, particularly in the tourism industry, who were concerned with adverse effects
that AIDS publicity might have on the economy as well as their own business concerns.
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These participants supported a limited and less publicized approach to the AIDS
dilemma. The Chatichai government, itself with extensive business interests, was a
coalition government dependent on strong economic performance. Consequently, the
business community was able to wield strong influence within the government.
EVIDENCE OF THE EPIDEMIC'S SPREAD
As the epidemic continued to spread rapidly in Thailand, studies, both
independent and governmental, were made public. By mid-1988, the results showed a
rapid increase of HIV prevalence among the IVDUs population. On May 15, 1988, the
Centre for the Prevention and Control of AIDS released a report which revealed that there
were 748 registered HIV and AIDS cases. Nearly ninety percent of the total cases were
IVDUs (CDC 1988). At the end of 1988, the AIDS Registrar reported 5075 infected
persons (only 27 AIDS/ARC cases) and 93% were IVDUs (Division of Epidemiology
1989).
In 1988, the majority of HIV infected persons were IVDUs in Bangkok. The first
volume of the Thai AIDS Journal presents the Bangkok Metropolitan Health
Department's testing results of IVDUs in four Bangkok districts (Pathum Wan, Huai
Kwang, Phra Khanong and Bang Khen). The tests disclosed seropositivity rates of greater
than 30% in February 1988 (Vanichseniertal 1989). According to the Bangkok
Metropolitan Administration (BMA), over a period of only six months in 1988, the
number of HIV infected heroin addicts in Bangkok increased from 15 to 43 percent.
Those who tested positive were drug users coming to BMA detoxification clinics for
treatment (The Nation, 10-13-91). The Thanyarak Hospital in Bangkok reported an
increase from one percent seropositivity in IVDUs in January to 32% by August 1988
(Uneklabh 1988).
In testing of female CSWs, from May 1985 through the end of 1988, all reported
serosurveys in Thailand detected nil infections, or rates less than one percent. However,
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by early 1989 there was evidence that the epidemic was spreading within the commercial
sex industry in Northern Thailand. For example, the Chiang Mai Provincial Health Office
reported that 208 AIDS cases had been discovered in Chiang Mai and 70% were from the
CSW population (The Nation, 2-25-89).
Sentinel Surveillance Survey
A major policy development occurred in June 1989 when the Epidemiology
Department of the MOPH conducted its first sentinel surveillance survey. This
standardized testing estimates the prevalence of HIV in certain risk groups. The sentinel
surveillance system is an indispensable tool for gauging the spread of the epidemic and
for formulating prevention and control strategies. The first survey tested samples from 14
cities and provinces, and the December 1989 survey included another 17 provinces. By
1990, it was extended to all provinces. The system tracks six groups in all provinces:
IVDUs, CSWs-low charge, CSWs-high charge, male STD patients, pregnant mothers and
blood donors. Male CSWs in Bangkok, and the provinces of Chonburi, Chiang Mai,
Phuket and Songkla--all popular spots for foreign tourists--are also tested.
The results of the June 1989 survey revealed that HIV infection had clearly
penetrated deep into particular risk groups especially in the northern provinces. In Chiang
Mai, 44% of the low-charge brothel based CSWs were infected with HIV (Division of
Epidemiology 1989). Moreover, by 1989, three percent of all blood donors in Chiang Mai
were HIV positive (Vithayasai 1990).1
The December 1989 sentinel survey found that the median percentage of HIV
infection in low-charge CSWs was 6.3% nationwide. Also, from June to December 1989,
1 The infection rate of blood donors is one indicator of the spread of HIV infection into the general
populace. It is only a rough estimate because it is confounded by false positives, high-risk donors
and prescreeeing affects. Other indicators of infection in the general public are the rates in new
army recuits and pregnant women. The recruits, however, may not be a representative sample
because they are likely to be from poorer families. Those from more advantaged families can
substitute service, similar to ROTC, while in high school or can pay their way out of
compulsarory service. The rate in pregnant mothers is considered the best gauge of infection in
the general populace. Thai males from all social and economic classes frequent CSWs and,
therefore, their girlfriends and wives are at risk.
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prevalence in high-charge CSWs increased from zero to 1.2% and males visiting STD
clinics rose from zero to two percent. The infection rate of blood donors at
Chulalongkorn Hospital increased dramatically from .12% to .69% in 1989. The
December 1989 survey also reported 30% median prevalency rates among IVDUs. The
infection rates were greatest, approximately 40%, in central and northeastern Thailand.
(Division of Epidemiology 1990).
By the end of 1989, there were 10,761 nationwide cases reported in the AIDS
Registrar--113 were AIDS and ARC cases. The greatest number of infected persons
continued to be IVDUs, 66%, but there was also a significant surge in seroconversion
through heterosexual contact, 20% (Division of Epidemiology 1990).
In 1990, results from the sentinel surveillance survey continued to show a rapid
progression of the disease. By December 1990, all 70 provinces were included in the
survey. From the previous year, rates for low-charged and high-charged CSWs, male STD
patients and blood donors had doubled to 12.2%, 2.5%, 4.4% and .40%, respectively
(Division of Epidemiology 1991). The increase from practically nil infections among
pregnant mothers to .3% was perhaps the most shocking increase, clearly evidencing a
shift in the spread of the epidemic from "high-risk" groups to the general populace.
Increased Openness by the Government?
As a consequence of implementing the surveillance system and publicizing its
results, many observers recognized that government policy was becoming more
progressive. Khanchit Limpakarnarat, the Adjunct Director of the HIV/AIDS
Collaboration, credits, in part, the implementation of the sentinel surveillance system for
the greater acceptance of the AIDS problem (Khanchit 1993). The Hastings Center
concluded: "The attitude of the government toward this new deadly disease was at first
secretive. Statistics on AIDS cases were not disclosed to the public out of fear that they
might stir up panic, damage tourism, and discourage foreign investment. Pressed by
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newspapers and international agencies, the government has become more open" (Hastings
Center, April 1990).
Steve Krause, Thailand's WHO Global Programme on AIDS (GPA)
representative, confirmed that policy had become more open, but noted that AIDS was
still considered only a public health problem and statistics were held tight (Krause 1993).
So despite the signs that the policy was maturing, clearly the changes were slow and
uneven. John Knodel, Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan, explained
that the transition from denial to openness was not going to happen overnight. There had
been total denial only a few years before and it was only natural that it would take time
for the policy to adjust. Every country faced with the AIDS epidemic has had to go
through the same adjustment period, he added (Knodel 1993).
Furthermore, although it is true that the government had improved its reporting
practices, official announcements were still at odds with estimates from other
organizations. For example, in March 1990, the WHO's GPA released preliminary
findings made by a team of Thai and international AIDS experts which approximated the
number of HIV infected persons with AIDS in Thailand at 45,000 to 50,000,2 more than
three times the official figure of 14,000 (Bangkok Post, 3-30-90). Many observers still
believed that the government was not being as forthright and objective in its reporting as
possible. However, the statistics released by the WHO and the Thai government were not
necessarily mutually exclusive. The government's figures often represented the number of
cases reported in the AIDS Registrar. For example, through 1989, the registrar recorded
15,882 HIV infected persons (Vichai 1990), close to the reported figure of 14,000 cases.
On the other hand, the WHO, used statistical models to estimate all HIV cases, not just
those that had been reported. The differences in reporting methods often became blurred
2 This estimate had increased significantly from a 1989 WHO estimate of 20-25,000 HIV positive
(New York Times, 3-30-89).
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in the media, and consequently, the government was blamed for under-reporting. To
complicate this matter, the government was not successful at clarifying the differences.
A Government Directive to Limit Reporting
In addition, there were other governmental initiatives which indicated that policies
were still in a period of transition. For example, in mid-1990, Jon Ungphakorn, Director
of Thai Volunteer Service, and Dr. Praphan Phanaphak of Chulalongkorn University
Medicine Department, revealed that the MOPH had ordered provincial public health
offices to prevent the number of AIDS cases from rising more than 35% a year in tourist
provinces and 30% in other provinces. Dr. Chanthakorn Chutithamrong, Director of the
MOPH's Centre for AIDS Prevention and Control, confirmed that the order had been
issued in a directive to make provincial health officials do their utmost to control AIDS.
Dr. Praphan said the directive would likely result in wide-spread false reporting by
provincial health officials; the officials would either falsify reports or stop testing for
AIDS when the limit was reached (Bangkok Post, 7-22-90). Ostensibly, the purpose of
the directives was to control AIDS. Some, however, believe that its more likely aim was
to suppress the facts and limit publicity (Ungphakorn 1993).
Moreover, in many sectors and regions there was little evidence of any transition
towards a more open policy. Areas other than Chiang Mai which also have extensive
commercial sex industries were outstanding examples. The Nation noted, "Though
Chiang Mai is one of the country's most famous tourist spots, the "flesh business" here is
much less thriving than such places like Pattaya, Patpong, and Hat Yai where authorities
remain tight lipped about the real (AIDS) situation" (The Nation, 2-25-89). The mayor of
Pattaya--a popular seaside resort with tens-of-thousands of prostitutes--swore that there
were no AIDS cases in the resort and promised that, if this were not true he would resign.
After testing was conducted in Hat Yai, a southern resort, headlines declared that the
town was AIDS-free.
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100,000 HIV Infected Thais
During the latter half of 1990, the MOPH began to release more accurate
estimates of the number of HIV infections in Thailand. In September, the Division of
Epidemiology (MOPH) reported that there were 100,000 HIV infected Thais at a meeting
with a UNDP representative, Thai health officials, representatives of foreign governments
and organizations that had contributed funds to national efforts to stem the spread of
AIDS. An increase in the heterosexual transmission of HIV was also acknowledged
(Bangkok Post, 9-27-90). Many of the donor representatives were shocked by this figure.
The UNDP representative called for increased top level support. (AIDS-Tech, September
1990).
This rather abrupt change in reporting practices not only resulted from an
environment of increasing openness, but also reflected a change in the MOPH's senior
health administration. Dr. Uthai Sudsak, who had just replaced Dr. Somsak Worakhamin
as the Permanent Secretary of Health in September 1990, was responsible for the release
of the new HIV estimates. Dr. Uthai had previously been an advisor in the Prime
Minister's Office. When accepting the MOPH post, he publicly committed to fighting
AIDS: "I will emphasize projects to fight AIDS and will improve medical service
provided to low-income people across the country" (The Nation, 9-6-90). The change was
significant because the previous administration would probably not have disclosed the




In addition to implementing the sentinel surveillance survey, another major
landmark in the maturation of AIDS policies occurred when Thailand became the first
Asian nation to develop a comprehensive medium-term plan. The Medium Term
Programme for the Prevention and Control of AIDS covered the years 1989-1991 and
was initiated on April 1, 1989 (Bangkok Post, 3-30-90). The medium-term plan was
much more extensive than the short-term plan. It followed the WHO's GPA guidelines
which included provisions for taking in account internationally agreed policies and
strategies to protect individual rights. It also sought to avoid the discrimination of
individuals belonging to population groups associated with AIDS, and infected persons,
their families and friends (CDC 1989). The medium-term plan included measures for
program management, health education, counseling, training, surveillance, monitoring,
medical and social care, and laboratory and blood safety control. The plan was intended
to provide a working framework for government, NGO and private initiatives (Bangkok
Post, 3-30-90). To launch the medium-term plan, the MOPH designated the week of
November 25 to December 1, 1988, as "Anti-AIDS Week" and 1989 as "Anti-AIDS
Year" (Xinhua News Service, 10-21-88).
To facilitate more cooperative anti-AIDS efforts, at an October 18, 1988, cabinet
meeting chaired by Prime Minister Chatichai, the government decided to set up the
Coordinating Committee for the Control of AIDS. In addition, a revision of the National
Advisory Committee was approved by the cabinet in order to involve more government
authorities and agencies, especially non-health workers (Prasert, 1989). The committee
was chaired by the permanent-secretary of the MOPH. The Minister of Public Health,
Chuan Leekpai, and his deputies were advisors to its thirty member panel (Xinhua News
Service, 10-19-88).
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As AIDS spread in to the CSW population, government agencies began
implementing programs aimed at controlling the epidemic in the CSW industry. In
August 1989, Dr. Wiwat Rojjanapittayakorn of the CDC initiated the "100% Condom
Campaign" in Ratchaburi province by forming a political network between the provincial
governor, brothel owners, police officers and health officials to address the issues of
commercial sex, condom use and empowerment of women. The campaign targeted CSWs
and their clients as a major group of HIV carriers and condoms as an effective protection
against infection. Theoretically, CSWs were empowered to refuse any clients who would
not use condoms. In a related effort the newly appointed Minister of Public Health, Marut
Bunnag, and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) agreed to shift the focus
of its strategy in Bangkok from CSWs to clients. They encouraged male clients to use
condoms, rather than asking CSWs to request their customers to do so (The Nation 2-3-
90).
Chatichai's Role
The Chatichai Government received much of the credit for the shift in AIDS
policy; particularly for the development of the medium-term plan. In early 1989, the New
York Times wrote, "In the last few months, despite the nervousness of influential
businessmen, the Government of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven has recognized
the dangers of a coming calamity and begun to do something to forestall it, designing
Asia's first medium-term plan to combat AIDS" (New York Times, 3-30-89).
Enthusiasm over the government's apparent commitment to policy development
did not last, however, because Prime Minister Chatichai continually refused to publicly
commit to fighting AIDS as a top government priority. In November 1989, Chatichai
refused to chair a conference on AIDS for fear it might cause panic (Economist, 3-24-90).
He also refused to chair the National AIDS Committee for the same reason (Daily
Telegraph, 8-8-92).
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Nonetheless, the AIDS issue continued to improve its position on the government
agenda. On October 31, 1989, the cabinet elevated the AIDS Prevention and Control
Programme to an operation to be conducted on a national level (MOPH, November
1991). On February 22, 1990, the Committee for AIDS Prevention was upgraded and
renamed the "National AIDS Committee for AIDS Prevention and Control." The Minister
of Public Health was named chairman and the Director-General of the CDC became its
secretary (MOPH, November 1991).
It was not until January 1991--shortly before being ousted from power--that in his
statement on health policy, Chatichai announced that the official campaign to control and
prevent AIDS would be regarded as national policy. The Prime Minister said that the
matter would receive urgent and high priority. Mechai said he supported the policy stance
in what he described as the first clear-cut government policy stance to combat AIDS
(Bangkok Post, 1-10-91).
Chatichai also added that the government would see to it that all relevant
agencies, in both the public and private sectors, seriously and continuously battled the
virus (Bangkok Post, 1-10-91). Subsequently, an advisory committee to the prime
minister on AIDS was set up with Mechai as chairman. The committee was responsible
for making policy recommendations to the prime minister and recommendations for
broad scale intervention that could be channeled through the MOI, Defense, Education,
Industry, Agriculture, etc. (AIDS-Tech, January 1991).
Budget
Financial commitment on the part of the government also reflected a transition in
policy. In 1989, seventy-five percent of the $4.77 million in funds that the MOPH
planned to spend on its campaign was to be supplied by international organizations and
Western governments and 25% or US $ 1.2 million from the Thai government (CDC
1989). In actuality, the Thai government supplied only US $ 400,000 to the MOPH in
1989 while international donors increased their support to US $3.74 million (MOPH
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1993). Since the budget allocation for AIDS-related activities reflects the degree of
political commitment, and the majority of funds were still external in origin, the
commitment of the Chatichai Government has been judged as being insufficient.
Finally in 1990, as a reflection of the policy changes occurring in 1989, the
government increased its financial commitment to US $2.63 million. However, foreign
donors still contributed the majority of funds or US $3.34 million (AIDS Division 1993).
Through 1990, the Thai effort had attracted more than US $10.8 million from the
government and 11 international sources. After the Thai Government, the UNDP was the
second largest donor, contributing $1.9 million (Jenson, June 1990).
Legislation
AIDS-Bill
Although there were positive signs that the MOPH was developing AIDS-related
policies, in retrospect it has become clear that the MOPH was using traditional contagious
disease control methods and members of the health profession dominated the choosing of
policy alternatives. Consequently, little regard was afforded to the social, legal and
economic ramifications of the AIDS epidemic.
The MOPH attempted to formalize its methodologies to prevent and control the
spread of AIDS through a major piece of legislation, the AIDS-bill. The first draft of the
AIDS-bill was completed in October 1989 (Bangkok Post, 9-22-89). The AIDS-bill relied
on medical and legal mechanisms to cope with AIDS. The bill included provisions to
establish a control committee, a welfare fund, medical measures, AIDS patients' rights,
legal obligations for employers of infected persons, legal power for health and law
enforcement officials, and infected persons right to appeal decisions by the control
committee (The Nation, 7-14-90).
On the positive side, it included measures to prevent employers from firing HIV
infected employees and medical facilities from denying AIDS patients access to
treatment. Also, the bill prohibited HIV infected persons from donating or selling blood
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and organs (Bangkok Post, 3-19-90). Under the bill, pregnant women would be entitled to
have an abortion without being considered in violation of the law (Bangkok Post, 9-22-
89).
On the other hand, it proposed compulsory reporting of AIDS cases to officials,
possible confinement of AIDS infected persons to special areas, and imprisonment of
infected persons if they indulged in certain activities leading to the spread of AIDS, e.g.,
prostitution (Bangkok Post, 1-3-91). CSWs would be required to be tested periodically
and removed from the work place if infected (Bangkok Post, 3-3-90). Those placed under
official surveillance who did not follow the rules could be banned from entering certain
places and sent to official "welfare and rehabilitation centers" to have their high-risk
behaviors changed (Bangkok Post, 9-22-89). The bill would have also empowered
officials to test anyone suspected of having AIDS and to imprison people found to be
carrying the virus who do not comply with government regulations (The Nation, 3-23-
91). There was a provision which gave MOPH officials the authority to enter private
homes and take AIDS-infected persons to receive medical treatment (Bangkok Post, 7-14-
90). The confidentiality of infected persons would have been threatened as HIV infected
persons would have been required to reveal their condition to doctors and dentists before
receiving treatment.
The politically appointed Deputy Prime Minister, Suthas Ngern-muen, was a
staunch supporter of the bill and attempted to push the bill though the legislative process
in 1989 and 1990. By 1990, a draft of the AIDS-bill had been approved by the Cabinet
and the Juridical Council. The parliament was still required to pass the bill before it could
be enacted. Leaders in the MOPH defended the law as the best way to combat the
epidemic.
At a government sponsored AIDS conference, a supporter of the bill, Dr. Witoon
Ungpraphan of Siriraaj Hospital said high-risk groups--prostitutes, IVDUs, blood donors,
surgery patients and pregnant women--should face mandatory testing. "I don't think we
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have to worry about any legal difficulties with mandatory testing of these people," he
said. He also advocated mandatory testing for spouses of infected persons. Former Prime
Minister Dr. Tanin Kraivixien, who chaired a legal panel at the conference, supported the
measures proposed by Dr. Witoon (The Nation, 3-23-91).
Nevertheless, the draft bill was strongly criticized by many doctors, social
scientists and representatives of NGOs. These participants along with certain influential
donors lobbied against the passage of any law that made blood testing mandatory and
restricted the freedom of movement of infected individuals (New York Times, 3-30-89).
Vitit Muntarbhorn, Associate Professor of Law at Chulalongkorn University, explained
that while this draft included provisions which would have provided protective measures
for infected persons, the stipulations giving the authorities the powers of confinement,
fines and imprisonment may ultimately lead to discrimination rather than respect for
human rights. The punitive measures were viewed as being counterproductive; the
infected persons would be driven underground for the fear of sanctions. There was also a
lack of provisions for care, counseling and assistance for families with infected persons
(Bangkok Post, 1-3-91).
Classical CDC Methods
An example of the MOPH attempting to adapt classical CDC methods to the
AIDS dilemma were the proposed therapeutic communities for infected persons. The
rationale for the establishing these communities rest on CDC principles similar to those
used in controlling a communicable disease such as leprosy; that is, to quarantine infected
persons or exclude them from many "normal" activities. Uthai Susak, then Director-
General of the CDC Department, explained that a planned community would
accommodate some 40 AIDS carriers as in-patients and another 200 as out-patients. Uthai
claimed that participation was to be on a volunteer basis with an emphasis on WHO
policies for human rights and dignity for AIDS patients (Xinhua News Service, 8-24-88).
By early 1989, Uthai was replaced as the Director-General of the CDC by Dr.Tira
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Ramasoot. The MOPH still maintained, however, that it would establish a relief center
and a therapeutic community for patients suffering from AIDS. Tira said the patients
would be given proper treatment and care (Bangkok Post, 2-17-89).
CSWs Targeted
In addition to the therapeutic communities, Dr. Tira planned to take legal action
against CSWs who were HIV positive: "The Ministry will seek police help in arresting
those who test positive for AIDS, and the courts will decide whether to jail them or put
them in the women's house for at least a year." According to Dr. Tira, the MOI would also
take legal action against both CSWs and brothel owners who would not cooperate in
preventing AIDS (Bangkok Post, 8-6-89).
Dr. Tira had decided to execute control efforts by issuing "AIDS-free" cards to
monitor each CSW and rid prostitution of HIV infected persons (Bangkok Post, 3-3-90).
The AIDS-free cards program was formulated as part of the AIDS-bill. Although the
legislation had not been passed into law, the Department of CDC went ahead and issued
80,000 cards to the provinces for registering all CSWs and recording the results of HIV
blood tests every three months (AIDS-Tech, July 1990). The program was to be
implemented nationwide but plans were canceled when many provinces objected. On
March 29, 1990, reviewers of the First Review of the Medium Term Programme
condemned the use of AIDS-free cards because they provided CSWs and their clients a
false sense of security (MOPH, November 1991). Some provinces, however, continued to
use the cards as a way of trying to encourage CSWs to use condoms and to evict those
who seroconvert (AIDS-Tech, January 1991).
Restrict Foreigners
In another development, on August 26, 1989, the MOI issued Ministerial
Announcement number 11 which added the AIDS issue to the Immigration Act (1979).
The aim of this amendment was to prevent foreigners with HIV from infecting Thais by
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Although Visit Thailand Year had concluded, the tourism industry continued to be
the largest earner of foreign exchange for Thailand. In 1988, Thailand received 4.23
million international tourists, an increase of 21% over 1987. The tourism sector earned
US $ 3.1 billion in 1988 (Tourist Authority of Thailand 1989). In 1989, tourism
continued to grow to 4.81 million tourists and accounted for US $3.3 to $3.4 billion in
revenue (Tourist Authority of Thailand 1993).
With such great economic affluence being generated, powerful interests in the
industry sought to protect their concerns by keeping AIDS publicity to a minimum. When
an article, entitled "The Lust Frontier," was run in the Far Eastern Economic Review (11-
2-89) about AIDS and the sex industry in Thailand it offended the Tourism Authority of
Thailand, which asked the police to ban the magazine and to refuse to renew the visa of
the author, Paul Handley (New York Times, 5-11-92). At the time, The Economist wrote:
"The moguls of Thailand's flourishing tourist industry do not want bad news to interfere
with good times, especially among all those single men who crowd Bangkok airport"
(The Economist, 3-24-90).
In 1989, when the Public Health Minister, Chuan Leekpai, publicized the HIV
prevalency rates in southern Thailand, the Malaysian press also began reporting on the
spreading AIDS epidemic in Thailand. Subsequently, the Malaysian government issued
health warnings for people traveling to Hat Yai--a provincial capital in the South--and
tourism declined. Thais reacted by vehemently accusing Malaysia of trying to destroy
3 It excluded aliens who have permanent residency and aliens born in Thailand.
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tourism in southern Thailand. Bangkok newspapers and Hat Yai hoteliers reasoned that
Malaysia was attempting to aid their own tourism at Thailand's expense.
In a related fashion, a rehabilitation center planned by the MOPH and endorsed by
the cabinet was rejected at a proposed site in Rayong because of the entrenched fear that
its close vicinity to the Eastern Seaboard would have scared away tourists and investors
while giving Thailand a bad image. There were indications that the inhabitants had no
objections to having the rehabilitation center in their province (Bangkok Post, 4-5-90).
Koh Samuli Targeted
In spite of opposition from the tourism industry, the MOPH continued to
undertake activities in areas frequented by foreigners. In 1990, the focus of media
attention centered on Koh Samuii, a southern resort frequented by foreigners, some of
whom took part in prostitution and drug use. There was growing concern over the rapid
increase of AIDS on Koh Samuii which according to the Director of CDC Department,
Dr. Tira Ramasoot, had the highest ratio of AIDS victims of any district in the country.
Therefore, he proposed to test foreign tourists for HIV infection at a medical center to be
set up near the island's ferry station. The Bangkok Post published a large front page
article covering the story (Bangkok Post, 8-5-90).
Bungalow owners and the Surat Thani office of the TAT were staunchly opposed
to the proposal. They felt that the screening measure, put forward in an effort to contain
the deadly disease, would have had a disastrous effect on tourism in Koh Samuii.
Thanongsak Somwong, a Koh Samuii businessman pointed to the previous AIDS panic in
Hat Yai, in which there was a decline in tourists in the southern city for almost six
months before things started to pick up again. He warned authorities to take great care not
to repeat the mistake on Koh Samuii (Bangkok Post, 8-5-90).
Tourism Association of Koh Samuii president Kamnuan Somwong said the
proposed measure would only destroy the atmosphere of the holiday resort and injure the
feelings of tourists who would simply stop coming. Tourism Association of Koh Samuii
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secretary, Mrs. Juthatip Thongsuk, said the consequences of an inspection of tourists
would have been grave considering what tourist operators had invested. She added, "I
think setting up an inspection post at the ferry harbor would result in more damage than
good. What should be done is a public relations campaign against AIDS" (Bangkok Post,
8-5-90).
Kamnuan also pointed out that other groups of potential AIDS carriers were Thais
such as CSWs, the so-called "hired wives,"4 drug addicts and fisherman who frequent
brothels. These Thais would not have been subjected to the inspections despite the fact
they were more likely to be carriers of the disease and more susceptible to catch AIDS
than ordinary tourist. He stressed, "Don't look at AIDS as a Samuii, Pattaya or Phuket
disease" (Bangkok Post, 8-5-90).
Participants Advocating Change
The latter half of 1989 marks a major turning point in AIDS policy development.
In addition to the establishment of the medium-term plan, the sentinel surveillance system
and changes in the MOPH, initiatives by the Royal family, Chuan Leekpai, and Mechai
Veravaidya were momentous. They all advocated the immediate and rapid development
of AIDS-related policies. Due to their prominence and the news worthiness of the issues,
their activities were widely covered in the press. Other participants who made important
contributions at this time included the army, the MOI, NGOs, international organizations
and the media.
Princess Chulabhorn
The support of the royal family to the anti-AIDS efforts was an important
symbolic occurrence. The royal family, especially Princess Chulabhorn, the second
daughter of the present Monarch, Bumibol Adulyadej, committed its prestige to the cause.
In early 1990, an article in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) reported, "A few months
4 "Hired wives" is a term used for CSWs who are paid by foreign, primarily western, male tourists
to accompany them on their holidays. Hired wives commonly act as tour guides and provide
sexual services (Meyer 1988).
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ago there was a surge of articles an AIDS in the Thai press, following statements by HRH
Princess Chulabhorn denouncing the sex industry and calling for greater awareness about
AIDS. Given the deep respect held for the royal family by Thais, this was seen to be a
turning point in public opinion" (Anderson, 2-17-90).
In early March 1989, the Princess gave the opening address at the International
Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific. The conference was held in Bangkok and
was organized by the WHO, Thai MOPH, and Mahidol University. The Princess said that
the Chulabhorn Research Institute which she directs was committed to assisting the Thai
government in becoming a model for other Asian nations (WHO, 3-15-89). She strongly
promoted a public campaign against AIDS and for the end of the sex business (New York
Times, 3-30-89). Princess Chulabhorn was also one of the first national leaders to
complain about the image of Thai women abroad (FEER, 11-2-89).
Chuan Leekpai
With the Princess' support, Chuan Leekpai and the MOPH were given impetus to
keep the public informed through factual information (FEER, 11-2-89). The BMJ
reported, "Similar statements (to the princess) from Public Health Minister Chuan
followed closely, and his campaign is clearly associated with an irreversible shift in
government policy" (Anderson, 2-17-90),
In September 1989, Chuan Leekpai, Minister of Public Health, became one of the
first Thai politicians to publicly recognize the need to repress the sex industry. His
proclamation stunned the country and the sex-entertainment industry (FEER, 11-2-89).
As Chuan began publicly releasing statistics, the tourism industry reacted emotionally and
exhibited strong opposition. Nevertheless, Chuan stated that Thailand should not defend
the sex industry and continued to push for a more honest and frank policy by re-iterating
that the number of AIDS cases in the South had greatly increased. As a result, Chuan
repeatedly came under heavy opposition from the Hat Yai business community.
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However, key policy makers in the government did not follow the examples set by
the Princess and Chuan. Although some leaders were sympathetic to the cause, no one in
the government risked coming out and giving overt support. In fact, while on a European
tour, Prime Minister Chatichai announced that AIDS was not a problem in Thailand. TAT
head, Dhamnoon Prachuabmoh, suggested that Chuan and the Hat Yai business
community keep their argument quiet so as not to hurt tourism (FEER, 11-2-89).
As it became evident that necessary support was not forthcoming, Chuan soon
toned down his unpopular rhetoric. He then suggested that an outside participant, the
WHO, was to blame for generating unnecessary publicity. "Don't be misled by it (WHO's
campaign)," Minister Chuan warned citing that the campaign's format was based on the
alarming situation in western countries. "The number of AIDS patients in our country is
still relatively low compared with some countries, so we should focus our efforts to
prevent it from spreading further." Later he added, "I didn't mean that the (WHO)
sympathy campaign will be ignored, but it will be carried out on a smaller scale."
Although Chuan had eased up on his aggressive approach, he continued to advocate
openness: "...what will happen in the next five years if we keep silent? We don't want to
look back in five years and say 'Why didn't we do it?' Do we?" (Bangkok Post, 12-5-89).
Mechai
A key proponent of developments in the anti-AIDS campaign, and perhaps, the
most vocal and visible anti-AIDS activist has been Mechai Veravaidya. Mechai has
vehemently advocated mass communication as an effective means of raising awareness
about AIDS and in pressuring leaders for policy development. He was able to use his
personal resources and the vast resources of his NGO, the PDA, to promote his efforts.
Mechai did not believe that the MOPH's activities to combat AIDS were
sufficient. In addition, he did not find the CDC Department, the MOPH agency
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responsible for AIDS prevention and control efforts, very cooperative.5 In 1990, The
Economist reported of Mechai: "He lobbied Mr. Chatichai Choonhaven, Thailand's PM,
to set up and lead a national AIDS committee. The lukewarm response led Mr. Mechai to
go his own inimitable way. To get his campaign going, he raised 50 million Baht (two
million US dollars) selling some land in Pattaya..." (The Economist, 11-10-90). Then, he
gained the support of the Army, which due to its vast media network, would be
instrumental in promoting AIDS education to the populace. Finally, Mechai approached
the MOI, Thailand's most powerful ministry, for its support.
Although Chatichai did not consent to leading the anti-AIDS campaign, Mechai
was able to obtain his permission to approach military leaders for support. He reasoned
with the supreme commander of the armed forces, General Chavolit Yongchaiyudh, that
there was a desperate need to educate his troops as well as to reach the rural and
provincial-urban populations. In a skillful political move, Mechai secured the support of
General Chavolit in the form of free advertising on the army's 126 radio stations and two
television networks--which command 60-80% of the country's viewing (Anderson, 2-17-
90). In a related development, the military admitted that there was an AIDS problem
among soldiers and planned to test and educate its troops (FEER, 11-2-89).
Next, Mechai turned to the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The MOI has authority
over provincial administration including governors as well as district and village leaders.
In addition, the police force, community development and social welfare administrations
are under the MOI's jurisdiction. Co-opting these groups into the anti-AIDS fight was
seen as an important development by those espousing a more comprehensive approach to
fighting the epidemic. These government organizations would prove to be indispensable
in implementing various anti-AIDS programs.6
5 Mechai's previous work in population control was related to the Department of Health and
Family Planning Division, MOPH.
6 It should be noted, however, that support from within the MOI was not unequivocal. Some of
the organizations under the jurisdiction of the MOI, the police in particular, enjoy a degree of
independence and are not easily controlled in the provinces.
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Although Mechai had done much to further the cause of AIDS through alliances
with the army and the MOI, he still felt that the overall response was inadequate.
Therefore, he sought to hasten the development of AIDS policy by advocating controls
over the sex industry and by emphasizing the enormous economic costs that the epidemic
would bring to Thailand if un-confronted.
Mechai decided to focus on the commercial sex industry once it had become clear
that AIDS was spreading rapidly among the CSW population. On August 8, 1989,
Mechai proclaimed that the sex industry should temporarily shut down to allow a major
clean up as part of the anti-AIDS campaign (Bangkok Post, 8-9-89). According to
Mechai's plan, brothels would be closed for several days or weeks. Then the brothels
would be re-opened as safe-sex establishments by instituting a condom only policy.
According to Bennet and Na Pattalung, the proposal received wide-spread support from
the district governors. More significantly, the Director-General of CDC Department
attended the orientation (where Mechai spoke) and publicly expressed his support for
Mechai. This was the first official recognition of the contribution of Mechai and PDA to
the national AIDS prevention program (Bennet and Na Pattalung 1990). Nonetheless, a
government representative responded on the nightly news by officially denying that there
was a sex industry.
In 1990, Mechai continued his efforts. For example, while at a conference in
Canberra, Australia, Mechai again called for a temporary closing of Thailand's sex
industry. Mechai said that while he realized his stance would be unpopular among many
influential Thais because of the impact on foreign tourism, the country's highest income
earner, the alternative was far worse. He aimed his remarks at Prime Minister Chatichai,
who he believed needed to play a greater role in the anti-AIDS campaigns. "The Prime
Minister will go down in history no matter what happens," Mechai said. "He will either
be a saviour or the real unwitting devil." Mechai claimed the sex industry problems,
including AIDS, were being officially denied because the local economy relied in part on
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sex and because prostitutes were viewed as "throw-away women" (Bangkok Post, 8-9-
90).
Mechai also attempted to convince key policy makers that ignoring the reality and
potential impact of the AIDS epidemic would be detrimental to businesses and the
economy. To study the possible economic impact of AIDS, a team of researchers was
organized. From that effort, Mechai reported that Thailand was likely to face economic
woes within five years unless the spread of AIDS was checked. He said the economy
would be adversely affected, starting with the tourism industry--the country's biggest
foreign-exchange earner. He also explained that labor problems, created by returning Thai
workers from the Middle East because of the Gulf War, would worsen since other
countries might refuse to allow Thai laborers to work in their countries, fearing they
might be infected with AIDS. According to Mechai, the most productive Thai men, aged
between 18 and 29 years old, were highly at risk of AIDS infection. He predicted a sharp
rise in the number of HIV cases to three million by 1992 if the 1990 rate of infection
continued in Thailand (Bangkok Post, 9-11-90).
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)
In addition to the PDA, other Thai NGOs became increasing involved in 1988-89.
Their participation, however, was not as strategically planned as Mechai's. According to
Nitaya Prophochuenbun, the AIDS Project Director of the Duang Prateep Foundation
(DPF), the DPF became aware of the spread of the epidemic in their community in 1988
and began to address the problem although the staff had little knowledge of the disease. In
May, the DPF tested IDVUs in the Klong Toey slum and found 75% of the addicts HIV
positive (DPF 1991). By 1989 the disease was spreading rapidly into the CSW
community. On July 26-27, 1989, Family Health International sponsored a two day
seminar to help the DPF establish an AIDS program for the slum community. Attendees
included DPF staff, community leaders and police (DPF 1991).
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Other NGOs virtually had the AIDS issue forced on them. Asked in 1988 what
they thought about AIDS, groups like prostitute support organization Empower said they
were already overwhelmed with work and unable to take on yet another issue (Panos
1990). By the following year, with AIDS spreading fast among CSWs, Empower and
other NGOs were among the leaders of Thailand's fight against AIDS.
These groups joined a growing number of NGOs that became involved in the anti-
AIDS efforts because of humanitarian concerns over the government's AIDS-bill. In
particular, human rights issues were raised after the government proposed harsh
punishment for AIDS victims. By late 1989, a group of 15 NGOs joined in a loose
alliance. They submitted a letter to Prime Minister Chatichai that stated: "Laws to control
AIDS will make criminals out of those who have contracted the disease unknowingly and
will cause others to avoid detection, spreading the killer virus even more." The NGOs
were also opposed to measures that separated AIDS patients from non-patients, detaining
or punishing infected persons, and non confidential blood testing. They supported specific
action plans, strict controls against sex and drug industries, and coordination between
government agencies and NGOs. The letter was signed by Magsaysay Award winner Dr.
Praves Wasi of Siriraaj Hospital (Bangkok Post, 10-12-89).
International Organizations
Under the Chatichai Administration the international community, particularly the
WHO and UNDP, intensified their efforts in Thailand to influence AIDS-related policies.
These organizations were instrumental in providing organization, guidelines, technical
expertise and financing. In particular, the WHO's Global Programme (GPA) on AIDS
provided the general policy framework for the Medium Term Programme for the
Prevention and Control of AIDS (Jenson, June 1990).
In 1988, one of the WHO's first objectives was to educate and build a rapport with
members of the MOPH. For example, a three day workshop organized by the WHO and
MOPH was held to discuss ways of preventing and controlling the spread of HIV. The
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focus of the workshop was infection among IVDUs. Then on August 1-2, 1988, the WHO
sent technical consultants to a CDC organized meeting to assist in formulating the three
year medium-term plan of action. Participants included health administrators, scientists
and social welfare workers from government and private agencies (Prasert 1989). Then
on November 28-9, 1989, the WHO and MOPH organized a seminar, "Resources
Mobilization Meeting for AIDS Prevention and Control." Representatives of various
international organizations and diplomats from 15 countries attended the two day
meeting. They primarily discussed Thailand's medium-term program (Bangkok Post, 11-
30-89).
Once Thailand had adopted the general framework for its national AIDS
campaign, the international organizations focused on assisting the Thai government in the
development of more progressive measures to better handle the spreading AIDS
epidemic. Foremost, these organizations began advocating a multi-sectoral approach.
"The Thai Government must mobilize many more resources ... immediate action must be
taken by all, I repeat, all ministries. The strength of HIV infection cannot be held in check
by the MOPH by itself," said Fabrizio Osella, Deputy Regional Representative of UNDP
(Bangkok Post, 9-27-90). Dr. Prayoon Kumasol, then Deputy Director-General of CDC
Department, responded to the calls for a multi-sectoral approach by admitting that it was
not only a MOPH problem, but really a national problem. However, he also clearly stated
the MOPH's sentiments concerning the manner of how to best combat AIDS: "We in the
MOPH are best able to lead when it comes to infectious diseases" (Bangkok Post, 9-27-
90).
Media
The information that the media was disseminating during the Chatichai period had
both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, awareness was greatly
increased and educational messages were frequently dispatched. A review of the National
Medium Term Programme for the Prevention and Control of AIDS in Thailand reported
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that the media had been very open and instrumental in increasing awareness and in
providing information on the situation (Bangkok Post, 3-30-90).
The spreading epidemic, the increasing openness by the government in releasing
statistics, and the growing number and prominence of the participants involved in AIDS
policy development, gave the media extensive opportunities for articles and stories. These
messages were communicated through the press, and radio and television stations. The
Thai public read, listened and watched AIDS educational messages with increased
frequency. Additionally, articles stressing compassion began to frequent the newspapers. 7
As mentioned, Mechai was instrumental in furthering mass media efforts. Once he
had been granted air-time on television and radio by the army, Mechai was quick to
publicize AIDS issues to increase awareness and to educate. He was able to enlist the
services of the Oglivie and Mather advertisement agency to produce four, thirty second
spots at cost (Anderson, 2-17-90). The cost was covered by a grant from the Rockerfeller
Foundation and a personal contribution from Mechai. The spots were aimed at
adolescents, CSWs, clients of CSWs, and clients' wives. They were placed on the military
TV stations at a time when the Mass Communication Department's television stations
refused to air any educational messages about AIDS (Bennet and Na Pattalung 1990).
Mechai believed that the government media needed to be used more effectively. "The
(privately owned) media have so far done a pretty good job, but the Government should
ask their media to do more educational programmes on AIDS prevention," said Mechai
(Bangkok Post, 9-11-90).
To assist in mass media efforts, Mechai's organization, the PDA, hired a Thai
factory worker to become an AIDS educator. He had been infected with HIV through a
blood transfusion and lost his job. He appeared with Mechai on a popular talk show to
7 For example, The Nation news reporter, Malee Traisawsdichai, wrote an article entitled, "Fight
AIDS with education and compassion." It presented views of activists and NGO leaders that
Thais must learn to live with persons with AIDS/HIV. It also stressed that AIDS should be
treated like other diseases and not as a disgusting and shameful plague (The Nation, 8-1-90).
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discuss his disease and the discrimination he had suffered. The purpose was to show
others how HIV is not spread and to describe the social injustice of AIDS discrimination.
Mostly, the PDA hoped to establish, symbolically, that AIDS was a problem that all of
Thai society would have to face (Bennet and Na Pattalung 1990).
On the negative side, the media still transmitted sensational stories which were
often more intent on attracting an audience than investigating and reporting facts. On
television, a news report of the 1989 WHO conference in Bangkok was followed
immediately by a picture of Patpong (the area of the city most clearly associated with
prostitution) with no accompanying commentary; Patpong became synonymous with
AIDS. The press picked up another story in which a young girl was.thought to be
suffering from AIDS. They reported that she had been admitted to a hospital with a high
fever and was so weak she could not walk. The story was accompanied by a photograph
of a girl with her hands tied to the bed (Panos 1990). The Nation newspaper published an
editorial which attacked a women activist and a television talk show host for frightening
the audience with talk of AIDS (FEER, 11-2-89).
In other cases the media was not guilty of mis-interpreting the news, but was only
reporting the misguided opinions of others. For example, various overseas studies
showing mosquitoes to be a carrier of the AIDS virus found their way into the Thai
media. Although there was no scientific proof, the erroneous beliefs flourished.
Subsequently, the Minister of Public Health, Chuan Leekpai, publicly discussed the issue
in order to set the record straight. Speaking at a news conference with a panel of medical
experts he tried to calm public hysteria over local press reports that AIDS could be
transmitted through mosquitoes and vegetables fertilized with human waste (Reuters, 8-
17-89).
A Media Event: The Princess Chulabhorn Conference
In late 1990, a significant event occurred that brought publicity and awareness to
the AIDS issue. A Thai law had been passed in August 1990, which banned people with
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HIV/AIDS from entering the country. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) upheld this
regulation by denying visas to two HIV infected persons who were to participate in an
international AIDS conference in Bangkok organized by the Chulabhorn Research
Institute (CRI) and the WHO. Tira Ramasoot, the Director-General of the CDC, spoke
out against the MOI directives. Then after a request from the WHO, the MOPH sent a
proposal to the cabinet to seek exemptions from the regulations.
On December 13, 1990, the WHO announced that it would not attend the
conference because of human rights reasons and withdrew its financial support. A
statement from the WHO explained, "Such restrictions have been shown to be ineffective
in preventing the further spread of HIV/AIDS, and often counterproductive" (Bangkok
Post, 12-14-90). On December 14, 1990, her Royal Highness Princess Chulabhorn
resigned as friendship ambassador of the WHO. The CRI released a statement explaining
that the Princess was not in a position to lobby the government to alter the controversial
piece of legislation (Bangkok Post, 12-15-90). On December 15, 1990, the MOI again
turned down a MOPH request to allow the AIDS victims to enter Thailand for the
conference. The MOI had denied the requests for visas on the grounds that allowing
AIDS infected persons to enter the country would worsen the epidemic. Some experts
said it showed that the government had little understanding of AIDS. In actuality, the ban
was most likely carried out for political, not public health, reasons (AIDS-Tech,
December 1990). In any case, the conference had many other participants and went ahead
on schedule (Bangkok Post, 12-16-90).
This event was significant because it generated a great deal of publicity about the
AIDS dilemma. It also raised awareness; particularly over human rights issues.
Subsequently, many participants became involved because of their concern with human
rights issues. Professor Debanom agrees that the conference helped raise awareness, but




THE ANAND PERIOD (March 1991 to September 1992)
INTRODUCTION
The Anand Panyarachun period is commonly divided into the Anand I and the
Anand II governments. Anand I was installed by the military after a February 1991 coup
de tats forced Chatichai from office. Anand I was in power until elections were held on
March 22, 1992. Then, General Suchinda Krayapoon, a major participant in the coup and
supporter of Anand, manipulated his way into the position of prime minister. This move
precipitated mass protests throughout April and cumulated in the May massacre of
civilians. In the aftermath, Suchinda was forced to resign and the Anand Government was
restored to power. Named Anand II, it was appointed as the interim government from late
May until September 1992. At this time, a new general election was held which resulted
in the formation of Chuan Leekpai's coalition government. Politics often overshadowed
the AIDS crisis during this period. In particular, the events of April and May 1992
absorbed the nation's attention.
Anand's caretaker government was unelected and temporary. His administration
was not staffed with politicians but rather hand-picked technocrats and activists who were
more concerned with good public policy than political objectives. Being apolitical, Anand
was not forced to contend with political parties or outside interest groups. This extra-
ordinary government also did not have to maneuver around the normal checks and
balances that "democratically" elected governments must overcome. Therefore, the
Anand government was able to pass 169 pieces of legislation in 1991 compared to 49
bills passed in 1990 by the previous, elected, Chatichai Government (Economist, 3-7-92).
During the Anand Period, the epidemic spread throughout the nation and was no
longer limited to "high-risk" groups. The Anand administration responded with
transparent and pragmatic policies. In August 1991, Anand firmly placed the AIDS issue
high on the government's decision agenda by becoming the first prime minister to chair
the National AIDS Committee. Anand promoted an atmosphere of openness and full
recognition of the AIDS dilemma. His appointed minister, Mechai Veravaidya, took
advantage of this opportunity, and his authority, to advance the national AIDS campaign.
At this time, the government was very forthright with AIDS-related statistics, and
if anything, tended to overestimate its projections of HIV/AIDS cases and the epidemic's
social and economic costs. There was also increasing concern for human rights of persons
with HIV/AIDS. Previous draft legislation, including the AIDS-bill, was seen as
discriminatory and discarded.
Major policy developments included the adoption of a national AIDS plan for the
1992 to 1996 period and a dramatic increase in budget allocation. The primary strategy
for AIDS prevention and control was mass media education and condom promotion. The
mass media played a vital role in the administration's strategy to create awareness for the
prevention of AIDS. Television and radio stations aired AIDS education spots hourly.
The media also began to question more fundamental social problems that are highlighted
by the far reaching nature of the AIDS epidemic. Additionally, attempts were made to
control the commercial sex industry as a method to stem the spread of HIV infection. For
example, the "100% Condom Campaign" was implemented. The results were significant;
By the end of the Anand period, condom use had increased dramatically and STDs had
decreased.
Except for the mass media efforts, however, the MOPH continued to be the
central government agency for AIDS prevention and control efforts. The MOPH has the
health expertise and the infrastructure to most effectively implement many of the AIDS
programs. However, in recognition of the increasing parameters of the epidemic, the
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campaign was reorganized to include a wider range of participants. All ministries, and
numerous government agencies and universities became involved. Moreover, the MOI,
the Army and the NESDB, some of the strongest organizations in Thailand, gave their
support to the prevention and control efforts. Coordination between the participants was
also strengthened. NGOs were recognized as important participants in education and
prevention efforts due to their close relationships with local communities. International
organizations played a less prominent role in financing the campaign as donors withheld
funds in protest over the overthrow of the democratically-elected Chatichai government.
Nonetheless, many of the policy measures promoted by the WHO were adopted during
this period.
On the other hand, many organizations and individuals refused to accept the
realities of the epidemic, or at least, failed to give public recognition. The tourism
industry actively disagreed with the highly publicized approach of Anand's national AIDS
campaign. Although, the business community generally tended to ignore the AIDS threat,
a few larger companies began to provide work place education. Individually, many Thais
still refused to believe that AIDS was a "Thai disease" and continued to blame the
marginal communities.
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INCREASES in AIDS and HIV PREVALENCE
By the end of 1991, a cumulative total of only 1321 AIDS and ARC cases were
reported to the MOPH (Division of Epidemiology 1992).1 The number of AIDS cases,
however, does not clearly represent the actual situation. In fact, as of December 1990, the
MOPH estimated that there were 242,605 HIV infected persons.2 In September 1991, the
Thai Working Group, composed of representatives from various domestic and
international AIDS surveillance and research agencies, estimated 200,000 to 400,000
infected individuals as of mid-1991. At that rate the group estimated that there would be
between two to four million HIV infected persons and 350,000 to 650,000 persons with
AIDS by the year 2000. Of those infected in 1991, it was estimated that 70% were
heterosexual men, 15 % IVDUs, 7.5% wives of infected men and .5% babies. Only five
percent of CSWs were believed to be infected. However, the disease had been able to
spread rapidly through the male heterosexual population because of the large number of
men that frequent the CSWs (AIDS-Tech, April 1991).
During this period, it became clear that the epidemic had entered the general
populace. The most important single mode of transmission was heterosexual intercourse
(MOPH 1991). Perhaps the best indication that the epidemic was spreading in the general
populace was the finding from the June 1992 sentinel surveillance survey that one percent
of pregnant women were infected nationwide. This rate increased from .3% in December
1990 to .7% in June 1991. In addition, as of November 1991, three percent of the nation's
new army recruits (Thai males aged 21) were infected (AFRIMS 1992). Furthermore, .8%
of blood donors, and 5.7% of male STD out-patients were HIV positive according to the
June 1992 survey (Division of Epidemiology 1992). From June 1991 to June 1992, the
1 These figures under-represent the actual number of cases due to non-reporting and mis-
diagnosis.
2 The MOPH utilized a "Province Weighted Methodology" in which an estimate of HIV infected
persons was given for each province by mutliplying the infection rates for the male and female
populations times the total number of individuals. The rate for females was the antenatal clinics
(ANC) rate and for males the blood donor rate was used.
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testing results revealed a slight expansion in rates for IVDUs, from 36% to 38%, and a
significant increase in HIV prevalence for low-charge CSWs, from 15% to 23%, high-
charge CSWs, from 4% to 4.7%, and male CSWs, from 7.7% to 13.4% (Division of
Epidemiology 1992).
Northern Thailand continued to experience the highest rates of infection and the
greatest spread of the epidemic into the general populace. The northern epidemic had
taken root in the commercial sex industry as early as 1989. Since northern Thai men
commonly visit low-charge CSWs and only a small percentage used condoms, many
became infected and passed the disease to their wives and girlfriends. Consequently, the
infection rates among pregnant women in the northern provinces ranged from four to six
percent. Among army recruits, blood donors and STD patients the highest rates in the
nation occurred in the northern provinces of Phayao (19.8%), Mae Hong Son (12.3%) and
Phayao (45%), respectively (Division of Epidemiology 1992).
There is also evidence that all other regions in Thailand were also experiencing a
rapid spread of the epidemic. The central provinces of Rayong and Petchaburi reported
seven percent rates of infection among pregnant women. Also in the central region, seven
provinces (out of 25) reported infection rates of greater than five percent for military
recruits (AFRIMS 1992). In addition, certain provinces, in regions other than the North,
were discovered to have "high-risk" populations with very high prevalency rates. In fact,
the highest rate for any province in the nation for low-charge CSWs was in Nakorn
Pathom (Central region), 67.2%, high-charge CSWs, Sisaket (Northeast region), 40%,




The appointment of Anand Panyarachun as Prime Minister in March 1991, proved
to be one of the single most important events that precipitated a rapid development of
AIDS-related policies. Anand quickly became involved with the AIDS issue and by July
had agreed to serve as Chairman of the National AIDS Committee, with the Minister of
Public Health serving as NAC Secretary (MOPH, November 1991). Then, for the first
time, on August 14, 1991, the Prime Minister chaired the National AIDS Committee
(NAC) meeting. Anand was also the first prime minister to include AIDS in the
government's general policy statement (NESDB 1992). These steps represented
significant commitment on the part of the highest level of government to give priority to
controlling AIDS. It was clear at this point that the AIDS issue was firmly placed high on
the government's decision agenda.
One of Anand's first and most important steps was to appoint Mechai Veravaidya
to a ministerial position.3 Mechai, an anti-AIDS activist and director of a Thai NGO, the
PDA, was put in charge of coordinating the AIDS prevention and control campaign.
Mechai was also designated chair on the Subcommittee for Public Relations on AIDS
Prevention and the Chairman of the Tourism Authority of Thailand. Led by Mechai, the
national AIDS campaign emphasized mass media education, AIDS legislation that
protects human rights, controlling the commercial sex industry and broadening the
number of participants involved in national AIDS efforts. Mechai's influence on the
policies during this period should not be underestimated. He realized that with his
position and the support of the Prime Minister much could be accomplished. "If the PM
listens, no one is going to get in the way," Mechai said (FEER 2-13-92).
3 Mechai was named as a minister without a portfolio attached to the Prime Minister's Office.
Minister's in the Prime Ministers Office act as advisors to the prime minister and are often placed
as heads of agencies or committees. Most ministers are appointed to head ministries such as the
MOPH, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, etc.
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Multi-Sectoral Approach
Although the international community and AIDS many experts had been
advocating a multi-sectoral approach to fighting AIDS, it was not until the Anand period
that government policy was tailored towards reaching this objective. Mechai was most
vocal in calling for all government organizations, NGOs and business institutions to
become involved (The Nation, 3-23-91). From the August 14, 1991, NAC meeting,
guidelines for addressing the AIDS epidemic were agreed upon including a provision
calling for increased participation and responsibility by every ministry, bureau and
department. Each organization was responsible for developing its own AIDS prevention
and control plans with the bureau of budget allocating funds for the implementation of
these plans (NAC, 8-14-91).
To facilitate a policy aimed at broad participation, the NAC was restructured. The
NAC had been originally set up under the Chatichai administration. Anand was persuaded
to re-arrange the NAC after it had been criticized as insular and ineffective. The
restructured committee was chaired by the prime minister and had a joint secretariat that
included the permanent secretaries of the Office of the Prime Minister and the MOPH.
The NAC during the Anand I included 41 key policy makers from all government
ministries, and various universities, NGOs and other organizations (MOPH, November
1991). Groups represented on the committee included: The Federation of Thai Industries,
The Thai Chamber of Commerce, The Private Hospitals Association, the National
Women's Council, the Women's Lawyers' Association, the Thai Red Cross, the TAT, the
Public Relations Department and a list of capable and respected figures. The reformed
NAC added subcommittees for Human Rights Protection and Public-Private Sector
Collaboration.
The Government also made it national policy to support the work of NGOs in
AIDS prevention and control. During the NAC meeting, on August 14, 1991, Anand
revealed a plan to strengthen NGO participation by streamlining rigorous registration
78
requirements and "by urging the bureaucracy to abandon its 'mistrust' of NGOs" (Grahm
1992).
On March 17, 1992, Anand approved the establishment of the AIDS Policy and
Planning Coordination Bureau (APPCB) within the Office of the Permanent Secretary of
the OPM. The purpose of the APPCB was to coordinate with the NAC, its subcommittees
and working groups, agencies in the public and private sectors, and the international
donor community (NESDB 1992). The Bureau's Steering Committee was co-chaired by
the Permanent-Secretary of the OPM and the Permanent-Secretary of the MOPH. The
AIDS Planning and Coordination Bureau successfully pushed the Budget Bureau to set
aside Baht 1.2 billion (US $48 million) to fight AIDS (The Nation, 1-21-93).
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) were also given a more prominent role in combating AIDS. In
1992, the NESDB was given responsibility to develop the National AIDS Prevention and
Control Plan: 1992-96 in coordination with Ministers to the OPM, Mechai Veravaidya
and Sairusee Chutikul, and the Minister and Deputy-Minister of Public Health (NAC, 8-
14-91). Mechai also facilitated greater involvement from the MOI which he believed was
the most important government agency to be included in prevention efforts because it
controls the police, public welfare, provincial administration, the BMA and many other
departments that were faced with the task of AIDS prevention (AIDS-Tech, March 1992).
To have a comprehensive multi-sectoral campaign, the government realized that it
needed to include the private business community. Due to its vast resources, this
community has the potential to hasten policy development and reach a large segment of
the Thai populace. Private business is extremely powerful because of the economic and
political roles that it fills within society. Consequently, in 1991, Mechai began to collect
information on the adverse effects that the epidemic might have on the economy. After
his appointment as minister he accelerated his efforts. At an annual World Bank/IMF
meeting on October 12, 1991, with the attention of numerous Thai economists and
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businessmen, Mechai seized the opportunity to emphasize the adverse economic impact
that the AIDS epidemic might have in Thailand while giving a speech entitled, "AIDS in
the 1990's: Meeting the Challenge" (Mechai 1991).
MOPH Continues to Play a Central Role
The MOPH publicly gave its stamp of approval to the multi-sectoral approach.
"AIDS is not just a health or medical problem but a very real social one," said MOPH
Minster Dr. Phairote Ningsanonda. "Cooperation between all government and NGOs is
essential in the National fight against AIDS" (Bangkok Post, 7-19-91). Nevertheless,
according to the AIDS Division, the MOPH would remain as the focal point for the
national AIDS strategy as it still served as the secretariat for the Prime Minister and the
National AIDS Committee. Observers, such as AIDS-Tech, agreed that the MOPH had
the most experience and the best infrastructure to deal with the epidemic. In the
proceeding five years, the MOPH was expected to bear the greatest burden of handling
the AIDS epidemic regardless of whom was directing policies (AIDS-Tech, January
1991).
To help implement prevention and control measures, the AIDS Division was
established in the Department of Communicable Disease Control (CDC), in the MOPH.
Staffed with technical experts and health care academicians, its purpose is to plan,
monitor and evaluate national prevention and control activities. It also serves as the
secretariat to the executive committee and the subcommittees within the MOPH as well
as the NAC (MOPH, November 1991).
The Thai Government Increases Budget Allocation Dramatically
The Anand period witnessed a marked decrease in international support and a
significant increase in financial commitment on the part of the Thai government. In 1991,
international organizations and foreign governments, primarily the United States,
discontinued financial assistance after the democratically-elected Chatichai government
was overthrown and replaced by the military-backed Anand government. In addition,
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Steve Krause, WHO-GPA representative, explained that donors had limited the allocation
of funds because they felt that there were too many human rights violations, NGOs
needed to be more included in the process, AIDS needed to be treated as more than a
medical problem and the government had to be more open with information (Krause
1993). During this period only the WHO and UNICEF continued to source MOPH and
government agencies. In both 1991 and 1992, external sources allocated less than one
million dollars to the MOPH and government agencies for AIDS prevention and control
activities (AIDS Division 1993).
On the other hand, the government's budget allocation for the anti-AIDS
campaign increased dramatically from US $2.6 in 1990 to US $7.16 million in 1991.
Then in 1992, the budget more than tripled to US $25.1 million (AIDS Division 1993). In
addition to the funds funneled through the MOPH, additional funds were distributed
directly to other government and non-government organizations. The Anand Government
backed its commitment to a more inclusive multi-sectoral approach with an extra-
ordinary budget of US $10 million (248 million Baht) that was assigned to the National
AIDS Programme in September 1991. A total of US $6 million (148 million Baht) was
allocated to government ministries and NGOs, and an additional US $4 million (100
million Baht) assigned to the Prime Minister's office for centrally-planned AIDS
activities, principally public relations and mass media activities (Medium Term
Programme Review 1991). The MOPH had already been assigned US $9 million (223
million Baht) for AIDS prevention and control activities. Perhaps the greatest legacy of
the Anand period was the US $44 million budget that was designated for 1993 AIDS
prevention and control activities (AIDS Division 1993).
Legislation
The Anand administration was instrumental in thwarting proposed legislation
which had been criticized as being discriminatory and based on un-sound public health
principles. Mechai had been a staunch critic of the AIDS-bill draft before being appointed
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minister. Once appointed, he quickly proclaimed that the AIDS-bill would have to be
radically changed before it passed into law (The Nation, 3-23-91). Then the NAC
organized several public hearings and sought out international expert opinions before
rejecting the AIDS-bill (MOPH, 1-11-92). The National AIDS Prevention and Control
Plans: 1992-96 summarized the conclusions:
"The NAC passed a resolution to abolish the proposal for an AIDS
law for the reason that it is inappropriate given the present situation
and the widespread distribution of infection, the large number of
infected persons in every area of the country. Thus, it is appropriate
to allow the infected to live in harmony and with full rights as the rest
of society." (NESDB 1992)
It soon became apparent that as long as Mechai was a minister in the OPM, no AIDS law
that had repressive or inhumane aspects would be allowed to progress (AIDS-Tech, May
1991).
The government proceeded to promote a declassification of HIV as a reportable
disease, a discontinuation of case reports and lifted the travel ban on infected foreigners.
The MOPH issued a decree dated September 4, 1991, stating that HIV was no longer a
disease that was required to be reported to authorities. Dr. Vichai Chokeviwat, former
director of the Epidemiology Division--MOPH, announced that HIV was categorized as
other communicable diseases (Bangkok Post, 11-15-91). The reversal of policy by the
MOPH was based on human rights principles and ineffectiveness of the former policy.
When classified as a reportable disease, the MOPH required the name and address of each
infected individual and anonymity of HIV infected persons was difficult to maintain. This
policy discouraged HIV infected persons from coming forward for fear of discrimination.
"The change came about not because the ministry wants to cover up the increasing
number of HIV infected people, but rather because we find it no longer necessary and that
it causes more harm than good, especially concerning the loss of confidentiality aspect,"
Dr. Vichai said. "In the new system, we ask for cooperation, not coercion through the
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law" (Bangkok Post, 11-15-91). However, medical personal were still required to report
full-blown AIDS cases to the MOPH (AIDS-Tech, October 1991). Then, the mandatory
reporting system in place since 1985, was replaced by a volunteer system in 1992. In this
system, health institutions and physicians are still requested to send selected anonymous
data on new patients with AIDS or ARC to the MOPH (MOPH, 4-26-93).
In March 1992, another policy development occurred when the MOI repealed
Ministerial Regulation Number 11 which prohibited the entry of foreigners with
HIV/AIDS into Thailand. AIDS was therefore removed from the list of diseases in which
infected persons are banned from entry through immigration procedures (NESDB 1992).
The ban was criticized as being based on irrational premises, causing Thais to perceive
AIDS as a foreigner's disease and was not effective in its purpose; to stop the spread of
the epidemic.
Prostitution Legislation
At the National AIDS Committee meeting chaired by Anand on August 14, 1991,
the National AIDS Committee (NAC) resolved to "intensify and accelerate efforts to
prevent the sexual transmission of HIV" by controlling the sex industry (NAC, 8-14-
91).The NAC emphasized the necessity of "intensifying and maintaining the effort to
reduce the number of women who become commercial sex workers." In particular, the
"prevention of youth under 18 years from working in commercial sex" was identified as a
primary objective. The NAC acknowledged that in order to accomplish this goal there
was a considerable need to "seriously and diligently improve the enforcement, by every
agency, of existing laws which promote the prevention of the spread of AIDS, such as
laws which prohibit prostitution and commercial sex establishments, and modify existing
laws to improve compliance" (NAC, 8-14-91).
In June 1991, the Anand administration began to lay the framework for
accomplishing these objectives by advocating amendments in the Anti-Prostitution Act
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(1960).4 The proposed amendments would decriminalize prostitution establishments that
could produce evidence of regular medical check-ups for their workers. In other words,
the bill was to make it legal to sell sex, as long as a prostitute had a health card showing
she or he did not have a sexually transmitted disease. The CSWs would be subject to
check-ups by officials. The bill outlined measures aimed at imposing heavier punishment
on procurers, pimps, and brothel owners and retain lighter penalties on prostitutes
(Bangkok Post, 6-22-91). The minimum age of a legal prostitute would be 18. Penalties
would be increased by 50% for establishments employing prostitutes under 18 years of
age (Bangkok Post, 2-14-92).
Former Deputy Prime Minister Mechai Ruchupan said that although
decriminalization is not a solution to prostitution, it would surely help reduce exploitation
in the sex industry (Bangkok Post, 6-22-91). Assistant Professor Malee
Pruengpongsawalee, Director of Women in Development Consortium in Thailand, said
she welcomed a move to decriminalize prostitution. Many young girls who were forced
into prostitution dare not seek help from the authorities for fear of being sent to jail, she
explained (Bangkok Post, 6-22-91). Jon Ungphakorn recommended licensing brothels as
well as prostitutes so health standards could be enforced (Ungphakorn 1993).
According to Mechai, legalization would serve to correct problems that the
criminalization of prostitution facilitates. "The official position--that prostitution does not
exist because it is illegal--is a severe handicap to campaigns that seek to provide
safeguards for prostitutes and to limit the spread of AIDS" (Economist, 2-8-92). Even as
late as 1992, the issue of prostitution was not always recognized. General Viroj Pai-in, the
metropolitan police commissioner, was quoted as saying that there were no brothels in
Bangkok "in the real sense." The general defined a brothel as a place that provides only
4 The reviewers of the medium term programme in November 1991, called for the revision of
Prostitution Probation Bill, 2503 B.E. (1950) and the Entertainment Places Bill 2509 B.E. (1956). The
reviewers also urged that the CDC Control act be enforced even though AIDS-Bill would not be
enforced (MOPH, November 1991).
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sex to customers (Economist, 2-8-92). Mechai says that at a legal brothel the use of
condoms could be encouraged. The brothel would be penalized if its staff had a bad
record of sexually transmitted diseases.
Anand's attempt to amend the Anti-prostitution Act, which, like previous
attempts, met strong criticism from non-government organizations and feminist groups.
Much of the criticism was over the "health cards" issue. Critics claimed that the law
would continue to penalize the prostitutes not the clients and pimps (Economist, 2-8-92).
Prostitutes under 18, or infected with HIV or a STD would likely be forced underground
where it would be difficult for health workers to reach them.
The Police Department concurred that the sex industry must. be controlled but
disagreed with the approach. Police Colonel Bancha Jarujareet, Deputy Commissioner of
the Crime Suppression Division (CSD), believes that the criminal code is sufficient to
deal with prostitution. Article 277 of the Criminal Code clearly states penalties up to life
sentence for customers of child prostitutes (under 15 years old). Articles 282 and 283,
provide penalties ranging up to death for procurers of under age prostitution. Instead of
focusing on legislation, Bancha believes interested parties should rather demand that the
Government enforce the law and take legal action against officials who are negligent of
their duties, especially those covering brothels where there is forced prostitution
(Bangkok Post, 2-16-92).
Also in 1992, the police department proposed revisions of the Entertainment Act
which were widely perceived as being counterproductive. The recommendations included
adding a clause to Article 16 of the Entertainment Act which would prohibit
entertainment places from employing persons infected with serious communicable
diseases which are sexually transmitted, specifically AIDS (Bangkok Post, 10-11-92).
The effort to amend the entertainment act was kept secret from the public until September
1992, when news of forced HIV testing in Bangkok's Chinatown was uncovered. The
police had been gathering data to support the amendments to the act. Police Major-
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General Sombat Amornvivat, Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Coordination and
Inspection of Crime Suppression, explained that the police initiative resulted from
consultations with Sairusee Chutikul, a Minister attached to the OPM, and Police Chief
Sawat Amornvivat. These proposed amendments were heavily criticized by NGOs and
academicians who point out that not only does it put the blame on the prostitute but may
also push the establishments and CSWs under ground where they are unreachable.
The cabinet decided on January 28, 1992, to back the bill to decriminalize
prostitution (Economist, 2-8-92). Therefore, the proposed amendments were placed on
the government agenda, but owing to the lack of time of the Anand administrations they
were never deliberated (Bangkok Post, 10-11-92). The efforts, however, were not in vain
as the Chuan Government continues to attempt to amend the existing legislation.
Condom Promotion
Efforts at controlling the commercial sex industry were viewed as being only part
of the solution. The NAC stressed that continuing efforts to "prevent the sexual
transmission of HIV through promoting condom use for both patrons and providers of
sexual services" were necessary. This would be accomplished "by requiring commercial
sex establishments to implement a condom only policy or requiring CSWs to use
condoms with all customers" (NAC, 8-14-91).
The 100% Condom Campaign was one such program. In some provinces where
the campaign had previously been initiated, by late 1991, there had been a tremendous
rise in condom use and decline of STDs. Testing in one northern province, Phitsanulok,
revealed an increase in condom use from 50% in December 1989, to 95% in December
1990, and the rate of STD infection decreased from thirty percent to approximately one
percent over the same period (Venereal Disease Department 1991). Success was
attributed to the 100% Condom Campaign, and it was subsequently adopted by the
MOPH on a wider scale. On August 14, 1991, the campaign was made a national policy
and 63 provinces were implementing it by March 1992 (The Nation, 4-1-92).
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PARTICIPANTS
Transition in the Tourism Industry's Stance?
During the Anand period the tourism industry continued to oppose the 'negative'
publicity that the anti-AIDS campaign generated. For example, Songchai
Jirachodkumjon, Chairman of the Songkla Tourist Association, said reports by the
Malaysian media that Hat Yai was infected with AIDS attributed to a drop in the number
of Malaysian and Singaporeon tourists in 1991 to its lowest level in ten years. Mr.
Songchai blamed ministers in the Anand government, who had allegedly made
irresponsible and misleading comments on the AIDS situation in the South, for giving
Malaysia the ammunition it allegedly needed to attack and destroy Thailand's tourism
image (Bangkok Post, 11-21-91). Mechai was the Chairman of the TAT during the Anand
I government. He came under fierce attack from businessmen, who feared his honesty
about AIDS was damaging Thailand's tourism trade (Economist, 2-8-92).
Although the policies of Anand I were condemned by the tourism sector, they
were vindicated in the press. It is unfair and incorrect to blame the previous anti-AIDS
public relations campaign for contributing to the decline in tourist arrivals from almost
5.3 million in 1990 to 5.1 million in 1991, wrote a Bangkok Post editor. "The truth of the
matter is that the 1991 tourism decline here was part of a global trend reflecting a terrorist
scare and economic recession in western countries in the aftermath of the Gulf War. If
anything, last year's February 23 coup also aggravated the tourism slowdown" (Bangkok
Post, 4-29-92).
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the Anand II period, key leaders in the tourism
industry, who met to discuss promotion plans, decided to present a unified front in
opposition of Mechai being renamed as TAT Chairman. They agreed to encourage Anand
to select "more proper" ministers to take care of tourism. The international attention that
Mechai attracted to Thailand's problems was deemed unwarranted. Many expressed
concern that if the PM's office appointed Mechai to chair the TAT, he would scare
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visitors away from Thailand (Bangkok Post, 6-16-92). Soon after, Deputy Prime Minister
Kasemsamosorn Kasemsri was appointed as chair of the TAT.
In spite of this resistance, there were signs that the tourism industry was starting to
comprehend the magnitude of the epidemic and the possible adverse consequences that it
might have on their businesses. For example, the hotel industry in Phuket expected
tourism to suffer in 1992 because visitors from Europe and Japan feared Thailand's AIDS
outbreak and political uncertainty. "The increase in AIDS cases in Thailand will hurt the
tourist industry," said Phuket Island Resort Hotel's Ken H. Khoo. The only way to help
the industry, he explained, was for the TAT to educate people in Japan and European
countries to understand Thai politics and the AIDS situation (Bangkok Post, 12-23-91).
Then on July 24, 1992, Anand became the first Thai prime minister to publicly
address the problems of AIDS and tourism in a speech given at the Australian Federation
of Travel Agents conference in Bangkok:
"The travel industry as a whole is much more concerned about AIDS
and travel worldwide. This situation which has become more serious
than anyone ever anticipated. This is a global pandemic and every
country is forced to face the realities that it brings with it. Thailand
also faces a severe problem in this virus. However, we do have a
clear, open, and honest national policy on AIDS. We know what we
need to do to control and stem the spread of the virus. We have
allocated a budget to every government ministry for education and
prevention programmes, as well as pushed hard on the private sector
to participate. Now, starting in the final two years of primary school,
children learn about AIDS and how to adopt a proper code of
behavior. It is not only fruitless but eventually most harmful to ignore
or hide the truth. My government has made a top level political
commitment and a comprehensive financial commitment to fight
AIDS. No traveler need worry about AIDS in Thailand--every unit of
blood is screened by the red cross. For those looking for specific
carnal pleasures, anywhere in the world is suicidal--as it is not the
place but the act which is dangerous." (PTN, September 1992)
Conference chairman Mr. Phil Hoffman later commented, "It was the first time we have
had a PM talking about AIDS" (PTN, September 1992).
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The TAT, not wishing to contradict Anand, developed a proper media response
position for the first time since Mechai was the chair. It recognized Thailand's open door
policy and the efforts of the Thai government in combating AIDS. Nevertheless, the TAT
still believed that increased publicity would discourage tourism. "Ironically, precisely
because Thailand is attempting to deal with the issue of AIDS in a frank, responsible
manner, it seems to be singled out for intense worldwide media coverage while those
nations that deny the existence of the problem or restrict information on AIDS escape the
glare of international scrutiny," said TAT Chairman Kasem. "Foreign visitors to Thailand
who do not frequent prostitutes and do not use drugs have no reason to fear contracting
the AIDS virus in Thailand" (PTN, September 1992).
Mass Media Efforts
A major component of the government's strategy to limit the spread of AIDS was
better utilization of the mass media campaign through both government and private
channels. The campaign was placed under the control of the OPM. As minister in charge
of the government's Public Relations Department, Mechai led the mass media campaign
for AIDS prevention and control. Making use of his appointment, he required national
radio and television networks to broadcast messages on AIDS (FEER, 2-13-92). He also
persuaded an international advertising giant, Saatchi and Saatchi, to produce seven
professional TV spots (15 to 45 seconds) and a series of twelve radio spots (15 seconds)
(The Nation, 7-24-92). At this point, mass media effort included 488 radio stations and
five television networks. Thirty seconds of free air-time was provided per hour (NESDB
1992).
The PDA, Mechai's NGO, also arranged a traveling group composed of HIV
infected persons. Its purpose was to personalize the disease, show that anyone can be
infected and prove that HIV infected persons are not a threat to anyone through casual
contact. When two of the team members appeared on the nation's top television talk
show, Si Toom Square, the program had more impact than any single event in the anti-
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AIDS campaign according to one critic. The two told of wanting to commit suicide, being
cast out by friends and later being convinced that they had no reason to give up (FEER, 2-
15-92).
The publicity generated by Mechai during his 14-month tenure (1991-92) as
Chairman of TAT--including two cover stories in Newsweek and the Far Eastern
Economic Review--won Thailand praise for not sweeping the problem under the carpet as
well as for its AIDS prevention work (PTN, September 1992). At the same time this high
profile approach magnified international attention on Thailand's AIDS and prostitution
problems.
After the eighth international Conference on AIDS was held in Amsterdam in the
Summer of 1992, the Thai Rath newspaper (the largest Thai mass daily) published an
editorial that questioned the manner in which AIDS awareness had been generated in
Thailand and the ensuing international reaction. The feeling conveyed was that due to the
Thai government's openness with the anti-AIDS campaign, foreigners were given the
impression that Thailand was a bad case scenario because it had reacted too slowly to the
epidemic. In particular, the editor felt that the method of using frightening projections to
estimate future AIDS cases had resulted in undeserving negative international publicity
for Thailand (Thai Rath, 7-24-92).
During this period the media continued to chart the spread of the epidemic and
occasionally published sensational stories. Moreover, a growing number of stories in the
press began to question the more humane aspects and the underlying causes of the
epidemic. Basic issues such as prostitution, sexual behavior, the role of tourism in Thai
society, and the relationship between the police and the mafia were investigated and
questioned. Additionally, as the realization set in that there would be no quick cure for
AIDS, journalists began to examine more traditional approaches to fight AIDS and care
for infected persons; foremost being Buddhism. These trends in reporting reflected the
opinions of government representatives, activists and AIDS experts.
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As various policy alternatives developed, human right issues came to the forefront
and the media found these controversial topics very newsworthy. Numerous articles
began focusing on human rights issues. Vaccine testing was one such example which was
perceived as threatening to the human rights of Thais and received much press. The
debate brought publicity to the AIDS campaign as well as involvement from many
concerned with possible human rights abuses. In 1991, the WHO sent a team to Thailand
to begin preparations for a vaccine trial. Human rights groups protested the use of
Thailand as a site for vaccine trials.
The Thai Rath newspaper branded the selection of Thailand by WHO as a site for
vaccine trials as "Thais Being Used as Laboratory Rats," and "AIDS Gang Picks Thailand
for Experiments." AIDS-Tech explained that many were under the misconception that
Thais would be used as guinea pigs without understanding the details of the project
(AIDS-Tech, April 1991). The MOPH tried to calm the media by explaining that
participation in the trials could benefit Thailand in the form of earlier availability of
vaccines. It espoused that Thailand was chosen because of its readiness and capability in
carrying out the trials. Mechai said decisions for participation should be made by the
government and not by a single agency (AIDS-Tech, October 1991).
Responding to growing criticism and concerns, Thailand became the first country
in the world to establish AIDS vaccine research guidelines, said Chris Breyer, a Johns
Hopkins researcher in Chiang Mai (Breyer 1993). The NAC and the WHO met several
times in preparing the draft. The guidelines state that vaccine research can only be
undertaken with the authorization of the NAC. The main objective is to protect human
rights while giving Thailand an opportunity to be involved in vaccine development
(Bangkok Post, 7-30-92).
It should be noted that media coverage was not consistent during the Anand
period. In the first half of 1992, the AIDS epidemic took a back seat to politics and Thai
attention focused on the political disturbances. There was less prime media coverage
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concerning the AIDS epidemic at this time. Also many NGOs concentrated on fighting
for political principles rather than AIDS-related problems. However, the restoration of
Anand as prime minister ensured that the AIDS issue would return to its prominent
position in the headlines.
International Organizations
During the Anand period, there was less financial support from the international
community because the democratically-elected government of Chatichai Choonhaven had
been overthrown. Yet, the Anand Administration selected policy alternatives very similar
to the ones advocated by the WHO's GPA. Both the WHO and the Anand Government
advocated greater human rights and a multi-sectoral approach.
At this time, WHO influence was more cooperative and less coercive. The WHO
continued to work closely with the MOPH. It was instrumental in providing the general
guidelines for the National AIDS Prevention and Control Plan: 1992-96 and in supplying
technical assistance. There was a visit of WHO legal experts in mid-1991 to review the
status of laws and draft-legislation pertaining to AIDS and to advise the government
based on their experience of similar laws in other countries (Medium Term Programme
Review 1991). Subsequently, an external review of Thailand's National Medium Term
Programme for the prevention and control of AIDS was conducted from November 4-15,
1991. It was undertaken in support of recommendations by the WHO-GPA (MOPH,
November 1991).
In spite of the relatively enlightened approach by the Anand Government, there
were still occasions that members of the international community tried to ensure that
Thailand did not become complacent in its anti-AIDS efforts. For example, Elizabeth
Reid, Director of the United Nations HIV and AIDS Development Programme, stated at a
conference in Melbourne that one in four Thai adults could be infected with HIV by the
end of the decade if Thailand did not significantly increase its efforts. This proclamation
brought protest from the MOPH. Dr. Tira Ramasoot, Public Health Deputy-Permanent
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Secretary, responded to the report by saying the forecast was exaggerated. He reportedly
said that persistent campaigns against AIDS had slowed the spread of the disease




THE CHUAN PERIOD (September 1992 to the present)
INTRODUCTION
In spite of the progressive efforts to combat the disease and tremendous amount of
resources invested, the epidemic continues to spread rapidly. The national AIDS
campaigns have been able to raise awareness but have had minimal success in changing
behaviors. Consequently, the epidemic has clearly entered into the general populace as
not only are the wives of Thai men who visit CSWs being infected but their babies as
well. As the realization sets in that no AIDS cure will be forthcoming in the near future,
the policy alternatives being generated in Thailand place more emphasis on care of
infected persons and learning to live with persons with AIDS.
Under the Chuan administration, the AIDS issue has been normalized as a high
priority issue; normalized, in the sense, that it remains high on the government's decision
agenda. The high status does not signify, however, that policies continue to develop as
rapidly as occurred during the Anand period. In contrast to the extraordinary political
conditions that the previous administration operated under, Chuan heads a loose coalition
government that maintains a slim majority. Consequently, the government has not been
able to render the quick and rapid changes which distinguished the Anand government.
Politics within the government and between government and non-government
participants have become more prominent in influencing the direction and substance of
the AIDS prevention and control campaign. The MOPH has re-asserted itself as the focal
point of the campaign by gaining significant control over the budget and the National
AIDS Committee (NAC). Other participants, outside the MOPH, continue to promote
greater emphasis on a multi-sectoral approach.
The most obvious measure of the government's commitment to support AIDS
prevention is evidenced in the budget which remains at a level similar to the one that the
Anand government established. Furthermore, the emphasis continues to be on education
programs as opposed to regulations that aim to control AIDS by placing restrictions on
infected persons.
Non-government organizations continue to be vital participants in the
implementation of programs and are particularly valuable at the grass roots level. In 1993,
the coalition of NGOs Against AIDS included 37 Thai NGOs. The government continues
to promote coordination between government agencies and NGOs.
Some private businesses are responding progressively to the. AIDS threat by
training employees and establishing work-place policies to deal with AIDS infected
persons. In general, however, the business community still ignores the epidemic.
Moreover, the manner in which the tourism and insurance industries are reacting to the
epidemic is considered by many to be detrimental to AIDS prevention and control efforts.
In 1993, the international media intensified its scrutiny of Thailand's prostitution
and AIDS dilemmas. Faced with mounting pressure both abroad and at home, the Chuan
administration has emphasized curtailing child and forced prostitution. Locally, the media
continues to question the root causes of the epidemic and to search for alternative
solutions. An increasing number of academicians, activists and government officials
acknowledge that some fundamental societal woes need to be addressed.
95
THE EPIDEMIC SPREADS RAPIDLY THROUGH THE GENERAL POPULACE
As of August 31, 1993, the cumulative number of reported AIDS and ARC cases
was only 5,624. Sexual intercourse accounted for 77.1% of AIDS/ARC cases while
infection among IVDUs accounts for 8.9% of AIDS and 13.6% of ARC cases. Only 1.3%
of the instances were homosexual/bisexual and .5% had acquired HIV from blood
transfusions. More than 80% of these infected persons were aged from 15-44 years old.
The male to female ratios for the AIDS and ARC categories were seven to one and 5.8 to
one, respectively (MOPH, 8-31-93).
The number of HIV infected persons provides a more accurate picture of the
spreading epidemic. The MOPH estimated that through 1993, .74%. of the populace (or
418,475 persons) was infected. Professor Debanom Muangman of Mahidol University
estimated that by the Summer of 1993 as many as 600,000 Thais may have been infected
(Debanom 1993). The results of the December 1992 Sentinel Surveillance Survey seemed
to indicate a leveling off of prevalence rates in pregnant women, blood donors, low
charge CSWs, male STD patients and IVDUs. The June 1993 Sentinel Surveillance
Survey' confirmed a leveling off of the infection rate in IVDUs to 35.2% nationwide, and
the median prevalence of blood donors decreased slightly to .72%. However, results from
the other groups suggested that the spread of the epidemic had continued in spite of the
positive signs from the December 1992 survey.
A dramatic development was the increase of HIV infection among pregnant
women. The Deputy Bangkok Governor Chaiyant Kampanatsalyakorn said the latest
MOPH survey showed three percent of Bangkok housewives [pregnant women] were
HIV carriers. (Bangkok Post, 1-28-94) Nationwide, infections in pregnant women
increase from one percent in December 1992, to 1.4% in June 1993. An increase of
1 By 1993 the survey was lauded as the most comprehensive in the world for monitoring the
spread of the disease by the World Bank in its 1993 report "Investing in Health" (Bangkok Post, 7-
7-93).
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infection in the sex industry also continued as the median prevalency rate for low-charge
CSWs was 28% (up from 24%) and 7.3% for high-charge CSWs (up from 6.5%). HIV
sero prevalency rates for private soldiers averaged almost four percent nationwide and
infections in male STD patients increase from 6.1% to 7.7% (Division of Epidemiology
1993).
In June 1993, the northern provinces reported the highest rates of infection in
blood donors (Mae Hong Son, 8.4%) and male STD patients (Phayao, 33%). Also, 7.6%
of new army recruits in the North were found to be HIV positive. The infection rate for
IVDUs was greatest, 70.8%, in the southern province of Chumpon. Pregnant women in
the province of Ranong (South) had a prevalence rate 7.6%. In the commercial sex
industry the greatest rates for low-charge CSWs and high-charge CSWs were 62.7% in
Nakorn Pathom (Central) and 37.3% in Sisaket (North), respectively (Division of
Epidemiology 1993).
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
The OPM and the MOPH Struggle for Control
The MOPH had directed the country's anti-AIDS program until the Anand
government adopted its "revolutionary" methods. During the Anand period, the
government advocated a multi-sectoral approach based on the view that AIDS was more
than a public health dilemma. In order to facilitate coordination between the various
agencies and ministries, control of the campaign centered in the OPM. Therefore,
ministries other than the MOPH had greater access to resources. Advocates, such as
Werasit Sittitrai of the Thai Red Cross, and former OPM's Minister Sairusee Chutikul,
maintained that AIDS is not just a medical problem or a public health issue, but a national
crisis threatening the country socially and economically (The Nation, 2-13-93).
Nonetheless, after Chuan took office in the Fall of 1992, the MOPH reasserted
itself as the core of the anti-AIDS crusades by regaining significant control of the AIDS
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budget and increasing its influence on the National AIDS Committee. "What they
(MOPH) have done is stage a coup to regain control over the committee and AIDS
budget. They've undone all of the Anand's government's efforts to set up an effective anti-
AIDS campaign," said an observer (The Nation, 1-21-93).
A parliamentary debate was fought over where the center of control for the
national AIDS program should be located in; the OPM or the MOPH. A powerful lobby
was behind the move to return overall control and coordination of government AIDS
prevention efforts back to the MOPH. This debate sparked editorials on all sides in both
English and Thai press (AIDS-Tech, December 1992).
Behind the debate was the 1.2 billion Baht (US $48 million).budget for anti-AIDS
programs in 1993 (The Nation, 1-21-93). According to Steve Krause, WHO-GPA
representative for Thailand, approximately US $40 million in budget was channeled into
the MOPH and approximately another US $10 million to other ministries and agencies
for 1993 (Krause 1993).
The majority of the budget has continually been allocated to the MOPH. However,
during the Anand era additional funding was funnelled through the OPM to other
government and non-government agencies. Of particular concern for the MOPH were the
funds--approximately ten million US dollars in 1992--designated to the OPM for mass
communications campaign. The MOPH, therefore, battled not only to retain its budget but
to regain control of funds allocated to the OPM and other agencies during the Anand
period.
On one side, in December 1992, the AIDS Policy and Planning Steering
Committee, established by and residing in the OPM, decided that the publicity budget
would remain with the OPM. The committee's planning and budgeting chief, Werasit
Sittitrai, said that since the disease could be reduced by social factors like informing and
changing people's behavior, the MOPH could not handle the problem alone; therefore, the
OPM and other ministries should be involved. "AIDS publicity budget has to be with the
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OPM because the MOPH has not been successful in providing information to people
about the disease," he added (Bangkok Post, 12-23-92).
Nonetheless, the MOPH did not relent and continued to maneuver for funds.
According to Deputy Minister Rakkiat Sukhtana, the MOPH should be the sole recipient
of government funding. "The ministry is directly responsible for this matter, but the
budget provided is comparatively small," said Mr. Rakkiat (Social Action Party). He said
even the Public Health House Committee (PHHC) felt the AIDS budget should go to his
Ministry (Bangkok Post, 1-13-93). The PHHC is the parliamentary committee staffed by
members of parliament that had the final decision on budget allocation.
Ultimately, the PHHC decided to assign the responsibility of handling the AIDS
campaign budget to the MOPH. Sources said the PHHC would allocate the University
Affairs Ministry funds to conduct AIDS research and confirmed that the OPM would be
in charge of publicity. PHHC first deputy chairman Songtham Panyadee (Chart Thai
Party, Chiang Rai) said the budget, like some research funding for certain ministries, had
been slashed and transferred to the MOPH because the committee felt the ministry was
directly concerned with solving the AIDS problem. He said the committee had carefully
considered each request and reduced the budget allocated to ministries such as Education
in favor of Public Health (Bangkok Post, 2-10-93). Professor Thavitong Hongvivatana,
the Vice President for Policy and Planning at Mahidol University, explained that the
politically-appointed Minister of Public Health, Boonphan Kaewattana of the Social
Action Party, was able to politically manipulate the budgeting scrutiny committee--which
is composed of politicians--to gain control over much of the AIDS budget (Thavitong
1993). Thamarak Karnpisit, Deputy-Secretary General of the NESDB, pointed out that
the Minister of Public Health was able to use his political influence to increase the
MOPH's control of the national AIDS campaign even though everyone involved realized
that AIDS is an inter-sectional issue (Thamarak 1993).
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The MOPH also attempted to gain back the influence on the NAC that it had lost
during Anand's "liberal era." In order to increase its prominence, the MOPH attempted to
reduce the number of committee members from 50 to 21. The reduction would have
meant that pro-ministry members dominate the panel. Prayoon Kunasol, Director General
of the CDC Department, said trimming the committee would facilitate decision making.
"The large number of members has made each meeting difficult--with members who are
academics always talking at length. AIDS is an old story. We don't need to talk about
details much. We should focus on policies in order to save the time of senior officials in
the committee." Under the plan, the academics would be transferred to subcommittees
which would not be involved in policy and decision making (The Nation, 1-21-93).
In the end there was a compromise as a total of thirty members sat on the panel at
the NAC meeting on June 3, 1993 (Churnatai 1993). The MOPH had a greater percentage
of members on the committee but disperse points of view were still represented.
It was the committee's first meeting in a year and a half. The long delay may be
attributed to political turmoil and changes in government. At the meeting the National
Plan for the Prevention and Control of AIDS: 1992-96 was adopted and four sub-
committees were approved; planning and policy, technical affairs, protection of rights of
AIDS sufferers or HIV carriers and the prevention and control of AIDS (Bangkok Post, 6-
4-93).
Politics within the MOPH
Not only was there friction between the MOPH and other government
organizations over the control of the national AIDS campaign, there were also internal
conflicts within the MOPH. In September 1993, adversity between a political appointee
and career bureaucrats surfaced. Public Health minister Boonphan Kaewattana of the
Social Action Party (SAP) transferred CDC Department Director-General Dr. Prayoon
Kunasol and Food and Drug Administration Secretary-General Dr. Morakot Korenkasem
100
to inactive posts (Bangkok Post, 9-14-93). This move was deemed politically motivated
in nature and was widely criticized.
By late September, the situation altered when the SAP was replaced in the
governing coalition by the Seritham Party. On September 24, the government announced
that Seritham's highly respected party leader Dr. Arthit Urairattana was to be rewarded
with the appointment as Minister of Public Health. Many involved in the anti-AIDS
campaign felt that this political move would be beneficial to administering a successful
campaign. Dr. Arthit is the head of the Phayathai Hospital and the rector of Rangsit
University. His reputation was enhanced after the political turmoil of May 1992, when he
recommended that Anand lead the interim government.
The NESDB Increases its Role
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) was included in
the national AIDS campaign during the Anand period. It is a respected government
agency responsible for planning Thailand's economic and social development. At the June
1993 NAC meeting, the NESDB was given the authority to coordinate the execution of
the AIDS Prevention and Control Plan. The NESDB will also incorporate the AIDS plan
in the 8th National Development Plan which is to commence in 1997 (Bangkok Post, 6-4-
93).
The NESDB realized that AIDS would have adverse effects on the economy. It
was particularly concerned with Thailand's human resources. Following the pattern begun
by Mechai Veravaidya, Wirat Wattanasiritham, Deputy-Secretary General for the
NESDB, used economic reasoning in attempts to stimulate Thais into action (Forbes, 12-
21-92). Thamarak Karnpisit, Deputy-secretary General of the NESDB, stresses that
Thailand already has as a labor shortage and believes that the AIDS epidemic will further
exacerbate the problem (Thamarak 1993). Then at the Third Annual AIDS Seminar, the
NESDB predicted that in order to maintain and further generate growth in the economy,
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Thailand would have to speed up its education and training programs to develop the
human resources to replace those lost to AIDS (Bangkok Post, 7-11-93).
Adjusting the National Plan
By early 1994, new policy developments were being promulgated. On February
15, the NAC, chaired by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, approved, in principle, a draft of
a new strategy. The National AIDS Prevention and Control Plan 1992-96 which was
initiated by the Anand government in 1992 is being altered to reflect the rapidly changing
AIDS situation. The new plan is called the Action Plan on AIDS Prevention and Control
for 1995-96. It places more emphasis on care of infected persons and living with
HIV/AIDS. Government spokesman Abhisit Vejjajiva said the new plan would
emphasize four main points in addition to those outlined in the current National AIDS
Prevention and Control plan: (1) To reach the risk groups; (2) To encourage families,
communities, and religious, non-governmental and business organizations to participate
in reducing the burden in taking care of HIV carriers; (3) To encourage all types of
counseling, starting at the district level; and (4) To develop management strategies and
ask all organizations concerned and all provinces to draft individual working plans under
the government committee, to suit the action plan (Bangkok Post, 2-15-94).
The NAC was unable to resolve human rights issues as several people, including
political administrators, could not understand why people should be protected from
having their blood tested (Bangkok Post, 2-15-94). AIDS Division Director Viput
Phoolcharoen said that the MOPH would hold a public hearing on the human rights issue,
saying both legal and ethical aspects must be considered (Bangkok Post, 2-16-94).
Public Health Minister Arthit Urairat added that a new administrative committee
has been set up to replace the coordinating sub-committee. It will be chaired by the
Minister of Public Health and would work directly under the NAC. It is responsible for
coordinating the distribution of the annual budget for AIDS prevention and control.
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Legislation: Controlling AIDS by Regulating the Sex Industry
Soon after Chuan came to power, the nation was in an uproar when a prostitute
was brutally murdered at the Songkhla Provincial Hall. She had escaped from a nearby
brothel only to be rejected by officials in the hall (Bangkok Post, 11-6-92). The event
intensified the mounting activism among legislators to deal with the commercial sex
industry. In a continuation of the trend that began during the Anand period, controlling
child prostitution, forced prostitution and the spread of HIV in the sex industry were
specified as government objectives.
The Chuan Government acknowledges that little can be done to eradicate the
culturally entrenched prostitution business. Chuan explained, "This government does not
have the immediate objective to close down all the brothels in the country. I accept the
truth that we cannot do this in a short period of time as the problem of prostitution exists
everywhere" (Bangkok Post, 6-28-93). Instead, much of the focus of its attention is on
preventing the exploitation of children. Chuan emphasized that "there must be absolutely
no girls under 18 in the flesh trade" (Inter Press Service, 1-29-93). He vowed to rid
Thailand of child prostitution not only to protect the youth from exploitation but also to
stem the supply of females to the sex industry and rectify the image of Thailand in the
eyes of the world community. To fund a program to stop child prostitution and
rehabilitate victims of the trade, the government approved a budget of over US $3.5
million (Inter Press Service, 1-29-93). The Department of Public Welfare declared 1994
as the "Year of Freezing Prostitute Numbers." A move praised by Chuan, but critics
doubted that it would have much impact.
Like Anand, Chuan has attempted to amend the Anti-Prostitution Law. There have
been several previous attempts at legislative amendments to tackle prostitution and to
curb the spread of deadly disease primarily by penalizing prostitutes. In a breakthrough,
the newest version would be the first to punish clients who have sex with children, agents
who supply child prostitutes, and brothel owners who employee child prostitutes. The bill
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would also protect male child prostitutes. The proposed revisions include punishing
customers who have sex with girls younger than 18 years old (Bangkok Post, 7-29-93).
Those who are involved with illegal activities concerning prostitutes under 15 years of
age will be most severely punished. The penalties for establishments employing child
prostitutes are much stricter than those proposed during the Anand period. However, men
visiting prostitutes over 18 would not be prosecuted (Bangkok Post, 8-19-93).
The Public Welfare Department proposed an amendment that would punish
parents who sell their daughters into prostitution by depriving them of parental rights
(Bangkok Post, 2-14-93). A significant development is the abolishment of the clause
which required CSWs to carry health cards. The requirement was deemed ineffective in
preventing the spread of HIV. It also misled the CSWs and their clients into believing that
they were safe because the girls were receiving regular medical check-ups.
Another piece of legislation, the Anti-Trade of Women and Girls Bill is also being
revised to cover the import and export of both females and males. The present law only
allows police to deal with the 'import' of women and girls. The revised law will empower
them to also deal with the "export" side of the business in what has become a more
complex international sex trade. Police Colonel Surasak Suttarom, Vice-Commissioner of
the Crime Suppression Division, believes that the revisions will allow the police to
handle the international trade of not only those sent into Thailand but also those who are
sent out (Bangkok Post, 7-29-93).
Bangkok Post columnist Sanitsuda Ekachai reports that the revised bill will give
police additional power to arrest conspirators before an actual crime takes place.
Runaway or rescued prostitutes will get accommodation under police care while they give
testimony, testimony which can be used in a trial without their having to be present.
Presently, police complain that they often lose their witnesses during the trial, and
therefore, must abort efforts to imprison those involved in the sex trade. The girls are
often threatened or find they cannot afford the time-consuming legal procedures. Judge
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Charan Padithanakul, one of those spearheading the bill revisions, exclaimed, "The point
is not the sex trade but the heinous crime of human trade" (Bangkok Post, 7-29-93).
Commenting on the proposed changes in legislation, feminist lawyer Naiyana
Supapueng comments, "The core problem is law enforcement. It's certainly better to have
a better law, but I doubt very much whether it can solve the problem of selective use and
corruption" (Bangkok Post, 7-29-93). Professor Bhassorn of Chulalongkorn University
notes that in spite of the good intentions, the effects of the proposed legislation may have
negative consequences on the child prostitutes. Bhassorn notes that in the South women
under 18 years of age do not go to STD clinics because they are considered child
prostitutes. How can they be helped if they go underground, asks Bhassorn (Bhassorn,
1993).
Supporters of the revised bills on prostitution are hoping that the increased
international focus on Thailand as a sex haven in the Summer of 1993, and consequent
local outrage, will help push the changes through--even if it is only a symbolic gesture
from a government concerned with its image. "I think our efforts will receive a more
positive response this time around," said Khunying Chantanee Santabur, chairperson of





Private Companies Join the Fight
An increasing number of Thai and multi-national corporations operating in
Thailand have begun to implement work place policies against AIDS. Activities in large
private organizations are most apparent. For example, the Dusit Thani Hotel, Robinson's
Department Stores and Thai Farmers bank have all implemented educational programs.
Then on September 29, 1993, Thai and foreign business executives launched the
Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS. Its purpose is to assist companies in developing
HIV/AIDS policies in accordance to WHO principles. Companies that join the coalition
have access to training and information (Bangkok Post, 9-29-94). The coalition was
organized by Bill Black, general manager of the Regent Bangkok, James Reinholdt,
managing director of Northwest Airlines, Steve Krause, WHO-GPA representative, and
Peter Deinken, USAID representative. The coalition's strategy is to use sound business
principles as rationale behind work place education rather than moralistic preaching, said
Black. The coalition tries to tailor its message to the business community by showing
companies how the epidemic might adversely affect their profits. Once the companies
understand how the epidemic will affect their businesses, hopefully, they will decide to
establish work place policies for AIDS, added Black (Black 1993).
The military, not generally considered the most enlightened institution in
Thailand, has the country's most progressive work place policy to date (Los Angeles
Times, 5-17-93). The military revised its policy and now accepts infected transcripts. It
conforms to the national AIDS policy of non-discrimination of infected persons.
Previously persons with HIV were discharged (FEER, 7-29-93).
Many Thai business leaders, however, prefer to ignore the issue. Since they do not
personally know of anyone who is infected with AIDS, they believe that the press and
leaders such as Mechai have exaggerated the impact of the disease. At an American
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Chamber of Commerce meeting in January 1993, local businessmen reportedly scoffed at
the notion that they or any of their employees might be HIV positive.
Insurance Companies Resist
Although some companies are taking progressive steps to confront the epidemic,
an increasing number of private insurance companies now screen all policy applicants and
decline to issue a policy if the applicant is HIV positive. American International
Assurance Company Limited Thailand (AIA), which controls over 50% of the Thai life
insurance market, not only screens new applicants but also started re-screening "high-
risk" policy holders in the Summer of 1993. Other companies may soon follow (The
Nation, 7-19-93). Larger companies and banks have also initiated a policy of screening
new employees, said Jon Ungphakorn. Only a few companies have established AIDS
education for their personnel and have policies guaranteeing work benefits for employees
with HIV, noted Steve Krause (Bangkok Post, 6-6-93).
Tourism Industry
The tourism industry continues to oppose anti-AIDS activities and publicity.
According to the TAT, 5.76 million tourists visited Thailand in 1993. This represents a
12.5% increase from 1992 (Reuters, 2-15-94). Black commented that beneficiaries of the
four billion dollar industry would not likely not deal with the AIDS issue (Black 1993).
When discussing plans to make a large AIDS quilt to raise awareness at the National
AIDS Committee meeting on June 3, 1993, a representative of the TAT voiced strong
opposition and the representative of the Thai Chamber of Commerce advocated keeping
publicity at a minimum (Ungphakorn 1993). Then at Thailand's third annual AIDS
seminar, the TAT warned that should the international mass media continue to publicize





The international image that Thailand's fame is due more to prostitution and AIDS
than temples, teak or smiling faces continues to be a major concern in Thailand and may
affect policies. In reply to international condemnation, in November 1992, both Prime
Minister Chuan and the Foreign Ministry, through Thai embassies, affirmed the
government's commitment to abolish child prostitution and child labor. When the US
announced that GSP (Generalized Systems of Preferences) privileges would be
discontinued for countries exploiting children, Interior Minister General Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh responded that Thailand would not use child labor and would stress
human rights (Bangkok Post, 11-6-92).
In the Summer of 1993, debate over Thailand's international reputation erupted
after international media highlighted Thailand's prostitution and AIDS problems. First,
Longmans English Language and Cultural Dictionary released its latest edition which
defined Bangkok as being "often mentioned as a place with a lot of prostitutes." Then the
June 21 issue of Time Magazine published a photograph of a Thai prostitute in the
embrace of a foreign tourist on its front cover. These events caused an uproar in the Thai
press and official circles. The government and officials denied such a label. Nitya
Pibulsonggram, ambassador and permanent representative to the UN, submitted a letter of
opposition to Time Magazine's headquarters. Alongkorn Pollabut, spokesperson for the
House Tourism Committee, said the committee would send a letter of protest.
Faced with international scrutiny, the Chuan Leekpai government re-emphasized
the need to fight child prostitution and carried out numerous raids against brothels. The
foreign ministry attempted to gain favorable coverage in the press by appearing
responsible for the repatriation of a group of female CSWs from Japan.
Chuan also criticized the Thai media and NGOs for exaggerating the situation and
the number of prostitutes which serves the foreign media in attacking Thailand. "An
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example is the report of Thailand having over 800,000 child prostitutes in addition to
some two million other prostitutes," said Chuan (Bangkok Post, 9-29-93). The Time
Magazine article used the figure of two million prostitutes. 2
Many others believe that Thailand's reputation as an international symbol of
prostitution is deserved. "While the problem in Thailand may not be the worst in the
world, Thai prostitutes rank number one the world over. They are undeniably the
worldwide symbol for the sex trade," writes Thai columnist Suwanna Asavaroengchai.
Calling it the most successful industry in the country, Tiziano Terzani, an Italian
journalist for the German weekly magazine Der Spiegal, added that there is nowhere in
the world where prostitution is so prominent, so open and so easily accessible (Bangkok
Post, 6-27-93).
Thai Media Coverage
Thailand's domestic media continues to contribute towards raising awareness
about the AIDS epidemic and the commercial sex industry. It also regularly charts the
spread of the epidemic and policy changes. Moreover, the tendency towards investigating
basic societal concerns related to the AIDS epidemic continues a trend that began during
the Anand period. Subjects that the media have focused on include: Buddhism's role in
the anti-AIDS fight, exploitation and empowerment of women, the evolving sexual mores
of Thais, living with AIDS, drug issues, and abortion rights. This type of coverage
reflects the views of both media personnel and the various participants involved in
prevention and control activities.
2 The Time article used figures from a UNESCO study which estimated that two million Thai
females work as CSWs and that there are 800,000 adolescents and child CSWs. NGOs commonly
cite figures ranging from 500,000 to 800,000. University of Michigan demographer Professor John
Knodel disagrees with the figures arguing that they do not make demographic sense. On the
other hand in 1992, the MOPH's survey found only 76,863 CSWs. Knodel and Werasit Sittradrai
believe that the most credible numbers are from the Thai Red Cross which estimated that there
are about 200,000 CSWs in Thailand.
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Thais often look to Buddhism for answers when problems brought on by outside
forces are not congruent with their beliefs or practices. The case of Phra Alongkod of Wat
Phra Bath Nam Phru is an example of applying Buddhist principles as a solution to the
AIDS dilemma. Phra Alongkod has been operating a hospice for AIDS sufferers in
Lopburi since September 1992. Phra Alongkod, who obtained a Master's degree at the
Australian National University, believes that AIDS is a social problem and that monks are
the best people to treat AIDS carriers on the basis of compassion and understanding.
"Buddhism is deep-rooted in our society, and no one can persuade the people as much as
temples. Therefore, monks should play a role in helping society because we are part of
society" (Bangkok Post, 2-21-93). In addition to acting as a hospice, a home care project
has been initiated which comprises of monks, doctors, nurses and psychologists who visit
home of HIV infected persons and give advice on how to cope with the illness (Bangkok
Post, 9-7-93).
Living with AIDS is also a topic that the media is highlighting. There have been
numerous stories focusing not only on how to care for infected persons, but also on
promoting compassion and nondiscrimination towards neighbors and friends who are
HIV/AIDS infected. In addition, editors and critics argue that laws must be passed and
measures be taken to ensure protection for infected individuals and to provide the
necessary support systems.
There has also been a proliferation of stories which point out the exploitation of
Thai women and the double standards in Thai society. Debate over these issues has
intensified with the spread of the AIDS epidemic and its relationship with the commercial
sex industry. Feminists, women's support groups and columnists provide their vocal
support to this movement. For example, Sanitsuda Ekachai, columnist for the Bangkok
Post, wrote an article entitled "AIDS and the Double Sexual Standard" (Bangkok Post, 6-
4-93). Others have stressed the need to empower women and the efforts that have
occurred to date. For example, at Thailand's National AIDS Conference (July 6-9, 1993),
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the media paid special interest to Thailand's attempts at empowering women. Dr.
Phaichitr Pavabutr, Permanent-Secretary of Public Health, said the ministry was
committed to developing ways to empower women. For example, a large-scale female
condom trial was underway in Udorn Thani. Such a device may enable women to protect
themselves if their partner is uncooperative. At that time, only three institutions in
Thailand were undertaking serious research to empower women; the MOPH, HIV/AIDS
Collaboration and Chiang Mai University (Bangkok Post, 7-5-93).
Coverage in the media has also focused on the right of pregnant HIV infected
mothers to have abortions. Of particular concern is their right to counseling and accurate
information before and after making the decision to abort or have a child (Bangkok Post,
9-5-93). There is also worry over the regulations of pipeline drug protection and the
consequences on AIDS drugs (Bangkok Post, 7-11-93).
On a more disturbing trend, articles that explore the sexual behaviors of Thais are
quite telling. There are indications that in spite of the AIDS epidemic, the sexual
networks among Thais are prevalent and extensive (Bangkok Post, 8-8-93). A new
phenomenon called "swinging"--clubs where middle-class couples socialize which may
lead to swapping of partners--has also become popular among a small segment of
Bangkok's population (Bangkok Post, 8-17-93). Professor Bencha Yoddamnern of
Mahidol University said that there is evidence that fewer teenagers are frequenting




This chapter analyzes the roles that participants both inside and outside the
government play in the agenda setting process. The major government participants in the
AIDS policy development process include the prime minister, political appointees,
members of parliament (MPs) and bureaucrats. Those outside the government include the
business community, academicians, NGOs, medical doctors, international organizations
and the media.
In Thailand, no single individual or group dominates the process but elected
politicians and their appointees have the most influence in agenda setting. Bureaucrats
were found to have more influence in choosing alternatives and in implementing policy.
Groups outside the government have had varying degrees of influence throughout the
process. The business community was initially successful at blocking the AIDS issue
from reaching higher levels of the political agenda. While the other outside participants
were very active in pressuring policy makers for change.
For each participant, this discussion first focuses on the general conclusions about
their role in the AIDS policy process. Then, particular attention is given to the
participant's contributions during the different administrations. To maintain consistency,
Kingdon's work on participants--which is an intricate part of his process model--will be
used as the basis of study. However, since Kingdon's research focuses on the presidential
system, research by Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993) on agenda setting in the
parlimentary system supplements the Thai case.
PARTICIPANTS INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT
PRIME MINISTERS
As the representative of the strongest political party in the government or
coalition, the prime minister is the most influential individual to affect the setting of
agendas. Although, the parliamentary system does not grant the prime minister the power
that a president yields, such as veto power, both the prime minister and the president
enjoy resources--organizational powers and command of public attention--that allow for
strong agenda setting potential. Therefore as Kingdon discovered in his examination of
the president's role in agenda setting (1984, 25), no other single actor in the political
system has the capability of the head of state to set agendas in given policy areas.
In a democratically structured political system, the amount of personal influence
that each prime minister has in agenda setting is dependent on his organizational powers
such as personal power within his party, relative size and strength of his party in the
coalition, degree of cooperation between political parties within the coalition, and relative
size of the coalition compared to the opposition. For example, the prime minister's power
and influence is greatly affected by his relationship with the MPs. When MPs belong to
the opposition they feel less restraint in pursuing their own agendas than they do when the
prime minister is from their own coalition. They are even more restrained if the prime
minister is from their own party. In other words, political parties can be a particularly
powerful organizing force because elected members almost always vote with other
members of their party. 1 Lindblom writes:
"Once legislators concede any significant authority to party leaders,
the leaders can strengthen their control by indirect use of authority.
In Parliamentary systems, where members of the majority actually
become cabinet ministers and take charge of running the government,
the prospects of receiving a ministerial position is sufficiently
1 Kingdon discovered that political parties affect the agenda more than they affect the detailed
alternatives considered by policy-makers (Kingdon 1984, 68).
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attractive that party leaders can usually hold a legislator to a party
program by threatening to deny him or her a leadership role."
(Lindblom 1993, 51)
The prime minister is usually the most influential person in his party and normally
receives support from the representatives of his party, even though factions within the
parties are not uncommon. As the leader of the strongest political party, the prime
minister has significant influence over the choice of political appointees. In Thailand, the
number of political appointees chosen from each political party is determined by their
relative strength in the governing coalition. The actual appointments are secured by back
room politics within the coalition.
PRIME MINISTER'S ABILITY TO SET THE POLITICAL AGENDA
Factor/Prime Minister PREM CHATICHAI ANAND CHUAN
Organizational Resources High Low Very High Very Low
Command of Public Moderate High High Low
Attention
Ability to Set Agenda High Moderate Very High Low
Prime Minister's Response Block from Higher Gives Partial Raise to Highest Maintains Agenda
Agenda Recognition Level Status
Agenda Status Reached Systematic Government Government Government
Agenda Agenda Decision Agenda Decision Agenda
SCALE: Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
In Thailand, Prime Ministers Prem and Anand had the greatest organizational
powers (see chart above). Prem's political base in the army and position with in the Chart
Thai party were powerful enough that party members--and consequently the government--
generally followed his leadership. In contrast, due to the temporary nature of his
government, Anand was able to proceed with his own agenda without having to worry
114
about party politics or significant opposition from other participants. Both Prem and
Anand had the luxury of choosing most of their political appointees. Of course the
opportunities for diverse participation outside the small circle of cabinet members and
political advisors was reduced under these governments. On the other hand, a prime
minister in a weak coalition government, such as Chuan, and to a lesser degree Chatichai,
is unable to rapidly execute policy, because members of parliament are not necessarily
accountable to the prime minister or his party. Chuan and Chatichai also had less input in
choosing political appointees because the positions were divvied up between the many
political parties that made up the coalition governments.
Perhaps the most obvious resource of a prime minister is his command of public
attention. His every appearance, statement and action are thoroughly scrutinized in the
media. Depending on the ability of the prime minister to utilize this resource, the
attention may be converted into pressure on other governmental officials to adopt his
agenda. However, the mere mention of an issue by the prime minister often is not enough,
rather personal involvement, such as phone calls or personal notes that show his
commitment may often precede agenda setting. Also the degree of partisan support is
dependent on the state of the prime minister's popularity. The more popular support a
prime minister has, the more likely he will gain parliamentary backing because there is
more cost at crossing a popular leader for the MPs.
While all prime ministers in Thailand are widely covered in the media, their
command of public attention varies depending on their personal ability to use the media,
and the respect that they are afforded. Although not a charismatic leader, Prem was well-
respected. His strong backing in the army was widely recognized and he provided the
government with stability. Chatichai had the ability to command public attention and did
so in the beginning of his administration. However, he was not able to utilize this asset in
the second half of his administration due to the highly publicized corruption in his
government. Anand also had a high level of ability to command public attention. He was
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highly respected to begin with and his stature grew as he made quick and progressive
changes. He was quite skilled at choosing the time and content of his public
announcements. For a prime minister, Chuan does not command a great deal of public
attention because of his relatively weak position in the government and his bureaucratic
manner of politicking.
Prime Minister Prem
Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1984 to August 1988) had the ability to
greatly influence political agendas because he possessed both organizational powers and
command of public attention. Prem's Chart Thai Party was strongly entrenched as the
dominant political party in Thailand. As the most influential member of the ruling party,
Prem was able to surround himself with handpicked political appointees who owed their
allegiance. Moreover, his strong power base in the army allowed him to weather periods
of political and economic change.
Although Prem was not a charismatic leader, he was generally well-respected. He
was viewed as an experienced elder statesman, who most importantly, provided Thailand
with stability. In comparison to some of the previous Thai military leaders, Prem's
approach was moderate and conciliatory. This helped assure the business community that
an atmosphere for economic growth would be maintained.
Even though Prem seemingly had the resources to place the AIDS issue on to the
government agenda, he was primarily responsible for keeping it off the agenda. During
this period, AIDS would remain a systematic agenda issue. A systematic agenda item is
one of many issues vying for formal status; reaching this agenda level does not require
governmental commitment.
Until the last year (1988) that Prem was in power, only a handful of persons had
reportedly been infected with AIDS and there was little knowledge of the parameters of
the disease. At this early stage, relatively few outside participants were actively pushing
to place the AIDS issue on the government agenda. On the other hand, AIDS was seen as
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a possible threat, although still distant, to economic and business interests. In the early to
mid-1980s, Thailand was in the midst of a recessionary period and the Thai economy was
forced to make structural adjustments. The business community supported Prem because
he was able to offer stability at a tumultuous time. Furthermore, the Prem administration
successfully targeted the tourism sector as an immediate growth area, and publicity about
the spread of AIDS in Thailand was perceived as possibly damaging to this most
profitable economic asset. Prem, therefore, had little to gain and much to lose by placing
the AIDS issue high on the political agenda. Moreover, he failed not only to publicly
recognize the urgency of the epidemic, but also actively blocked the AIDS issue from
reaching the government agenda.
Prime Minister Chatichai
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven (August 1987 to February 1991) placed the
AIDS issue on the government agenda. He also had the resources necessary to raise the
issue on to the government's decision agenda. However, he was forced to contend with
competing demands--to protect business interests and to become more active in
developing AIDS-related policies--in his decision making process. Although Chatichai's
stance evidenced compromise, he decided that it was not in his best interest to place the
AIDS issue on the decision agenda.
Chatichai had great skill in commanding public attention, but he was not as
strongly entrenched as Prem. In the first year and a half that he was in power, Chatichai
won wide-spread acclaim for his efforts at liberalizing the economy. His popular appeal
also stemmed from unprecedented economic growth. In 1990, however, his popularity
dwindled because of increasing awareness that corruption was rampant within his
government and the perception that instability was imminent.
Furthermore, the coalition government headed by Chatichai did not have the
organizational resources that Prem had. As an elected prime minister, Chatichai's
coalition did not enjoy a large majority. Foremost, Chatichai lacked Prem's power base in
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the army. His delicate relationship with the army was further jeopardized as Chatichai
concentrated on increasing his personal wealth and the wealth of his companions while
disregarding the Army's wishes.
As a general-cum-businessman, much of Chatichai's power was due to his pro-
business orientation. He and some of his closest cronies had large business interests that
benefited from Chatichai's powerful position. Consequently, his agenda often mirrored
the interests of the business community. On the other hand, it was much more difficult for
Chatichai, than Prem, to ignore the AIDS issue because of greater public awareness about
the epidemic. Although many believe that there were conscious efforts to suppress facts
concerning the spread of the epidemic, the truth began to surface by.1988. There were
factions within the bureaucracy that called for acknowledgment of the AIDS crisis. In
terms of the AIDS issue, Chatichai sought to regulate the flow of publicity so that
information about the epidemic could be released, and at the same time, tourists and
foreign direct investment would continue to flood into Thailand. However, the AIDS
issue could not be secured on the government decision agenda without the support of the
prime minister. Even when the politically-appointed Minister of Public Health, Chuan
Leekpai, called for increased government action in 1989, there was little real change in
Chatichai's position.
By the end of his term, however, Chatichai began making some concessions to
pacify the increasing number of factions that demanded the AIDS issue be placed higher
on the government agenda. The clearest sign of his growing commitment can be inferred
from the dramatic growth of the AIDS budget. Chatichai did not, however, go as far as to




The very status of the AIDS issue on the political agenda was contested until
Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun became head of the National Committee on AIDS in
August 1991, almost seven years after the discovery of Thailand's first case.2 Anand had
extremely strong organizational powers and command of public attention.
The Anand I government was appointed by the Army after the coup de tat in
February 1991. Anand was the Chairman of Saha Union (one of Thailand's largest
conglomerates) and a former diplomat. The purpose of appointing Anand, a respected
civilian, was to give the army-backed government legitimacy. Anand was an acceptable
leader for the majority of the elite and mass populace. Most Thais welcomed the change
in government because the corruption under Chatichai was perceived to have become
excessive.
Since the army placed the Anand in power, it expected that he follow the Army's
agenda. Anand, however, was quite adept at following his own agenda, often to the
dislike of the army. As long as Anand did directly cross or confront the army, however,
the army could not withdraw their support without weakening its own position. In
addition, Anand quickly gained statue as a leader by initiating brisk changes--many seen
as progressive--and his enhanced position made it difficult for detractors to challenge his
leadership.
The Anand II Government was chosen after the political occurrences of April and
May 1992. Anand was endorsed by His Majesty the King, prestigious Thai leaders and
influential politicians. He was considered the most suitable leader for restoring stability at
a time when the Thai populace and the world community needed reassurance that
Thailand would continue to be stable and safe. Although Anand did not enjoy the ardent
support of the military during Anand II, he was able to continue governing much as he
2 In the United States it took nearly six years into the epidemic before the first head of state
(President Regan) publically recognized the disease.
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had in Anand I. Publicly, Anand was cautious before taking a stand but his decisions were
highly respected. His command of public attention remained high.
Anand's organizational resources were enhanced because he had far fewer
obstacles to overcome than the previous government. Since he was not a politician and
did not belong to a party or a political coalition, there was relatively little pressure on him
to please the various political factions. Additionally he was not perceived as a politician;
nor as someone who became prime minister to further his own interests. In fact, Anand
clearly stated that he was not a politician nor that he would pursue politics in the future.
The Anand governments were somewhat unique in that they occurred in periods
of political transition. Once in power, the Anand government was not subjected to the
regular checks and balances of a parlimentary system. The MPs were busy campaigning
and gathering support for the future elections, and the legislative process was streamlined.
Consequently, there were fewer possibilities for the fragmentation of policy. Furthermore,
the positions regularly held by political appointees--who are often from other parties in
the coalition and have political agendas that very from that of the prime minister--were
filled by non-political appointees of Anand. Many of these appointees were technocrats or
represented institutions outside the government. In this un-democratic environment, there
were fewer opponents within the government to contend with than during the
"democratic" periods.
Prime Minister Suchinda
In the Spring of 1992, General Suchinda became prime minister for less than two
months. Under his leadership, the government advocated a less visible AIDS campaign.
Suchinda's Deputy Public Health Minister Charoon Ngamphichet said that the anti-AIDS
campaign would continue but more caution would be executed to avoid affecting tourism.
In publicizing the threat of the virus the MOPH would be more careful, he said, noting
the Anand government's public relations campaign had seriously affected tourism.
(Bangkok Post, 4-29-92) The reversal in policy by the short-lived Suchinda government
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and the beliefs that his government would not continue to be as open and frank with
information, supports the assertion that top leadership is a key participant. It also
indicates that the evolution of policy is not a natural process (from denial to recognition),
but is rather dependent on the orientation of the key participants and the type of political
system in which they operate.
Prime Minister Chuan
The Chuan period (September 1992 to the present) offers a stark contrast in terms
of the political environment and leadership. Relative to the previous prime ministers,
Chuan is deficient in both organizational powers and command of public attention.
Chuan's governing coalition is made up of five political parties and maintains a slight
majority. The parties joined in an unnatural union in order to wrest power away from the
traditionally powerful Chart Thai party. However, each party has its own agenda,
constituencies and factions. Within the coalition, Chuan's Democracy Party maintains a
slight majority. Therefore, Chuan has had less input in choosing political appointees. In
sum, Chuan does not have the power base to work from that former prime ministers
enjoyed.
To his credit, Chuan has kept the AIDS issue high on the government agenda and
at the same time has been praised for his courage in declaring war on child and forced
prostitution. As a former minister of public health, Chuan has perhaps the greatest
knowledge and background concerning the AIDS situation. Enthusiasm for his efforts has
dampened, however, because his bureaucratic style of governing is generally considered
deficient. 3 Furthermore, Chuan has not exhibited the ability to command public attention.
In the media, he is portrayed as being weak, and the general populace also shares this
belief. Therefore, although Chuan has kept the AIDS issue high on the agenda, he has had
3 The Bangkok Post reports that Chuan relies on official reports and in doing so has automatically adopted
positions set forth by public officials (Bangkok Post, 9-29-93).
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perhaps the least amount of impact on policy initiatives and in choosing policy
alternatives.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the head of state is the most influential individual in agenda setting.
Lindblom explains that democratically styled systems require leadership capable of
restructuring political controversy, finding common grounds for action among groups
otherwise in contention, and moving debate from profitless posturing toward new vision
and action. In principle, this kind of leadership can spring from anywhere in the system,
but the obligation and opportunities to provide it rest especially on the president or prime
minister (Lindblom 1993, 52). In the Thai case, the prime minister has had considerably
more influence on agenda setting when the political environment was less democratic (the
Prem and Anand periods). At these times, the prime minister did not have to contend with
pressures from as many participants and there were fewer opportunities for policy to
fragment.
Although the prime minister has much influence on deciding which issues are
placed on the government agendas, Kingdon notes that setting the agenda and getting
one's own way are two very different matters (Kingdon 1984, 73). The head of state may
be able to dominate and even determine the policy agenda, but is unable to dominate the
alternatives that are seriously considered, and is unable to determine the final outcome.
Of course during the Anand period, the administration included and worked closely with




The political appointees include cabinet members, ministerial or deputy-
ministerial positions, and key advisors to the prime minister. In theory, the political
appointees evaluate issues from within their own agencies and their own parties, and
arrive at some type of agreement from interaction with the OPM. They also generate
various alternatives that the OPM chooses from. Kingdon provides insight into their vital
role as policy makers:
"Even when the political appointees do not originate an idea, they
still play a large part in placing it on the agendas of important
people, both within and outside of their agencies. Many times,
proposals and ideas float around within the executive branch
agencies for some time, without being taken very seriously. But should
a high level political appointee take an interest in the project, the
issue suddenly attains much greater prominence." (Kingdon 1984, 31)
Even though political appointees owe allegiance to the prime minister and his
party because of the authority granted by the prime minister's commands, the appointees
have many other competing interests. As Lindblom notes, political participants do not
share a dominant common purpose; instead, each pursues some combination of private
purposes and his or her own vision of the public interest (Lindblom 1993,.25). In
Thailand, political appointees and cabinet members are regularly MPs which politicizes
the situation even further. They are expected not only to conform to party line and that of
the coalition government, but they also represent a geographic region and constituency in
which they have vested interests.
The amount of influence that political parties have on political appointees'
agendas depends on whether the political appointees belong to the prime minister's party
or another coalition party. The relative amount of cooperation and subservience between
the leading party in the coalition and the smaller coalition members are also relevant
factors. In sum, the prime minister has much less control and influence over political
appointees from parties other than his own.
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Although political appointees have sufficient resources for influencing political
agendas, most did not in the case of AIDS because of their political orientation. Political
appointees usually hold their positions for a short period of time and often try to
maximize the political benefits that these coveted positions afford. Moreover, political
appointees are temporary representatives of the ministry or agency that they head. They
do not have long-term vested interests in these organizations and often do not have the
expertise or background to understand the issues that the organizations face.
In the case of AIDS in Thailand, the Minister of Public Health has been a key
political appointee. Depending on the nature of the political environment and their
personal orientation, the ministers have promoted their own interests, supported
bureaucratic efforts, struggled for control over the national AIDS campaign and the AIDS
budget, and down played or raised awareness to the AIDS threat.
Individual initiatives by political appointees have had limited success in impacting
the agendas, because they lacked governmental support. During the Chatichai Period, a
stance taken by the Minister of Public Health, Chuan Leekpai, to raise the AIDS issue to
the government's decision agenda received little support within the government. This can
be attributed, in part, to Chuan belonging to a minor party within the coalition. Without
support, Chuan could not proceed with the same amount of vigor or success. In the Chuan
Period, Minister Boonphan Kaewattana of the Social Action Party sought to consolidate
his power within the MOPH which was incongruent with the wishes of Chuan's
Democracy Party. This type of policy divergence occurred within the coalition because
Boonphan's party exhibited little allegiance to the rest of the coalition.4
Again the Anand period was exceptional in that the positions normally filled by
political appointees were held by technocrats and bureaucrats. Due to the unelected nature
of the Anand government, Anand was able to personally choose his appointees. These
4 The Social Action Party was replaced in the coaltion by the Seritham Party in September 1993.
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appointees were not career politicians and did not represent a political party. Moreover,
they were less likely to have political ambitions and more concerned with sound public
policy. Within the administration, Anand chose technocrats from a wide-variety of
backgrounds, and gave them considerable leeway. Those with technical expertise, such as
bureaucrats and researchers, had considerable input not only in the choosing of
alternatives but also in setting the agenda. In particular, those directly in contact with
Anand, members of the OPM and the cabinet, were the most influential. Therefore, while
most politicians were gearing up to secure a position in the next government, Anand and
his technocrats pragmatically went about instituting changes.
The impact that they were able to make as appointees was outstanding. In
previous years, as advocates of policy development, they were unable to make a serious
dent in the status quo. But once given formal authority, the political appointees were able
to further their interests and beliefs substantially. In regards to AIDS, the appointment of
Mechai Veravaidya as Minister was most important. He was minister in charge of the
National AIDS campaign, public relations and tourism (during the Anand I government).
In addition to Mechai, prominent appointees included Dr. Sairusee Chutikul and
Professor Werasit Sittitrai. Dr. Sairusee had tried in vain for years to amend the
prostitution act as an activist. She was sternly against child prostitution and forced
prostitution. As a Minister attached to the OPM under Anand she was able to bring the
issues to the forefront. Although she did not have sufficient time to follow through on the
amendments, Prime Minister Chuan has continued to build on her initiatives. Professor
Werasit is a highly respected social researcher who was appointed to the OPM. He lent
his credibility to Anand's anti-AIDS efforts and promoted the multi-sectoral approach to
combating the epidemic.
A clear limitation to the political appointee's influence is their impermanence--
often they do not last as long as the prime minister as a result of shake-ups in the
government and the tenuous nature of coalition governments. These aspects tend to make
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them history happy. For example, Minister Boonphan was able to make an impact on
policy during his finite reign as Minister of Public Health by regaining control over the
majority of the funds allocated to national AIDS campaigns. Mechai also accomplished
much, with great fanfare, during his term as minister. Although some believe that Mechai
is overly concerned with his personal stature, his contribution to developing AIDS policy
can not be disputed.
MEMBERS of PARLIAMENT
Members of parliament (MPs) have a great degree of influence on the agenda
setting and the choosing of alternatives stages in the policy development process
(Kingdon 1984, 38). MPs possess assets that enhance their ability to set agendas
including holding legal authority, allocating funds, receiving publicity and being
privileged to blended information. Of course once they become political appointees, are
on committees, or are influential members, MPs have increased power to promote their
own agendas. Limitations to MPs' ability to set agendas include the loss of collective
power due to divisions in parliament, being forced to follow party line and their tendency
to dodge critical issues.
Although some Thai MPs backed progressive and controversial AIDS legislation,
they generally followed the top leadership in the government. The MPs tended to dodge
the controversial issues because they did not want to risk the alienation of their political
cronies or their constituencies. The reaction by some MPs also may have been affected by
the belief that publicity from the AIDS issue could be detrimental to the economy and
their personal business interests--which are often extensive. In Thailand, MPs greatest
impact on agenda setting has occurred when they are placed on key committees.
The parliament's power is based in its legal authority to enact legislation and
appropriate funds as well as the influence and visibility of some of its key members
(Palumbo 1988, 48). Perhaps its greatest strength lies in its legal authority. Any major
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changes in policy usually require new legislation. Also issues in the OPM may be shaped,
dropped or added because of support/opposition in the parliament.
In addition, the MPs receive formidable publicity; they hold hearings, introduce
bills and make speeches which are covered in the media and communicated to other
participants. The impact from publicity that each MP commands is dependent on his
political power, potential political power and his personal ability to entertain the media.
Publicity gives MPs a boost to any ambitions for re-election or higher office.
MPs are also privileged recipients of blended information. Since the parliament
has access to many levels in the government, the information they receive is not detailed
like bureaucrats but rather a blend of the substantive and the political. It is a mixture of
the academic and interest group information, as well as the bureaucracy and the
constituents. It is more rounded and informed than any one source.
The role of the committee is vital to the legislative process. The committee can be
viewed as a government within a government. With a few exceptions, legislation comes
to the floor of the parliament only after a committee has considered it and has made a
positive recommendation. Not supervised by any supercommittee nor joined together via
a coordinating body such as legislative cabinet, committees and even sub-committees
practice a striking degree of autonomy. Lindblom warns, however, that such
specialization and autonomy bring a likelihood that members of the relatively small
committees, and the even smaller subcommittees, will neglect considerations that other
legislators would consider important (Lindblom 1993, 50).
Thailand's Budget Allocation Committee is one of the most powerful committees.
It allocates the various budgets to the government agencies as it sees fit. The committee is
composed of MPs who do not have the technical expertise to understand the in-depth
nature of each area that funds are assigned. Although they receive technical input from
various agencies, their decisions are often influenced by political concerns. In addition,
leaders of the ministries and agencies, which are competing for the limited resources, are
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usually MPs themselves. At times, they are more concerned with gaining the greatest
possible share of resources for their organization in lieu of good public policy.
In the case of budget allocation to the national AIDS campaigns, the increase in
funds has been exponential and the battle over these resources has been fierce. Overall,
the MOPH has been allocated the majority of the budget. During the Anand period,
however, a significant amount was appropriated to the OPM. The OPM controlled the
budget for the mass communications campaign and allocated funds to other government
and non-government organizations. The stated reason for shifting control of the budget
was that the AIDS campaign should be multi-sectoral in nature and not confined to public
health measures. Once the Chuan government was installed, the MOPH was able to
regain control over a great proportion of the budget by winning approval from the Budget
Committee. Thavitong Hongvivatana, Vice-President for Policy and Planning at Mahidol
University, explained that the ability of the Minister of Public Health to influence the
members of the budget committee was a decisive factor in transferring control of the
budget from the OPM to the MOPH (Thavitong 1993).
Although the parliament has strong incentive to engage in agenda setting, it will
dodge controversial issues if it can (Price 1978). Dr. Apichart Chamratithirong, the
Director of Mahidol University's Institute of Population and Social Research, explained
that while politicians are serious about AIDS, they are reluctant to confront the issue,
because they are often more concerned with being re-elected. People do not want to hear
bad news and the politicians do not want to be seen as the bringers of bad news, Apichart
added (Apichart Chamratithirong 1993). When MPs do face an issue, it is very rare that
they delve into policy detail, Kingdon ascertains. Rather, the members are likely to set the
direction and leave the details to the staffers, who then consult with the bureaucrats,
interest group representatives, researchers and other specialists (Kingdon 1984, 74).
The impact of leadership in the parliament also affects agendas. Lindblom
explains, "Once the Prime Minister and senior cabinet ministers have debated a policy
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problem and reached a verdict--within very broad limits, set partly by what they think
their junior colleagues in the party will go along with--the actual parliamentary vote is
close to a formality" (Lindblom 1993, 51). Therefore, as with political appointees,
political parties can influence the agendas of MPs. This asset is enhanced if the governing
party controls the majority of seats in parliament.
In a parliamentary system, however, the collective power of the MPs is reduced
when there are a multitude of parties and divisions within the coalition and opposition
parties. Thailand's parliament has 535 individual agendas, various political parties
incapable of coordination, is deficient in the expertise to draft detailed proposals, and is
under the influence of interest groups, constituencies, and administration pressures which
may prevent them from setting an agenda of their own. The collective power of the MPs
has been particularly weak during the Chuan period and to a lesser degree during the
Chatichai period when the coalition government was divided.
BUREAUCRATS
Bureaucratic Assets
Bureaucrats play an important role in policy development. Their influence,
however, is most prominent in choosing alternatives and in implementing policy rather
than in agenda setting. The strengths of the bureaucrats are many. In his book,
Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, Rouke observes, "Within its own ranks, public
bureaucracy numbers a wide variety of highly organized and technically trained
professionals personnel, whose knowledge and skills powerfully influence the shape of
official decisions" (Rouke 1969, 2). The resources that bureaucrats hold are longevity,
expertise, dedication to the principles embodied in their programs, an interest in program
expansion and a set of relationships with the parliament and interest groups. Weber
emphasizes expertise as a major source of bureaucratic power (Weber 1949).
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Within the bureaucracy there are two general types of bureaucrats: line and staff.
Line bureaucrats administer existing programs and are usually preoccupied with these
programs. In Thailand's national AIDS program, line bureaucrats implement projects in
education, condom promotion, counselling, blood testing, etc. On the other hand, staff
bureaucrats are located in planning and evaluation or legislation offices and often have
more time to spend on policy issues. They concentrate on legislative proposals, studies of
future problems, and the directions public policy may proceed. In the MOPH, there are
staff bureaucrats in the CDC Department, Division of Epidemiology and the AIDS
Division. 5 The NESDB, OPM and all ministries involved in AIDS prevention and control
activities also have staff assigned to AIDS programs.
Contrary to Palumbo's assertion that bureaucrats can have the greatest impact on
agenda setting in the early stages of deliberation when policy makers are just beginning to
assign relative importance to various policy problems and government administrators are
often consulted (Palumbo 1988, 47), Thai bureaucrats played a relatively minor role in
the AIDS agenda setting process during the Prem period. As Sombat points out, a few
doctors in the MOPH and at the universities were the only Thais interested in the AIDS
problem in the first few years of the epidemic (Sombat 1993). However, the early efforts-
-which were both sparse and sporadic--by these participants were easily blocked by Thai
leaders who had other interests at stake.
Nonetheless, the MOPH staff bureaucrats have became the source of many policy
initiatives because they possess the necessary expertise in public health and the AIDS
issue has generally been considered a public health dilemma. Some of the ways that the
bureaucrats promote their ideas include gaining influence over the political appointees in
their agencies, shaping the flow of information essential to policy proposals, and forging
powerful relationships with interest groups and members of parliament.
5 The AIDS Division was created for staff functions but the Division has been critcized for
attempting to overextend itself by participating in line functions.
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As a bureaucrat and planner, Thamarak Karnpisit, the Deputy-Secretary General
of the NESDB, attempts to initiate policy development by influencing key leaders. He
argues that the message must be tailored to the crowd by using economic reasoning,
social reasoning--quality of life arguments--and political reasoning. Moreover, to obtain
the capability to pressure leaders on policy matters, a base of support must be built within
the bureaucracy. One must find those responsible in each ministry by targeting high-
ranking career civil servants, not ministers or deputy generals. 6 Then these persons must
be brought together through networking and workshops to build a core group from which
to work from, he added (Thamarak 1993). And indeed, there are that indications that
joining the bureaucratic efforts contributes towards policy development. According to
Steve Krause, Thailand's WHO-GPA representative, development of AIDS policy can be
attributed, in part, to a broader base of support within the MOPH and with bureaucrats in
other ministries (Krause 1993).
Bureaucratic Limitations
Participants and observers have noted that in the AIDS arena Thai bureaucrats
have been limited by a preoccupation with protecting their own budgets, power, or policy
turf, concerned with the process instead of results, and have become captured by ones
narrow set of interests. Lindblom explains that this quite common for bureaucrats:
"Personal ambition may be placed ahead of achieving a program's
goals; bureaucrats may self-protectively cover up errors instead of
correcting them; procedural rigidity may be used as a means of
escaping responsibility, even if it means willful persistence in actions
that are not succeeding, or that clearly are not worth the expense. All
lead to marked deterioration in bureaucratic intelligence." (Lindblom
1993, 63)
In Thailand, these limitations have manifested themselves in the MOPH's narrow
approach and fierce competition for AIDS funds. Until recently, AIDS in Thailand has
6 The political appointees who usually fill these position are often preoccupied with political matters and
have different interests than the civil servants.
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been considered a medical and public health crisis. The ministry, specialized in its
orientation, has been blamed for not giving serious consideration to the vast interests that
are outside its sphere of expertise. This is not surprising considering agencies with one
task by definition tend to ignore or under emphasize other concerns. With the added
incentive of controlling the AIDS budget, the MOPH has fiercely fought to protect turf
that it considered its own. Moreover, there is a strong tendency to protect their existing
programs even if they are not going smoothly because bureaucrats are concerned with
personal liability, the uncertainty of change, and being criticized.
Bureaucratic Agencies
Although bureaucrats from each Thai ministry and numerous government
agencies have been involved in the national AIDS campaigns, the majority are in the
MOPH. Within the MOPH, control of AIDS-related activities was originally given to the
Venereal Disease Department and then the CDC Department--when AIDS was labelled as
a communicable disease. The Epidemiology Division and the AIDS Division are other
bureaucratic agencies within the MOPH which are pivotal in AIDS policy development.
The Epidemiology Division is responsible for tracking the spread of the epidemic. The
AIDS Division provides support to the other government organizations' anti-AIDS
activities and advises the National AIDS committee and its subcommittees. Ungphakorn
notes, however, that it became clear at the June 1993 national AIDS meeting that the
Epidemiology Division and the AIDS Division have little political power (Ungphakorn
1993). Rather, their influence is greatest in generating and choosing policy alternatives.
In the Anand period, both the OPM and the National Economic and Social
Development Board (NESDB) were given prominence as agencies in the national AIDS
campaign in order to promote a multi-sectoral approach. The OPM coordinated the
national AIDS program, allocated funds to agencies outside the MOPH, controlled mass
communication efforts and proposed legislation. As the agency responsible for Thailand's
development plans, the NESDB was given responsibility to develop the national plans for
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AIDS prevention and control. Furthermore, the AIDS plan was incorporated in the overall
national development scheme. This signalled a shift in policy from one that promoted
AIDS control as a sole responsibility of the MOPH to one which included agencies such
as the NESDB, MOI and MOE. It reflects the realization by the Anand Administration
that AIDS is not only a public health/medical problem but is also a major concern for all
sectors of the society. Placing the AIDS issue in this context also exhibits the
government's high level of commitment to confronting the dilemma.
MOPH Remains Primary Bureaucratic Agency
Nonetheless, the MOPH did not relinquish its leading position and has remained
the focal point of the anti-AIDS campaigns. Except during Anand administration, when
the OPM was responsible, the coordination of the national programs has come under the
MOPH. However, even during Anand's administration, the MOPH controlled the
majority of funds and had the greatest say in the programs that were undertaken.
Outwardly the MOPH gave in to pressure from the Anand administration, but the
bureaucrats were well aware that the government was temporary and the changes
impermanent. This situation demonstrates the bureaucrat's vital resource of longevity.
Moreover, the expertise found in the MOPH could not be replaced.
A ministry can make the greatest impact on policy when the bureaucrats and
political appointees representing their ministry work hand in hand. During the Chatichai
period, there was some convergence in policy objectives between the Minister of Public
Health, Chuan Leekpai, and the bureaucrats in the MOPH. However, many of their
initiatives were blocked in the parliament or by the administration. On the other hand, the
Anand/Mechai leadership promoted many of the same policy goals as the bureaucrats. In
addition, positions normally held by political appointees were filled with career
bureaucrats and technocrats. The objectives, relationships and communication between
the ministries and government leaders was therefore greatly improved. Civil servants
proposed and initiated changes that would not have received such support during other
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administrations. Also, more liberal factions within the MOPH were afforded greater input
at this time.
On the other hand, an intense struggle between the career bureaucrats and the
temporary political appointees often occurs. An extreme case took place in September
1993 under the Chuan government in which a conflict between a political appointee and
career bureaucrats went public. The politically appointed Minister of Public Health,
Boonphan Kaewattana of the Social Action Party, was influential in wresting control of
the AIDS budget away from the OPM and back to the MOPH. His motives were viewed
with skepticism and distrust both inside and outside of the MOPH. In August 1993, he
transferred two respectable career bureaucrats, CDC Deputy Director-General Dr.
Prayoon Kunasol and Food and Drug Administration Secretary General Dr. Maorakot
Korenskasem, to inactive posts for questionable causes. In the end, the minister and his
party--a minority party in the coalition which had been uncooperative with the
government--were replaced in the coalition. The bureaucrats were reinstated to their
former positions.
In the above example, the career bureaucrats ability to outlast the political
appointee is evident. Nonetheless, the appointee was able to make a significant impact on
policy in his relatively short (one year) tenure. As Kingdon discovered in the United
States, it is the political appointee, the ministers, the deputy-ministers and the agency
heads who have the ultimate influence in the ministries for agenda setting (Kingdon 1984,
33). The staff bureaucrats are often under and responsible to the political appointees.
They make proposals in the hope that they will be later requested by upper level policy
makers. However, they depend on political appointees, the parliament and OPM to
evaluate their ideas to the point of receiving serious consideration on the policy agenda.
Kingdon adds that setting the agenda still depends on the political appointees, and the
civil servants are obliged to convince those appointees to highlight the subjects they
prefer (Kingdon 1984, 36). For example, career bureaucrats at the director and deputy-
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director levels have more influence and visibility than most bureaucrats in the MOPH, but
they can not rival the influence of the politically-appointed minister in agenda setting
matters.
Although relatively weak in influencing agenda setting, it should be reiterated,
however, that the staff bureaucrats in these departments and divisions are extremely
influential in generating and choosing alternatives. Perhaps more importantly, the line
bureaucrats actually make policy in the implementation phase of the policy cycle. If a
program in which they are working on is going poorly they often initiate changes and
contribute to policy development. However, line bureaucrats are usually so involved in
administrating existing programs that they have little time left for promoting new agenda
setting ideas.
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PARTICIPANTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT
Participants outside the government that have the ability to impact policy
development include the business community, academics, non-government organizations,
medical doctors, international organizations and the media. In Thailand, the line dividing
those within the government and those outside the government is not, however, always
distinct. Academics and consultants become advisors, NGO leaders become ministers,
and international organizations work in communion with government agencies. The
communication channels inside and outside the government are open and ideas often
freely circulate. In addition, common values, orientations, and world views form bridges,
at least to some degree, between those inside and those outside the government. Kingdon
notes that the distinction is nonetheless important because those in the government hold
official authority (Kingdon 1984, 48).
Nevertheless, the outside participants play an important and necessary role. The
government agencies do not have the resources or the expertise to consider all policy
issues or their various aspects. They must limit themselves to focusing on a manageable
amount of problems by limiting themselves to: considering policies fairly close to the
status quo, only focusing on a handful of policy alternatives, focusing primarily on the
most pressing problems, or trying a trial and error approach (Lindblom 1993, 27-29).
The inevitable result is that individual political participants and government
agencies neglect important considerations outside the scope of their immediate pursuits.
Fortunately, the outside participants fulfill this need by representing various interests that
may differ from the.government. "Rather than relying on any one set of analysts or
partisans to attend every issue in superhuman fashion, different people become watchdogs
for different social problems and needs" (Lindblom 1993, 30). In Thailand, the NGOs,
academics, international organizations and the media have strongly advocated the need
for AIDS policy development and pressured policy makers into confronting the issues.
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Interest Groups
Interest group leaders can be considered as part of the elite who set policy. In this
research, interest groups include the business community, academics, private medical
community, NGOs and international organizations. 7 The involvement of these
participants over the period from 1984 to 1993 varied depending on environmental
factors. Furthermore, their effectiveness at influencing policy was largely dependent on
their access to policy makers and the degree of involvement they were granted in
government affairs.
Lindblom writes that interest groups are helpful and perhaps necessary for
bringing diverse viewpoints, factual information, and other ideas into the policy making
process. In addition, the interest groups help the politicians in reducing the numerous
policy alternatives into a manageable amount. Therefore, interest groups help overcome
enormous diversity and conflict of individual interests. The interest groups do not
consider all views of all individuals, they do, however, help structure the conflicts.
Additionally, they do not accomplish policy positions on their own, but rather through a
shaping process affected by the media and other social factors (Lindblom 1993, 75-76).
Since the interest groups bring in diverse viewpoints, theoretically, the decision-making
process should be more intelligent, or in other words, based on a broader set of
perspective that incorporates important factors that participants involved in a narrower
may overlook. However, if one interest group is successful in dominating political
attention, their views will be over-represented to the detriment of other interest groups. In
this case, the process may actually become less democratic.
The interest group activities are varied. Their action can affect the agenda or
alternatives. An interest group that mobilizes support, writes letters, sends delegations,
and stimulates its allies to do the same can get government officials to pay attention to its
7 Some observers also characterize the media as an interest group. However, the media most often reflects
the views of the other participants rather than acting as an independent interest group.
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issues. There are also some more informal methods of influencing policy makers such as
golfing outings or social activities in which influential leaders of interest groups interact
directly with policy makers (Apichart Nirapathpongpor 1993).
A resource that gives interest groups an advantage in affecting the government
agenda is cohesion. The groups have the ability to convince the government that it speaks
with one voice and truly represents the preference of its members. Groups with electoral
clout, the ability to affect the economy, cohesion, and organization have better initial
resources than those lacking in such respect (Kingdon 1984, 55, 71).
There are numerous limitations to the interest groups successfulness. Officials
disregard some group leaders because they may be perceived as cranks, fools and
troublemakers. Of course interest groups often neglect common welfare in pursuit of their
own narrow interests (Lindblom 1993, 85-86). Policy makers cannot listen to all interest
groups, so those with the greatest access are often the most influential. Again it is the
elite, wealthier and more educated, who have the most access which may skew the
representative nature of the process.
In Thailand, the business community is the most powerful interest group. It's
primary role has been to keep the AIDS issue from reaching higher agenda status. The
business community, and more specifically the tourism industry, was most successful
during the less democratic Prem period when AIDS was relatively a new phenomenon,
and during the Chatichai Period when there was a close relationship between business
and government. The other outside participants have been instrumental in pushing for
policy developmentby attempting to influence government policy with external pressure,
most often manifested through the press. More effective involvement has occurred when
interest group leaders have been granted authority in the government or given special
access to leaders as advisors.
Additionally, the interest groups had greater influence when the AIDS issue was
less visible, and there was less ideological and partisan the debate about it. For example,
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at an early stage of the epidemic in Thailand, NGO leaders and academics were active
and influential in shaping opinion. Once the AIDS issue was given greater importance
and the debates began taking place in parliament, these groups had relatively less input.
Likewise, the business community was quietly able to influence the policy makers early
on, but as more formalized controls went in effect, the informal channels utilized by the
business community decreased in relative effectiveness.
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
This section first describes how the business community's tremendous resources
make it the most influential interest group. To protect its interests, the business
community used these resources to keep the AIDS issue off the government and decision
agendas. The tourism sector has exhibited particular concern because AIDS directly
threatens its profitable relationship with the commercial sex industry. To better
understand the situation, the development of the tourism and commercial sex industries
since the 1960s is briefly presented. However, the tourism sector is not an isolated entity
in the economy, but rather, it has links throughout the private and public sectors. The
discussion therefore focuses on the different participants who have interests in the
business community, tourism sector and sex industry. Next, the efforts of the participants
to promote sex in the tourism industry are mentioned. Finally, some indications of the
consequences of placing the AIDS issue high on the government's agenda are presented.
The most recognized interest group, and often the strongest, is business and
industry. The business community is extremely influential because of its domineering role
in the economy and its ability to affect politics.8 Lindblom observes that in market-
oriented societies, business managers organize the labor force, allocate resources, plan
capital investments, and otherwise undertake many of the organizational tasks of
8 The term "interest group" can be misleading. As an interest group, the business community cannot be
considered a single entity. Business enterprises do not form groups in the normal sense of the word.
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economic life. These public officials give the private sector a system of control over
society's directions that rivals government in overall importance (Lindblom 1993, 8).
The resources favoring the business community in influencing policy
development include: (1) No other interest group has the disposable funds like the
business community; (2) The ease that business leaders gain access to government
functionaries; and (3) Business already has functioning organizations from which to
launch business activities. In other words, business mangers do not have to assemble a
team of political activists, but rather use of their own enterprises as political organizations
has become common practice. As political organizations, the most obvious business
activity is conducting public relations campaigns. However, government's efforts to retain
influence are especially difficult because business executives also are'major participants
in political life. They "contribute to campaign funds, put their own energies to work in
political parties and interest groups, and organize to further the candidacies of persons
favorable to them" (Lindblom 1993, 99-103).
In Thailand, the business community's primary role in the policy making process
has been to block the AIDS issue from rising to higher levels of the government agenda.9
The fact that interest groups have much more success blocking an item from reaching the
agenda than putting one on the agenda, is in part, a consequence of a democratically
structured system. To reach the government's decision agenda, an issue had to pass
through many checkpoints. To pass legislation and develop official policies during the
Prem and Chatichai periods required support by the executive branch and in the
parliament. Important legislation was scrutinized by various committees and had to be
ratified by both the Senate and House of Representatives. Furthermore, the steps to pass
legislation often took an extended period of time, sometimes longer than the elected
9 As Kingdon observed, the actual creation of policy agenda items by interest groups may be a less frequent
activity than blocking agenda items or proposing amendments to or substitutions for proposals already on
the agenda (Kingdon 1984, 54).
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politicians were in office. The involvement of multi-party coalition governments and
opposition parties complicates this process. Each individual member and political party
have different agendas which they try to fulfill. In this situation, the possibilities for
fragmentation in policy making are numerous. If an interest group is successful at
influencing those inside the government at any point in the process then the issue can be
blocked from the agenda. Since politicians have strong interest in the business
community's continued success, it is not surprising that the AIDS issue was kept off the
government's decision agenda even though it went against sound public policy.
The Thai case illustrates that the central role of business in politics can render the
task of intelligent, democratic governmental policy making extremely difficult. According
to Lindblom, when government officials and representatives of public interest groups try
to oppose or circumvent the business community in the policy making process, three
influential forces stop their action. First, government officials fear that regulations will
cripple business or industry, causing harm to workers, communities, the society, and to
the officials as well. Second, many citizens share the fears of government concerning
"excessive" restrictions on business. Third, electoral and other political activity by
business works to enlarge the fears of both governmental officials and ordinary citizens
(Lindblom 1993, 102-3). Moreover, an additional concern of many Thai government
functionaries is to protect their own business interests.
A significant systematic difference that characterized the Anand period was that
the political leaders did not have to overcome the constraints of a democratic system.
During the caretaker governments of Anand, the checks and balances of a democratic
government were largely absent. Furthermore, not only were there less points where
policy could be fragmented, but the swiftness that policies were passed left opposition
forces little time to defend their positions. Without these "obstacles," Anand and the
technocrats in his administration were able to pursue their own agenda which happened to
be considered good public policy.
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Leaders in the Anand administration were also astute enough to realize the
potential benefits that support from the business community could have on AIDS policy
development. Therefore, they attempted to reason with business leaders by using an
economic and business approach. Foremost, they emphasized the negative impact that an
unchecked AIDS epidemic would have on the Thai economy and their companies' profits.
This approach was somewhat successful because the message was communicated clearly
and some business leaders took it to heart. 10 On the other hand, many business leaders
were alienated by the aggressive style of the national AIDS campaign because it
emphasized the alarming projections of AIDS/HIV cases and the epidemic's dire
consequences.
In the case of AIDS policy development in Thailand, business is not a
homogeneous or cohesive political class and does not attempt to shape policy as a unified
pressure group. 11 Within the business community, the tourism sector has had the biggest
impact on AIDS policy. As a result of exponential growth over the last 30 years, revenues
from the tourism industry now exceed four billion dollars annually and tourism has been
the largest single contributor of foreign exchange since 1982. In addition, the groups and
individuals who have interests in the sector are diverse and numerous. The web of
interests include a rather intricate set of relationships between the tourism industry, the
broader business community, politicians, government officials, the Thai police and the
Thai military.
The advent of the AIDS epidemic was perceived by many leaders as threatening to
continued growth in-the tourism industry. Moreover, political leaders feared that they
would lose key political support from the business community if they supported AIDS
10 Some companies, mostly large Thai companies and Western MNCs, have taken positive steps to deal
with the AIDS epidemic. In 1993, the Thai AIDS Business Coalition was formed to assist companies in
dealing with epidemic. Activities have been primarily limited to educational efforts although some
companies are developing work-place policies. The business leaders have stopped short of pressuring the
government for more progressive policies.
11 It is often not actual groups of individuals that are in a position to influence policy rather it is a few top
managers or organizational leaders who determine the interest groups activity.
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policy development. Some leaders were also concerned with their own direct interests in
the industry. Consequently, both business and political leaders sought to block the AIDS
issue from rising on the political agenda.
Their fears stemmed from the belief that a highly publicized national AIDS
campaign would scare away tourists and foreign direct investment. Concern was based on
two main factors: (1) Publicity about the epidemic was potentially damaging to Thailand's
international reputation; (2) The fact that the tourism industry has a close relationship
with the commercial sex industry directly links it to the AIDS threat. To better understand
the relationship between the commercial sex and tourism industries, and the involvement
of the various participants, a brief presentation on tourism development since the 1960s
follows.
Development of the Tourism Industry
In the 1950s, the potentiality of tourism as a source of growth for the Thai
economy was largely ignored. However, during the 1960s, tourism blossomed due to the
unexpected influx of US military personnel on rest and relaxation (R & R) leave from the
Vietnam War. As the war progressed, Thailand became the only R & R location for US
personnel. From 1965 to 1973, the results were dramatic as the number of annual tourist
arrivals increased four-fold and tourism receipts by a factor of seven (Tourism Authority
of Thailand 1989).
This boom in tourism was accompanied by haphazard investment in supporting
infrastructure and services. From 1964 to 1968, the number of hotel rooms in Thailand
increased at annual rates of 18.5%, 21.0%, 95.8%, 31.1% and 26.0%, respectively
(Tourist Authority of Thailand 1989). Loans were supplied by various domestic and
international financial institutions. 12 Many hotels were financed by short-term, high-
12 Financial support originated from various sources such as the US Export-Import Bank, Thai Board of
Investment and the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand, a consortium including the Bank of
America, Chase Manhatten, International Finance Corporation and the Deutsche Bank AG (Permtanjit
1982, 215).
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interest loans. At this point, the primary goal was short-term benefits for those directly
involved in the industry. It would not be until the late 1960s, however, that tourism
emerged in official policies.
It was during the Vietnam War era that tourism and prostitution became closely
linked. Two laws, contradictory in nature, were passed that allowed prostitution to
flourish under the cloak of legalized entertainment establishments. The Prostitution
Suppression Act (1960) defines prostitution as a crime. However, the Service
Establishment Act (1966) legitimized entertainment as an industry and legalized places
which allowed women to provide "special services." The act gave the entertainment
industry legal formalization aimed at capturing the R & R market. Consequently, there
was a proliferation of prostitution disguised within the entertainment industry such as go-
go bars, massage parlors and tea houses. These types of establishments continue to be an
intimate part of many tourist's Thailand itinerary.
In the 1970s, two trends occurred in the tourism industry: One, the void left by the
end of the Vietnam War was filled, in part, with sex tourism; Two, tourism became an
integral part of the nation's long-term development plans. With the withdrawal of
American troops from Vietnam, growth in Thailand's tourism slowed immediately. The
hotel industry was hit hard by the absence of American military and by a over supply of
rooms--a consequence of the erratic nature of investment that occurred in the 1960s.
Many of the first and second class hotels turned to sex tourism to boost business. 13 The
random manner of combining prostitution with other tourism services became more
systematized as enormous revenues were realized.
Nonetheless, in the 1970's, Thailand integrated tourism in to the nation's economic
development plans. By 1970, spending by US military personnel had reached as much as
13 One example is the Grace Hotel, a first-class hotel built in 1966 with 104 rooms to host US R & R
tourists. In the 1970s, the hotel developed into a 'sex farm' (and expanded to over 300 rooms) whose
services were contracted to tour operators from Switzerland and Germany, and to visitors from the Middle
East and the Pacific region (Business in Thailand, November 1981, 44).
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one-forth of the total value of rice exports for that year (Bangkok Bank Monthly Review,
October 1973, 666). As Truong notes, "The effects of Rest and Recreation tourism on the
balances of payments were so substantial that when the market declined, alternatives had
to be found to maintain the operation of the tourist infrastructure for investment returns
and benefits" (Truong 1990, 199). After the World Bank recommended more investment
in tourism infrastructure and sites, the Thai Government commissioned the National Plan
on Tourist Development (Business in Thailand, December 1981, 60). Large infrastructure
projects were undertaken to bolster this strategy. The TAT has listed ten major tourism
development projects undertaken in the 1970s, including the construction and expansion
of 17 deluxe hotels with a total of over 9,000 rooms (Rojanasoonthon 1982). In 1979, the
Tourist Organization of Thailand (TOT) was upgraded to the Tourist Authority of
Thailand (TAT) and was given the power to develop infrastructure and tourism-realted
facilities (Rojanasoonthon 1982).
In the early 1980s, the world economy experienced a slump in primary product
prices. Thailand became increasingly dependent on the service and manufacturing sectors
of its economy. By 1982, tourism had become the largest single earner of foreign
exchange. Muscrat writes that although the World Bank ceased to support the tourism
industry in the late 1970s and Thailand's Fifth Plan (1981-1986) failed to address the
industry, tourism promotion became Prime Minister Prem's single most important export
policy strategy (Muscat 1994, 197).
During the early Prem period, tourism arrivals and earnings grew at over ten
percent annually (except 1983). As a bright spot in a recessionary period, the Prem
government decided to make an extraordinary effort to promote the industry, because of
its potential to increase foreign exchange earnings in a relatively short period of time. The
government appointed economic managers to organize public and private organizations,
and to oversee the development of an integrated program of international promotion, and
domestic investment in accommodations and services, built around the Visit Thailand
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Year, 1987. The result was to increase tourism earnings from approximately US $1
Billion in 1985 to nearly US $2 Billion in 1987 and over US $3 Billion in 1988 (Tourist
Authority of Thailand 1989). (See the following chart).
Number of Visitors and Tourism Receipts















A Labyrinth of Interests
To support the government's strategy of promoting the tourism industry, private
and public organizations (the hotel industry, tourism companies, TAT, Thai Airways, the
Airport Authority, etc.) worked together to reach tourism objectives. The direct
beneficiaries of tourism receipts are the hotels, airline companies, tour operators and
agents. The labyrinth of individuals and companies that have interests or relationships
with these organizations is immense. For example, accompanying the growth in tourism
were multiplier effects on such activities as construction, land transaction, public
investment in airport facilities, handicrafts and recreation services (Muscrat 1994, 197).
Furthermore, as the number of tourists soared, there were growing demands for more
varied attractions. Consequently, an expansion in tourism services and the geographic
diversity of tourism destinations followed. In other words, interests in the success of the
industry were no longer concentrated in Bangkok, Chiang Mai and a few coastal resorts.
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Participants with direct and indirect interests in the sex-tourism industry include
government officials and politicians, military personnel, the mafia, the police and
financial institutions. The Bangkok Post reported that police and military officers as well
as government officials are known to be involved in hotels, entertainment places,
prostitution and in the traffic in Thai women abroad (Bangkok Post, 11-7-83). The Far
Eastern Economic Review wrote that underlying the defense of business interests in the
commercial sex industry "is of course the triumvirate of brothel owners, police and
politicians who have a financial interest in keeping the industry going. This is not a petty
group: senior politicians and their staff are known to have interests in brothels" (FEER,
11-2-89).
Thailand's military/political leaders have had a history of collaboration with the
commercial sector which has continued to flourish with the growth of the tourism
industry. 14 From the beginning of the R & R period, high ranking Thai military personnel
were intimately involved in tourism industry activities and, consequently, many
developed financial interests in the industry. For example, the negotiations for the R & R
treaty were conducted by a general of the Thai Airforce, whose wife was a co-director
with a foreign air force officer, of a tour agency--Tommy Tours. The monthly net income
of Tommy Tours in its first year of operations was estimated to be US$ 150,000 (Le
Monde Diplomatique, 7-4-70). As the industry grew in the 1970s, key military figures
14 The relationship between military/political leaders and the commercial sector began with the abolishment
of the absolute monarchy in 1932 and intensified after World War II. In particular, the 1950s witnessed a
proliferation of close ties established between the communities. This relationship can expressed in the
number of ministers and officials who became board members in private companies, often holding seats in
many companies. Fred Riggs analysed the Thai bureaucracy and reported that "61 out of the 237 men who
had been cabinet members between 1932 and 1962 held positions on boards of director of business and
industrial corporations from 1952 to 1957" (Riggs 1966, 266). In particular, seven generals who
orchestrated the 1947 coup de tat, occupied 91 board of director positions (Riggs 1966, 266). Their
involvement extended to most sectors including banking, trading, mining, manufacturing, construction and
services. A significant portion of this integration resulted from the development of collaboration between
military/political leaders and ethnic Chinese business leaders. Some of these ethnic Chinese businessmen
formed business groups which now control much of Thailand's commercial sector activity. During a period
when anti-communist and anti-Chinese sentiment ran high in the 1950s, it was impossible--even for the
largest business groups--to continue to develop their enterprises without political patronage of the military
command (Suehiro 1989, 138).
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became involved in the national efforts to develop tourism. Perhaps most importantly,
key organizations such as the Tourist Authority of Thailand and Thai Airways have been
chaired by military leaders.
Dr. Sairusee Chutikul, a former cabinet member under the Anand administration,
explained that the sex industry is under mafia influence: "I have heard, unofficially, that
they [the mafia] exercise a great influence over high-ranking police officials." The mafia
consolidates sex establishments into networks which increases their power, she added
(Bangkok Post, 9-17-91). Police Colonel Banch describes these networks: "They (brothel
owners) join together in an association which handles everything which will be needed to
keep them in business. Each pay a membership fee and a head fee for each prostitute to
the chairman of the association. The fee can be between 250 and 700 Baht [US $10 and
$28] per head. The money is then distributed to all concerned" (Bangkok Post, 2-16-92).15
To protect their interests, the proprietors of "entertainment establishments" rely on
police cooperation which they obtain with financial favors. Consequently, the police are
an integral participant in the protection of the sex and tourism industries. The police have
not enforced the Prostitution Suppression Act because many policemen of both high and
low rank have some type of business relationship with entertainment establishments
(Plukpongsawalee 1982, 160). Even honest policemen are helpless because of the
powerful participants involved: "Often, the police can't do anything because they know
that the men behind the operation of some brothels are those whose pictures are
frequently seen in the newspapers, attending big parties with top ranking policemen and
government officials" (Business in Thailand, November 1982, 160). Although, some
police are alleged to have ownership in businesses that offer prostitution services, more
commonly, police reap benefits from turning a blind eye on illegal activities. The
coexistence of the two contradictory laws (the Prostitution Suppression Act and the
15 One association Narathiwat province has 50 member brothels (Bangkok Post, 2-16-92).
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Services Entertainment Act) permits prostitution to flourish while at the same time
making it illegal. The police can easily ignore the activities being undertaken in these
establishments or crack down on them depending on their personal relationship with the
establishment and the nature of the establishment's ownership.
Attempts to enforce anti-prostitution laws have been sporadic and largely
ineffective. One effort occurred during the Anand period when a special task force was
organized with high ranking police officers. They were given the authority to free child
CSWs (under 18 years of age) from brothels. They were quite successful as hundreds of
CSWs were released each month. Strong protests were heard from the brothel owners and
the police officers were threatened. Nonetheless, the task force was able to continue
operations due to the strength and independence of the Anand government. Once the
Anand Government was replaced, however, the task force was abolished and the officers
were transferred to the inactive list (Debanom 1993).
One of the most important participants in tourism development have been
Thailand's financial institutions.16 The institutions first got involved with hotel
development in the 1960s, and then became an integral player in the efforts to develop
tourism on a national scale beginning in the 1970s. Although most loans supported
infrastructure projects and large hotel development, banks have also been involved in
financing entertainment establishments. The larger legal entertainment establishments,
such as massage parlors with 700 to 1000 service girls, are able to borrow money directly
from the banks and other investment companies (Srisang 1990, 43). For example, the
Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand gave loans to seven companies involved in
prostitution activities (Permtanjit 1982, 215).
16 The leading banks, a central part of the Thai business groups, are an intregal part of the Thai economy
and are linked to all sectors of the economy.
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Political Leaders Rely on a Strong Economy
Although some elected officials have direct interests in the tourism industry, more
often than not, their relationship is indirect in nature. Politicians often rely on financial
contributions from the business community to run their election campaigns and to reward
their loyal supporters. Additionally, the politicians rely on a strong economy to maintain
power. Therefore, even if business executives did not play a direct role in influencing
elections, political activities, or governmental actions, they would still be important to
policy making because the politicians must favor private industry in order to stay
politically healthy.
The rules and structure of the free market system limits the government's ability to
control business. To maximize economic gains government officials must listen to
business executives to find out what business needs. The government must provide
supporting policies that promote a business environment conducive to profit making
activities. Neglect of business, on the other hand, may lead to unemployment and
stagnation; or political suicide. Although business can demand that the government act in
a certain manner to support business activities, more often business managers strike no
explicit bargain. Business leaders simply operate under circumstances in which both they
and government officials know that continued performance depends on (Lindblom 1993,
93-95).
The influence of the business community on AIDS policy rose and fell in the
different periods. During the Prem period, the political strength of business grew because
there was widespread concern about the state of the economy. 17 Although the army was
Prem's main source of support, backing by the business community was crucial as well.
Conservative fiscal management, well-planned structural changes in the economy, and
strong leadership during a recessionary period were reasons that the business community
17 For an indepth analysis of the political strength of businesses over the business cycle see Vogel (1989).
150
provided backing for the Prem administration. Prime Minister Chatichai did not have as
strong of a power base in the army, and perhaps more than any other prime minister, he
relied on strong economic performance and the vital support of the business community.
It was not until corruption by Chatichai and his cronies became "excessive" that the
business community, and the army, relinquished support. Anand, on the other hand, did
not rely on the business community for support, and consequently, was able to forge
ahead with highly publicized anti-AIDS and anti-prostitution campaigns much to the
displeasure of many in the business community. Prime Minister Chuan's coalition
government has been able to maintain a slight majority while the economy has expanded
rapidly. Although Chuan's relationship with the business community is indirect, it is
questionable whether Chuan would be able to maintain power without continued
economic growth. The Chuan administration has promoted AIDS policies similar to those
of Anand, but is less threatening to the business community because of the relative
ineptitude of the government.
Domestic Commercial Sex Industry
An additional factor to consider is that the domestic commercial sex industry18
shares, with the sex-tourism industry, the common interest of keeping AIDS off the
government's decision agenda. Those catering to Thai customers have benefitted from the
maintenance of the status quo in the sex-tourism industry. The domestic sex industry has
been left to flourish, in part, because tourism's importance to the economy has allowed
sex tourism to grow unhindered and has provided a shield to protect the domestic industry
from prosecution. Moreover, the two sectors overlap in many respects: some
establishments service both Thais and foreigners,19 owners have interests in both sectors,
18 The number of establishments and commercial sex workers servicing Thai males is greater than those
that primarily service tourists. Although there is no agreement as to the economic significance of the
domestic market, the tourist market is widely considered to provide greater contributions.
19 The segregation between those establishments which cater predominantly to the foreign clientele and
those which draw their clients from the local population has gradually broken down over the years (Cohen
1988, 481).
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and there is a sharing of resources between the sectors--including CSWs. Therefore, those
catoring to the domestic customers have also supported the stance that Thailand should
deal with the AIDS epidemic in a restrained manner.
Government Promotes Prostitution as an Asset of Tourism
Although the actual number of tourists that visit Thailand for its prostitution
services has not been accurately gauged, 20 it is evident that the airlines, hotels, tour
operators and entertainment places have a clear interest in promoting prostitution as a
tourist attraction (Truong 1990, 181). Furthermore, leading officials have gone to the
extent of publicly endorsing prostitution as a critical economic asset of the tourism
industry. A former director of the TAT stated his position:
"Yes, we have to admit that we have prostitution, but it is the same for
every country ... It might be partly true [that tourism encourages
prostitution], but prostitution exists mainly because the state of our
economy, because everyone needs to earn their income. If we can
create jobs, we can promote per capita income and do away with
prostitution." (FEER, 1-9-76)
Late in 1979, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, Police-General Choompol Lohachala,
declared that his department would "respond to the cabinet's resolution (to promote
tourism) by lengthening service hours of entertainment places in Bangkok to welcome
tourists" (Srisang 1990, 40). Speaking at a national conference of provincial governors in
October 1980, Boonchu Rojanasathian, former Deputy-prime Minister for Economic
Affairs, encouraged governors to contribute to national tourism efforts by developing
scenic spots while encouraging "certain entertainment activities which some of you may
find disgusting and embarrassing because they are related to sexual pleasures" (Sanakhaw
Prachachon Judaakhon, 11-20-80, 1-2).
20 A 1979 survey of Bangkok tour operators found that 90 % of the visitors from the Middle East were men
coming for the night life (Business in Thailand, January 1979). Studies in Japan indicated that between 60
to 80% of Japanese men who visited Thailand went to establishments that provided sexual services (Daily
Telegraph, 8-8-92). A study in 1991 found that 75% of German males who visited Thailand went there
expressly for sex tours (Graham 1992).
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Direct and Indirect Promotion
The tourism industry has successfully used prostitution as a marketable feature to
attract foreign consumers. The government, tour operators, hotels and airlines have
utilized both indirect and direct ways of exploiting Thailand's sexual attributes. The
government's role in tourism promotion efforts has been indirect. Most importantly, it has
established policies and laws which allow prostitution to flourish. Tour operators directly
participate by organizing sex tours, and indirectly, by promoting sex as a tourist attraction
and providing customers with information on places of entertainment. Some hotels have
become directly involved by offering prostitution services or hosting sex tours. Indirectly,
hotels provide information to clients on services available in entertainment places outside
the hotel or by charging a 'joiner fee' for visitors who bring in a guest. Airlines are
indirectly involved with the sex tours and tourism promotion (Truong 1990).
Effects of High Agenda Status on Tourism
Thai leaders perceived that the tourism industry would be devastated by excessive
publicity if the AIDS issue was placed high on the government's decision agenda. On the
other hand, advocates of high agenda status for the AIDS issue argued that an open and
frank policy would benefit, rather than hurt, the tourism industry. The rationale being that
tourists would feel safer about coming to Thailand if they knew the situation was under
control. As it has turned out, placing AIDS on the highest level of the government agenda
(in 1991) and promoting a highly publicized national AIDS campaign has .not ruined the
tourism industry. In fact, from 1991 to 1993, tourism arrivals increased 12% (TAT 1993).
It is not clear, however, whether tourism growth would have been greater if the AIDS
issue did not reach such high agenda status. Foreign tour agents have reported that
tourists bookings decreased during periods when the media and the government of their
home country publicly reacted to the AIDS problem in Thailand.2 1 Furthermore, some
21 When the Malaysian government introduced random blood tests of citizens returning from Thailand in
late 1989, the number of Malaysian tourists dropped significantly. Some hotels along the Thai-Malay
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studies have reported that certain groups of tourists, decreased their patronage of Thailand
in favor of 'safer' places because of the fear of AIDS.2 2
ACADEMICS
By being active and vocal, academics have played a key role in developing AIDS
policy (Thamarak 1993).23 Academics have had an impact on policy development as
members of committees and subcommittees, and by having direct access to policy
makers. In the long-run, they play a major role in shaping other participant's knowledge
and attitudes. Throughout the policy process evidence of their input remains. Ideas from
academic literature are regularly discussed by parliamentary staff andbureaucrats.
Prominent academics are well known by name, and referenced repeatedly. Committees
and agencies call on the expertise of researchers and analysts in hearings, meetings and
advisory panels (Kingdon 1984, 57). Researchers have been prominent among the people
to whom politicians turned for ideas of how to cope with the AIDS dilemma once it was
place on the government agenda. Therefore, academics and researchers affect the
generating and choosing of alternatives more than setting the government agenda.
Their ability to have a direct impact on policy has been limited to those academics
who are members of policy committees, included in the government or are political
advisors. For example, academics regularly hold positions on the national AIDS
committee and most of its sub-committees. They have a chance to express their views at
NAC meetings. However, they are greatly outnumbered by politicians on the NAC, and
border reported over 70% declines in room occupancy (Reuters, 9-15-89). Johnny Lim of the Raya Travel
Agency in Singapore, a tourist agency that specializes in sex tours to Thailand, said business had gone down
30% because of the AIDS threat (Los Angeles Times, 1-7-92).
22 Singapore men began trying new locations such as Tanjung Pinang in Indonesia and Johor Baru in
Malaysia believing such places were safer because no cases of AIDS had been detected. In Japan, operators
began to concentrate Japanese sex tours in South Korea and Taiwan, which they believed to be safer than
Thailand and the Philippines (Daily Telegraph, 8-9-92).
23 The term'academics (or academicians) includes professors, researchers, consultants and advisors. In
Thailand, academics are quite independent; they are free to express their ideas on any subject except some
highly sensitive areas related to the military and the royal family.
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the academics usually do not make a significant impact on agenda setting. Once a general
policy has been passed, academics play an active role on technical committees. At this
alternative generating stage of policy making, academics play a major role because of
their expertise.
Academics most obvious and direct impact on AIDS policy has occurred when
they were included in the government. For example, during the Anand period Werasit
Sittitrai was appointed to a position in the OPM. Thavitong Hongvivatana, Mahidol
University's Vice-President for Policy and Planning and a social scientist, believes that
Werasit is the only social scientist to directly influence policy (Thavitong 1993). Werasit
was intimately involved in promoting and adapting a multi-sectoral approach that
emphasized the social and economic aspects of the epidemic in addition to the public
health ones. In addition, there were instances when academics, such as Debanom
Muangman, were advisors to the prime minister. As an advisor to Chatichai, Debanom
was able to assert his views that an open and progressive approach to the AIDS situation
would not hurt tourism. In fact, he believed that Westerners would appreciate the security
of knowing that the government was handling the epidemic in a responsible fashion
(Debanom 1993).
These are exceptions, however, as academicians have generally expressed
frustration at their relatively limited access to policy makers (Thavitong 1993; Debanom
1993; Chayan 1993). Although academics are well respected and often quoted in
Thailand, Professor Debanom explained that when they send letters and reports to the
policy makers they are ignored. Therefore, academics only recourse is voice their
opinions in the media. Once their ideas go public there is hope that external pressure on
the leaders--who are not accessible by other means--will mount and changes will be
initiated (Debanom 1993).
On the other hand, academics can access mid-ranking officials through direct
contact or seminars. Thamarak explained that since the top ranking officials in the
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ministry are often hard to reach because of their political orientation, educating the mid-
level officials may be a more effective way to influence the bureaucrats (Thamarak 1993).
The mid-level bureaucrats influence policy when policy makers turn to them for advise.
Again, however, bureaucrat's ability to impact policy is greatest in the choosing of
alternatives because they are referred to for their expertise.
The nature of academic participation in policy making often limits the influence
of academics, because the information that they provide often can not be easily
transferred into policy. In the short-run, policy makers in the government listen to the
academics most when their analyses and proposals are directly related to problems that
are already occupying the officials' attention. However, a great deal of work by academics
and other professional analysts is wasted in that government officials and citizens do not
find what is offered them to be useful (Lindblom 1993, 16). Leaders may value the work,
but believe that practically its recommendations cannot always be implemented (Kingdon
1984, 60). Critics claim that analytical policy making is inevitably limited, and people
believe it to be so. It cannot wholly resolve conflicts of value and interests, it is too
slowly and costly, and it cannot provide conclusive answers on which problems to attack
(Lindblom 1993, 22).
There is also a distrust of, and even a destain for, academic work by some. In
Thailand, politicians on the National Aids Committee complain that academic members
waste time by talking at length and by delving too far into the detail (The Nation, 1-21-
93). Satichai Liengchetz, Deputy-Director of the OPM under Prime Minister Chuan, said
that his office does not encourage spending much on long-term social research projects
because the results are not very practical. He added that the researchers are often more
concerned with the process than applying the results. Furthermore, many of the results
only tend to glorify the researcher (Satichai 1993).
Part of the difficulty in applying academic research is due to the complexity of the
AIDS epidemic and the type of research that is being conducted to deal with the situation.
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AIDS research has gone through three phases. The first two, epidemiology and
knowledge, attitude and practice studies, were rather simple. They provided
understanding of the situation and assisted in deciding basic responses. In 1992, social
science researchers began to focus on issues such as sexual behavior, social context,
affects on the political economy and coping methods (Chayan 1993). These subjects are
complex in nature, and the research is difficult, timely and costly. Furthermore, the results
are often measured in qualitative terms which can not be easily transferred into practical
policies (Bencha 1993). To complicate the problem even more, effective coordination
between the researchers has been lacking (Churnurtai 1993).
Although many of the research efforts do not provide easily applicable short-term
solutions, they can shape the knowledge and understanding of participants which may
influence policy in the long-term. Weiss writes that the principle influence of researchers
and academicians lies in their ability to affect the general climate of ideas about a policy
(Weiss 1981). Palumbo adds that researchers do not have a direct impact on a program in
the sense of changing or stopping a specific policy; instead, they have an indirect and
long-term impact because they influence how government officials perceive issues
(Palumbo 1988, 51).
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Non-government organizations (NGOs) first became involved in AIDS prevention
and control activities in 1987. The Population and Community Development Association
(PDA), headed by Mechai Veravaidya launched its educational activities that year. In
addition, a few women's groups and activists, such as Sumatra Troy, became involved
because they believed that sex tourists might infect Thai CSWs. There was also a dance
troupe that gave performances to the gay community in order to educate them about AIDS
(Natee 1993). In the next few years, other NGOs, such as the Duang Prateep Foundation
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and Empower, became embroiled in the AIDS dilemma because populations--IVDUs and
CSWs--that they represent were being infected with HIV at alarming rates.
In 1989, controversial AIDS legislation attracted the attention of a large group of
NGOs who were concerned with human rights issues. In particular, the AIDS-Bill
brought the issue onto the public forum, explains Thavitong. NGO leaders, such as Jon
Ungphakorn, the founder of ACCESS, became involved because they believed that this
type of legislation was discriminatory in nature and would be counterproductive to AIDS
prevention and control activities (Thavitong 1993). Human rights issues also spurred on
the cooperative efforts NGOs. They began to collectively express their views and the
NGO Coalition Against AIDS was soon organized. By 1993, the NGO Coalition had 37
members (Bangkok Post, 12-1-93).
According to Sombat Thanprasertsuk of the AIDS Division, NGOs perform three
types of activities: (1) education and public relations, (2) providing care, and (3) training.
The strengths of the NGOs are their abilities to react quickly and to provide resources in
areas that the government can not reach (Sombat 1993).
NGOs influenced the development of AIDS policy by voicing their views in the
media, reasoning with government and business leaders for change and by having their
leaders included in the government. The NGOs attempted to influence policy
development by dramaticizing the situation and bringing attention to their point of view,
says Thamarak (Thamarak 1993). Stories originating from NGO leaders frequently reach
the press, and their activities are often covered on television. For example, Apichart
Nirapathpongpor of the PDA, said that although education was the most obvious goal of
the high-profile condom shows that the PDA conducted in the Patpong redlight district,
the main reason was to get on TV in order to desensitize the issue (Apichart
Nirapathpongpor 1993).
NGOs lack the funds and access that the business community uses to influence
government leaders. Therefore, they must rely on the ability of persuasion. NGO leaders
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have directly addressed groups of politicians and business leaders in attempts to motivate
them into changing policy. Perhaps, more importantly, NGO leaders, such as Mechai,
have used informal opportunities such as golfing to reach politicians (Apichart
Nirapathpongpor 1993). Mechai understands politics and was particularly apt in this
regard. He previously worked for the NESDB and is an economist who knows what
motivates leaders, added Thamarak (Thamarak 1993). Mechai attempted to persuade
policy makers by arguing that the AIDS epidemic was going to have an adverse impact on
the Thai economy and society if appropriate measures were not taken..
NGO participation has affected both agenda setting and choosing alternatives. In
the Prem and Chatichai periods, the NGOs increased awareness through the media. In
particular, they pressed for attention to issues that directly affected the communities they
represented. As alternatives were being formed, NGOs were influential in pushing for
choices that did not exhibit potential human rights abuses. They also helped shape
perceptions and opinions about the AIDS epidemic.
During the Anand period, Mechai was appointed as a minister and the inclusion of
NGOs in AIDS prevention and control activities became formalized. The NGOs were
given a better opportunity to express their views to a higher level of the government.
They received greater support and cooperation from the government, and were allowed
greater participation in the policy debates. NGOs had more impact on policy during the
Anand period than at any other time.
By the time Chuan reached office, the NGOs had formally become part of the
national AIDS campaign. Now there are standard lines of communication between the
NGOs and GOs. The NGO coalition has a NAC representative--Jon Ungphakorn of
ACCESS--and NGO representatives are included on some government committees.
However, the NGOs do not directly impact agenda setting. The limited influence that they
still retain is in choosing alternatives. For example, the NGOs continue to fight against
human rights abuses and policy alternatives that include discriminatory measures.
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The impact of NGOs has been limited by some leaders perceptions that NGO
input is less than professional. Vichai argues that although the role of the NGOs has its
benefits, they do not conduct work on a long-term basis and the technology being
employed is antiquated (Vichai 1993). On the other hand, some NGOs feel that the
government does not treat them as an equal partner. NGO efforts have not been optimized
because of the poor cooperation between the government and the NGOs. Chumpon adds
that NGOs rely on cooperation from the government in order to conduct its programs, but
the government often lacks supporting policies (Chumpon 1993).
DOCTORS
Since AIDS has generally been considered a medical and public health dilemma,
medical doctors are in a strong position to make a significant impact on AIDS policy.
Medical doctors virtually own the way problems are defined in the health area (Palumbo
1988, 53). In addition, doctors in Thailand are one of the most revered professions and
are naturally turned to for solutions and advice.
"In the beginning, the only people interested in the problem were health
personnel; particularly doctors in the MOPH and in the Universities," remarked Sombat
Thanprasertsuk of the AIDS Division in the MOPH (Sombat 1993). Early efforts by
individual doctors to uncover evidence and confirm testing results were vital for raising
awareness to the fact that AIDS had indeed been introduced into Thailand. Since the
doctors who made the initial discoveries were highly respected, their findings were
considered credible.; Mahidol University's Dr. Thavitong Hongviatana provided the
example of Dr. Somsak Pakdeowongse, the Director of the Bangkok Venereal Hospital.
Dr. Somsak was active in early case detection efforts. He helped prove that the number of
HIV infected persons was increasing. This information heightened potential participant's
awareness of the need to fight the AIDS epidemic (Thavitong 1993). Sombat added that
Dr. Somsak had warned him many times that the MOPH should establish a center to fight
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AIDS. At a very early stage, he also recognized the importance of convincing health
policy makers of the need for taking appropriate measures (Sombat 1993).
Although doctors made key contributions, the potential impact of the medical
community has never been fully realized. Many doctors, especially from the older
generations, have had a hard time accepting the reality of the epidemic, said Dr. Somsit
Tansuppasawddikul, Director of the Bamrasnaradura Hospital's AIDS ward. He added,
however, that much greater progress is being made with young doctors. Furthermore, as
more and more doctors come face to face with AIDS patients, they begin to realize that
they should not fear the epidemic; especially when they apply universal precautions
(Somsit 1993). Dr. Suporn Koetsawang of Siriraaj Hospital, points out that to have a
successful response to the epidemic, the medical profession must be educated and
convinced because people will look to them for advise (Suporn 1993).
Many of the doctors who have committed to fighting the epidemic are criticized
for treating AIDS as purely a medical problem. Uthayan Utayanaka, the chief of the AIDS
Planning and Coordination Bureau, OPM, stresses the need to make doctors feel that
AIDS is more than a medical problem (Uthayan 1993). The situation is changing,
however, as more and more doctors accept that medical solutions can not solve all the
problems that the epidemic causes (Somsit 1993).
In addition, many doctors in the private sector have resisted from fully
participating in the AIDS fight because they have other interests at stake. A doctor from
an established private hospital in Pattaya said, "First of all, we must accept that private
medical institutions are businesses, and if news spreads that we have taken in only one
single AIDS patient, we will lose many others" (Bangkok Post, 7-8-92). Very few
hospitals private, or public, want to deal with AIDS patients because of fear and
stigmatization, adds Dr. Somsit (Somsit 1993).
Dr. Jamroon Mikhanorn, honorary secretary general of the Association for
Strengthening Integrated National Population and Health Development Activities of
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Thailand (ASIN), urged the private medical institution to take a greater role in the fight
against AIDS. He explained that the private institutions were becoming more and more
vital because the government system would not be able to oversee all the operations in the
context of an ever more diverse society and in the face of the AIDS epidemic (Bangkok
Post, 7-8-92).
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
International organizations have played a major role in developing AIDS policy in
Thailand. They have affected both agenda setting and choosing alternatives. The
international organizations were particularly influential in providing financial and
technical support for the short-term and medium-term plans. The WHO provided the lone
funding, US $500,000, for the short-term plan (1988). It was largely based on
international guidelines. It is questionable if there would have been a short-term plan
without WHO support. International organizations also provided the greatest amount of
resources for the first two years of the medium-term program (1989-90). Although, as
external participants, the international organizations could not set the agenda, they
provided resources, support and framework for the Thai participants who advocated the
development of policy.
By the Anand Period, impact by international organizations was limited to
influencing the choosing of alternatives. Since the AIDS issue had reached the
government's decision agenda, more government officials and representatives became
involved in policy making. Consequently, there were fewer opportunities and less need
for external participation in agenda setting. Moreover, most international organizations
withdrew their funding after the 1991 overthrow of the elected Chatichai regime, and the
Thai government became the primary financier of the national AIDS campaigns.
Consequently, the international organizations lost much of their clout.
Nonetheless, international organizations continued to influence the generating and
choosing of alternatives. The WHO/GPA has been able to influence alternatives through
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its close relationship with the MOPH. In fact, the WHO has provided funding and
technical advise since 1987, and the WHO/GPA representative works directly with the
MOPH. The international organizations advocate alternatives which promote a multi-
sectoral approach and protest any measures that might violate human rights.
Although the WHO has been the most influential, other international
organizations have been very active in AIDS prevention and control efforts in Thailand.
The UNDP and foreign governments were most instrumental in providing funding for
prevention and control activities in 1989 and 1990. Although government agencies
received some funding, Thai NGOs were the primary recipients of their support. USAID
is another major external funding source which allocates its funds through Family Health
International (FHI). For the 1992-96 period, approximately US $9.3 million will be spent
on AIDS projects (AIDS Division 1993). FHI usually supports projects of Thai NGOs. It
also attempts to educate and influence policy makers (from government officials to grass
roots level health workers) by conducting seminars and training sessions.
MASS MEDIA
Mass media--television, newspapers, magazines and radio--have a unique ability
to influence policy because its daily coverage reaches all participants involved in the
agenda setting process as well as the general public. Although the media can create
issues; more often they reflect issues and the views of others. An issue develops if there is
an interest in it either in government, among politicians, or among outside participants.
However, a group must gain some initial success before the media will focus on an issue.
When media coverage of a particular issue or story stimulates its audience, the media will
continue to report on it, generating greater and greater attention and concern. In other
words, the media may affect the agenda by magnifying movements that already started
elsewhere, as opposed to originating those movements. They can accelerate an issue's
development and magnify its impact.
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However, not all issues can maintain their news worthiness. To receive continued
coverage in the media an issue must have certain characteristics that appeal to a mass
public. AIDS is a highly salient issue because medical stories are particularly attractive to
the media (Colby 1991). Furthermore, in Thailand, having AIDS linked to homosexuality,
drug use, frequenting CSWs, and its potential threat to "innocent victims," made it much
more controversial than if the initial coverage had addressed purely medical problems.
When the Thai media associated AIDS with both high fatalities and stigmatized sexuality,
the stories made for banner headlines.
With highly salient issues, like AIDS, mass media has great potential to make an
impact on policy because these issues are frequently covered in the media and are highly
controversial. In Thailand, mass media has contributed to AIDS policy development in
three major ways: (1) It has helped to create and shape perceptions about the nature of the
epidemic and the appropriateness of the government's response; (2) It has acted as a
mouthpiece for participants involved in AIDS policy development; (3) International
coverage focusing on AIDS and prostitution in Thailand has pressured leaders for change.
Media Increases Awareness and Helps to Educate
Mass media plays an important role in defining the nature of an issue it is
covering. The media often reinforce or alter the prevailing definition of the conflict. In
Thailand, mass media contributes to shaping perceptions and creating opinions about
AIDS by raising awareness and educating its audience. 24 Furthermore, it contributed to
pressuring the government into releasing more reliable and thorough information. On the
other hand, the media frequently reported sensationalized stories which led to the
stigmatization of certain population communities.
24 Although the press provides the most consistent and thorough coverage, television has had perhaps an
even greater impact on shaping perceptions about AIDS in Thailand. Professor Apichart Chamratithirong,
Director of Mahidol University's Institute of Population and Social Research, stressed that addressing the
AIDS issue on television in a humane manner was vital for desensitization of the issue (Apichart
Chamratithirong 1993). Having AIDS infected persons appear on popular television talk shows is
considered by some critics as having a greater impact on the AIDS prevention and control efforts than any
other events (FEER, 2-15-92).
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One of mass media's greatest contributions to the AIDS dilemma has been to raise
awareness throughout the populace and with key policy makers. Mass media regularly
chronicle the spread of the epidemic by reporting the increase in AIDS/HIV incidence and
the government's stated policy developments to deal with the epidemic. Furthermore, the
Thai media often expands its coverage to provide its audience with insight into AIDS-
related events and issues that the government does not highlight. Most often these topic
driven stories originate from outside participants such as academics, NGOs and
international organizations.
The media has also been instrumental in educating its audience about the AIDS
epidemic and its related issues. By promoting a clearer understanding.of the nature of the
disease, the media has helped to create an atmosphere suitable for progressive changes in
policy. General education in the media provides a larger group of people greater and more
similar knowledge. Therefore, as the populace and its representatives became more
knowledgeable about the parameters of the epidemic, their demands that the government
respond responsibly became more vocal and numerous. In addition, many policy makers
have also received an education through the media which may have affected their policy
stance.
The media's role as an educator is limited, however, because of its over-riding
objective to attract an audience. For example, some of the positive input that journalist
provide is offset by their tendency to report sensational stories such as the rare or bizarre
ways in which HIV might be spread, rather than concentrating on the common modes of
transmission (Mann 1992, 722).
Media as an interest group
Although the media usually reflects the views of other participants, they also have
the ability to create their own demands. For example, in the Prem period, the press's
insistence upon better information, particularly regarding the number of infected persons,
assisted in eliciting reluctant responses from the authorities. In a more indirect example,
165
The Nation newspaper reported that as a result of the sensational nature of the stories,
particularly in 1987, the press was charged with provoking national panic. Consequently,
the government urged the media to be more responsible in its reporting, and in exchange
offered more complete and reliable information on the AIDS situation from the health
authorities (The Nation, 10-13-87).
Sensational Stories
Sensational AIDS stories reported in the media have also contributed to raising
awareness. AIDS is a sensational issue that deals with death, disaster, sex, prostitution
and drugs. By focusing on these aspects of the disease the media was able to attract large
audiences. However, the negative consequences of the sensational stories were far more
damaging and long lasting as they reinforced stereotypes and stigmatized the groups
perceived as at risk. In Thailand, the first groups identified by the media as being highest
at risk were homosexual men and foreigners; followed by IVDUs and CSWs. Although
the media's attention would later focus on the risk to the general public, the earlier beliefs
that AIDS is a disease associated with these high risk groups did not disappear.
Moreover, irresponsible journalism, especially in the 1980s, generated fear and
contributed to the discrimination and alienation of HIV/AIDS infected persons.
Stigmatization of this kind is still echoed in the beliefs of the general populace and
leaders. Perhaps more importantly, at an early stage of the epidemic, the belief that these
marginalized groups were at risk established an environment in which the government
could easily disregard the epidemic. Additionally, little pressure was exerted by the main
stream populace--who did not consider themselves at risk--for action and change.
Media as a Communicator
Since the media in Thailand is the principle source for interpreting events, it is
one of the main architects of the public policy debate. In particular, the press has been
used as an open forum for the various participants--both inside and outside the
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government who are involved in AIDS prevention and control activities. Mass media acts
as a communicator within the policy community.
In an attempt to avoid national panic, the government used the media to present
the AIDS epidemic in Thailand as being under control and unthreatening to the main-
stream populace (Bangkok Post, 2-8-87). The government sought to create an atmosphere
of security and safety by blaming the marginalized populations, under-reporting
AIDS/HIV incidences and announcing its prevention and control activities--aimed at the
marginal communities. However, the government was only partially successful because
the Thai media, especially the press, is extremely independent and resourceful. Against
the government's wishes, information indicating that prevalency rates were significantly
greater than the government's figures was released by international organizations,
academics, NGOs, and even government officials, and reported in the media. The media
also questioned the government's honesty, motivations and methodologies in regard to its
AIDS prevention and control plans. This tended to undermine the populace's confidence
in the government's response.
Mass media has also acted as a public forum for the AIDS policy debate. In the
early stages of the epidemic, AIDS was considered a medical and public health problem.
At this time, the medical and political sources "converged on a storyline that reassuringly
noted science doggedly at work to master the epidemic" (Colby 1991, 241). Later, as the
parameters of the epidemic widened and a growing number of participants became
involved, beliefs diverged and competing interests formed. The ensuing policy debates
often played out in the media. For example, in 1989, Chuan Leekpai, then Minister of
Public Health, used the media to publicize the high HIV prevalence rates in southern
Thailand and argued for measures to combat the epidemic. However, without significant
support in the government and after a stiff display of opposition by the tourism
community in the media and in political circles, Chuan was forced to back down on his
position. A more recent (1992 to 1993) example was the struggle between the Office of
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the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Public Health over control of the national AIDS
prevention and control activities and, more importantly, responsibility for budget
allocation. The OPM was granted the authority to coordinate the national program during
the Anand period and promoted a multi-sectoral approach. The MOPH regained control
early in the Chuan period and maintains that the MOPH is best suited for coordination
and control efforts. The debate was chronicled in the press and participants from all sides
had a chance to be heard.
Outside the government, those--like the business community--with direct access
to policy makers, do not need to communicate through the media to make an impact.
However, participants with little direct access, such as NGOs, use the media to influence
leaders. Telephone calls and letters are usually ineffective methods of putting pressure on
policy makers. Therefore, these participants have no other means to pressure policy
makers except by going public. To gain attention in the media, NGOs frequently present
alarming stories and frightening projections. Although they often succeed in gaining
attention, their credibility has been damaged by the release of information that many
deem outrageous. Academics also use the press to voice their opinions and pressure
leaders (see Academics Section). These outside participants were particularly influential
in raising awareness when the epidemic was just beginning to spread rapidly and the
government was not yet forthright in its reporting practices.
International Media Coverage
International media coverage has indirectly influenced policy development by
focusing on prostitution and AIDS in Thailand. Perhaps, the greatest impact was caused
by high profile stories on the covers of international magazines such as Time, Newsweek
and the Far Eastern Economic Review. In addition, in the Summer of 1993, a
controversial reference to Bangkok in Longmans English Language and Cultural
Dictionary resulted in strong protests from government officials. International scrutiny of
this type has made it difficult for politicians and influential Thais to continually ignore
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the issues. Whether Thais believed that there was truth in these messages or only that the
integrity of Thailand was being threatened, they were forced to examine the state of
affairs and take a stand. Some officials chose to deny that Thailand deserved its
reputation as a place infested with prostitution and AIDS. Others, including Prime
Minister Chuan, tailored their policies and responses to reassure the world community
and the Thai people that the government was addressing the situation. For example,
Chuan announced that the elimination of forced prostitution and child prostitution were
major objectives of his administration.
Politicians Respond to Mass Media
The media's identification and definition of public issues work not only on mass
audiences. Policy makers are also very attentive to news coverage. Kingdon writes,
"Media attention to an issue affects legislators' attention, partly because members follow
mass media like other people, and partly because media affect their constituents"
(Kingdon 1984, 61). In Thailand there has been little research on the media's direct
impact on policy making. However, it is clear from their reactions that leaders are very
attentive and often adjust their responses to problems or aspects targeted in the media.
Price noted that politicians generally avoid an issue on which action would
occasion severe conflict unless that issue has considerable public salience--which is often
greatly influenced by the media. With issues that have high public salience, the potential
pay off for action--or, perhaps more correctly, the potential cost for inaction--is
correspondingly high (Price 1978, 569). In the Prem and Chatichai periods, the leaders
sought to avoid the AIDS issue because the perceived costs for action were high and the
payoffs limited. The controversy surrounding the AIDS epidemic and its association with
marginalized groups made it less likely that most politicians would be willing to serve as
authoritative sources of news on AIDS, further dampening the ability of the media to
report the story. On the other hand, after Anand placed the AIDS issue high on the
government's agenda, the potential cost for inaction was very high for Prime Minister
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Chuan. Moreover, Cook notes that when leaders do respond to highly salient issues, even
those that provoke considerable conflict, they do so largely in the context that the media
have provided (Cook 1989).
The Media Cycle from 1984 to 1993
Despite its contributions to policy development, mass media has been remarkably
inconsistent. If the media were merely reflecting a growing problem, the expected
trajectory of media coverage should resemble the exponential increase in HIV and AIDS
prevalence. However, the frequency of AIDS media coverage has risen, peaked and
declined several times since 1984. One reason for the media's less-than anticipated effect
on policy is its tendency to cover a story prominently for a short period of time and then
to turn to the next story, diluting its impact. The media are also less likely to cover slow
moving disasters, such as droughts or famines, than fast-breaking ones, such as
earthquakes or floods (Colby 1991, 246).
Initial Peak in Media Attention (1984)
In 1984 and 1985, the first few reported cases of AIDS in Thailand received much
coverage in the media. The initial shock and novelty of the stories grabbed the attention
of the nation. However, the frequency of coverage rapidly declined because there were
few additional cases reported until 1987, and AIDS was generally perceived as a
homosexual and foreign disease.
Second Peak in Media Attention (1987)
The latter half of 1987 marked the next peak in media attention. Blood testing
revealed an upsurge in HIV prevalence among IVDUs, especially in Bangkok. Moreover,
1987 was Visit Thailand Year and many Thais were afraid that Western tourists were
going to introduce AIDS into the nation by infecting the commercial sex workers that
cater to tourists. Journalists contributed to the media blitz by communicating the belief
that the government was not being frank in its reporting because it sought to protect the
tourism industry from 'bad' publicity. In late 1987, a series of sensational stories startled
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Bangkok. The case of Miss Spun Selakhum, a popular model, caught the attention and the
imagination of all Thais, regardless of socio-economic class. She was allegedly an HIV
carrier and rumored to be a high-class call girl. This event shocked the Bangkok
populace, which up to then had felt it did not have any real association to a disease that
infected only marginalized groups. After the Spun Selakhum case, AIDS become
recognized as newsworthy and it became a topic for multiple journalists in multiple news
beats. Although the frequency of AIDS coverage in the media would decline again after
1987, complete neglect of the disease would never be repeated.
Third Peak in Media Attention (1989)
The next peak in media coverage occurred in the latter half of 1989. The
government was becoming more open and forthright in releasing information about the
epidemic. The MOPH conducted the first sentinel surveillance survey that summer and
later publicized the results. In addition, influential leaders such Minister of Public Health
Chuan Leekpai, Princess Chulabhorn and Mechai Veravaidya publicly pushed for policy
development and were widely covered in the media. Mechai was particularly influential
as he persuaded the Army to provide free air-time for AIDS educational messages on its
vast radio and television networks. In addition, the government's attempt to pass the
controversial AIDS Bill, and the subsequent opposition from a disperse group of interests,
was also reported frequently in the press.
1989 was a period of transition for the media in terms of its stance on AIDS
coverage. In early 1989 some media members still followed the government's line--that
minimal publicity best served the interests of the nation. When controversy broke out
over the release of AIDS figures and information, some media members backed the
conservative line. However, as the environment began to change and important policy
makers got behind the anti-AIDS movement, media coverage reflected this change.
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Forth Peak in Media Attention (1991)
In 1991 media attention again peaked after Prime Minister Anand placed the
AIDS issue on the government's decision agenda. This peak in media coverage lasted
longer, in part, because Mechai Veravaidya was named minister in charge of the national
AIDS mass media campaign. Mechai was able to stimulate interest in the AIDS issue by
stressing the risk to the Thai populace as a whole, by incorporating shocking statistics and
by emphasizing the negative social and economic consequences that the epidemic could
cause. 25 Moreover, AIDS messages were frequently broadcast on television and radio
networks each day.
Normalization
At times when there was serious political controversy in Thailand, attention to the
AIDS issue declined. This was never more true than in the Spring and Summer of 1992
when political events 26 dominated the headlines. Then with the election of Chuan in
September 1992, the AIDS issue began a phase of normalization in the media. The
government now cooperates with the media and releases information in a responsible
open manner. For the most part, stories reported in the media are no longer novel or
sensational in nature. The topics that the media present focus more on how to live with
infected persons and how to show compassion, rather than the sex and disaster themes of
the past. This normalization process follows a trend that has occurred in other nations.27
25 Critics argue that although mass communication efforts headed by Mechai were very successful in raising
awareness, there were negative consequences as well. Vichai Poshyachinda, Director of Chulalongkorn's
Institue of Health Research and a member of the NAC, says that Mechai's campaign had a lot of positive
impact on creating awareness in the short-term but the negative impacts are greater and longer lasting
(Vichai 1993). In particular, the use of shocking messages in the campaign created fear, myths and the
rejection of HIV/AIDS infected persons (Chumpon 1993). Furthermore, raising awareness is only the first
step, Vichai added. Mass media has never been successful in changing the behavior of people (Vichai
1993).
26 The events included: the Spring election, the short but controversial reign of Suchinda, the April and
May mass demonstrations, the May massacures, the ousting of Suchinda, the reinstatement of the Anand II
government, and preparations for the September elections.
27 A British news editor proclaimed in 1989 that the disease was a 'boring story ... the only stories now




"The media's construction of AIDS has thus influenced not merely
how we as individuals will react but also how we as a society and as
a polity will respond. In short, the media have played and continued
to play a critical role in the construction of the syndrome, the
epidemic, of persons living with AIDS, and the range of possible
social and political responses." (Colby 1991, 218)
In general, the media report what is going on in government, or at least things that
they are aware of, rather than having an independent effect on governmental agendas. The
media is cable of directly influencing general attitudes about a policy issue by stimulating
discussion. In other words, news media can "tell the public what to think about if not
exactly what to think" (Mann 1992, 729). Although the policy makers may have already
been aware of the issues, knowledge that the Thai people were also aware may have
influenced policy. Moreover, when participants were successful in getting the media to
publicly cover their views, it was much harder for leaders to ignore the issue. Vichai
credited the media with keeping AIDS in the public view:
"The awareness of the public was further stimulated by the extremely
intensive media campaign about fatal danger of HIV infection
initiated by government and private bodies. From thereon, the sense
of urgency about devastating impact of HIV infection to the whole
country was never far from the interest of the government,
professionals and public." (Vichai 1990)
Due to its ability to shape perceptions, the media had greater impact when the
AIDS issue was just emerging and opinions just starting to be formed. Media's impact
was also greater during agenda setting (a process more general in nature with greater
public salience) than in choosing alternatives (a more detailed process that is often
conducted behind closed doors). However, the media's ability to directly influence agenda
setting was limited by biases of their sources. Politicians, officials, academics and NGO
leaders, had some success in manipulating journalists to cover the AIDS issue from their
point of view, thus helping these participants to set the political agenda.
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APPLYING KINGDON'S PROCESS MODEL
Chapters III through VI chronicled the spread of the AIDS epidemic in Thailand
over a ten year period (from 1984 to 1993). This historical presentation exhibits the
manner in which Thailand's anti-AIDS efforts evolved into one of the most
comprehensive and progressive national AIDS campaigns in the world. As the spread
intensified, counter-measures were developed by the Prem, Chatichai, Anand and Chuan
administrations, various government agencies and by participants outside the government.
Consequently, during the first three administrations, the AIDS issue reached successively
higher levels on the political agenda.
During each period, the AIDS issue in Thailand took on different characteristics:
The Prem period was marked by a strong sense of denial; The Chatichai period by a
transition from denial towards recognition; The Anand period by full recognition; and in
the Chuan period a normalization phase began. In addition, there is a correlation between
the degree of the epidemic's spread and the development of AIDS-related policy.
Recognition of these aspects has led some observers to conclude that the development of
AIDS policy was a logical and natural process dependent on the characteristics of the
AIDS epidemic.
Other observers have concluded that participants inside and outside the
government are most rqsponsible for policy development. They argue, that as the
epidemic spread, AIDS was infecting a more diverse spectrum of the Thai populace--not
only the marginalised communities. Consequently, a growing number of concerned
participants, representing disperse interests, began pressuring the government for policy
development. Furthermore, as some influential leaders realized that the epidemic
threatened the social and economic fabric of the nation, they also sought to influence
policy makers. Chapter VII analyzed the roles of the major participants in the agenda
setting and choosing of alternatives stages of policy making.
Although both the issue characteristics of AIDS and the role of the participants are
intricate and necessary parts of the policy development puzzle, this discussion will
demonstrate how the nature of the political system was the determinant variable in policy
development. In other words, the degree of impact that the other factors had in the policy
development process depended on the nature of the political environment. This is not to
imply that issue characteristics and participant involvement have not made important
contributions. In fact, within the parameters of the political environment, these variables
have been most instrumental in shaping the response to the AIDS epidemic.
This discussion draws on information presented in the previous chapters and
analyzes the policy making process within the context of John Kingdon's process model.
As previously explained, Kingdon presents three streams of processes (problem
recognition, policy alternatives and politics) that must be joined together to raise an issue
onto the government's decision agenda. Each stream has certain conditions which must be
met before the stream is predisposed to being joined. In addition, a window of
opportunity often opens and provides a policy entrepreneur with a chance to join the three
streams.
During the Prem period, the epidemic was at its infant stage, and consequently,
conditions necessary to raise the issue on to the government agenda were not met. In the
Chatichai period, conditions in two of the three streams, problem recognition and policy
alternatives, were sufficiently met, but the conditions in the third, the political stream,
were lacking. The appointment of the Anand government was the major turning point in
the AIDS policy development process. The Anand administration quickly established an
environment conducive for fulfilling the conditions in the political stream. The
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government was able to rapidly develop policy because of a lack of restrictions, that
democratically-styled governments normally face, and by a prime minister and his
appointed cabinet members who were committed to confronting the AIDS epidemic. In
particular, as a policy entrepreneur, Mechai Veravaidya took advantage of this window of
opportunity to join the streams and assist in placing the AIDS issue on the government's
decision agenda. In the present period of Prime Minister Chuan, the conditions in the
three streams are sufficient enough to maintain the AIDS issue on the government's
decision agenda. However, the conditions are less than ideal which makes the
development of additional policies very difficult and cumbersome.
Prem Period
While the Prem Government was in power, AIDS was a systematic agenda issue--
or one of many issues vying for government recognition and action. The conditions
necessary for raising the AIDS issue onto the government agenda were not fulfilled.
In the problem stream, indicators that allow for problem recognition had not yet
been established. Although HIV testing results became increasingly available, there was
not an established system of testing. There was also a limited amount of feedback from
the MOPH, the primary government agency responsible for monitoring and controlling
AIDS, to policy makers. In the Prem period, the most obvious indicators of the problem
were highly publicized dramatic events. Dramatic events that brought attention to the
AIDS issue included the discovery of the first few AIDS infected persons, stories of HIV
infection in celebrities, and the discovery of a large number of HIV infected persons in
Bangkok jails. Nonetheless, the testing results, feedback and dramatic events were
conveniently cast off as irrelevant because of the limited number of infected persons and
because of the marginal nature of the population communities that the infected persons
belonged. Moreover, many leaders believed that it was in their best interest not to
recognize the indicators. Consequently, the AIDS issue was defined as a problem limited
in nature; not as a national priority.
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The necessary conditions in the policy stream were also not met. There were few
policy alternatives, in the form of proposals (bill introductions, speeches, testimony,
papers and conversation), to deal with the AIDS epidemic. This was due to the relative
youth of the epidemic in Thailand, a negligible amount of resources allocated to AIDS-
related activities and the small number of participants focusing on the disease. In any
case, the proposals that did exist were not compatible with the dominant values of the
policy community or free of constraints. The dominant values of policy makers were
shaped by political and economic interests and the belief that AIDS was not personally
threatening. The constraints on the proposals were numerous considering the lack of
resources available and the strong resistance from many potential participants.
The political stream was also not predisposed to raising the issue onto the
government agenda. As mentioned, the political leaders did not make the AIDS issue a
top priority. In fact, it never even became a subject seriously considered by the
parliament, nor did the public demand that action be taken. Most importantly, the
extremely influential business community actively blocked the AIDS issue from reaching
the government agenda in order to protect its own interests. Other interest groups, NGOs,
international organizations, academics and activists tried to push the issue onto the
government agenda but were met with strong resistance. With his power base in the army
and the support of the business community, Prem was not forced to answer to the
demands of the other participants. Nonetheless, by the end of the Prem period, policy,
such as the short-term plan for the prevention and control of AIDS, was being




During the Chatichai period the AIDS issue was placed on the government
agenda--or one of the issues up for serious consideration by the government. In this
period the necessary conditions for the problem and policy stream were nearly complete.
However, the conditions in the political stream were not met, and consequently, the AIDS
issue was not elevated on to the government's decision agenda.
Conditions in the problem recognition stream were greatly enhanced with the
establishment of the sentinel surveillance system in 1989. This system provides the
necessary indicators for bringing the problem to the attention of policy makers. In
addition, dramatic news such as the rapid spread of HIV into the CSWs populace
attracted high levels of media coverage. There was also feedback from established
programs within and outside the government that indicated the types of problems that
needed to be addressed. Furthermore, to address those needs, the feedback indicated that
the AIDS issue should be given higher priority by the Thai government. Nonetheless,
conditions in the problem recognition stream were limited by government reporting
practices that did not fully disclose all of the available information, and at times, down
played the information's significance. The ability to recognize the wide-range of problems
associated with the epidemic was also limited, because the AIDS issue was classified as a
public health crisis and addressed accordingly. Broader economic, legal, social and
cultural aspects were largely ignored.
While conditions in the policy stream were not ideal, the main requirement--the
availability of proposals to deal with the problem--was fulfilled. Numerous scientific
papers were written, speeches given, and conferences held concerning the AIDS epidemic
in Thailand. In addition, the government introduced legislation aimed at preventing and
controlling the spread of AIDS. There was also a great deal of conversation taking place
at various levels between government representatives, academics, public health workers,
the media, NGO leaders and international organization officials. For the most part, the
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proposals were technically feasible. However, the proposals were still not consistent with
the dominant values of some key policy makers. Furthermore, there were resource
constraints placed on the proposals, and the possibility for implementation was limited.
Although the conditions in the problem and policy streams were sufficiently met,
the political conditions in Thailand did not allow the AIDS issue to reach the
government's decision agenda. While the indicators necessary for problem recognition
existed, there was still wide-spread denial by key leaders and the Thai public. Moreover,
the priorities of the Chatichai administration necessitated that political and economic
concerns take precedent over public health problems. The business community continued
to be instrumental in blocking the issue from reaching the highest level of the agenda.
Within the parliament there was debate over proposed bills, but reluctance to deal with
issue by the majority of members--regardless of their political affiliation--was pervasive.
However, the growing involvement from participants within the government (primarily
the MOPH, the MOI and the army) and participants outside the government (activists,
NGOs academics, the media and the royal family) increased the pressure on policy
makers to address the AIDS epidemic.
It is difficult to make general conclusions about the developments during the
Chatichai Period because of the rapid change in the environment surrounding the AIDS
issue. The epidemic, and the policies developed to control it, transformed swiftly.
Although the AIDS issue did not reach the government's decision agenda, it was placed
on the government agenda. Moreover, the Chatichai administration's financial
commitment to combating the disease increased significantly. There were also signs that
the administration was getting closer to publicly recognizing the AIDS issue as a top
government priority shortly before Chatichai was ousted from power.
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Anand Period
After the appointment of the Anand Administration in March 1991, the AIDS
issue was soon elevated to the highest level of the government agenda; a high priority
item on the government's decision agenda--or an issue up for active decision making.
Problem recognition during this period was enhanced as indicators of the problem
became increasingly publicized. Rather than hiding the facts or down playing their
significance, government representatives instead highlighted the most dramatic indicators
to increase awareness and stimulate change. Dramatic events continued to be covered
widely in the media. There was also considerable feedback from the existing programs,
implemented under the medium-term plan, which indicated where problems existed and
the policy developments needed to address these problems. During the Anand period, the
AIDS issue was classified not only as a public health problem but as a social, legal and
economic issue as well.
There were many technically-feasible policy proposals available at this time and
many were seriously considered. A major difference, in comparison to the Chatichai
period, was that the proposals became relatively free of constraints due to the political
commitment of the Anand Government. In addition, the proposals were compatible with
the values of key leaders in the policy making community. The crucial distinction was
that the composition and nature of this community had transformed under the Anand
administration.
The nature of the political environment during the Anand period was the deciding
factor in elevating the AIDS issue on to the government's decision agenda. The
appointment of the Anand government was the major change in the political stream
which provided a window of opportunity for moving the AIDS issue onto the
government's decision agenda. The previous elected government had been forced to
answer to interest groups from whom they were dependent on for support. In addition, the
AIDS issue had not been able to pass the rigorous legislative process that is necessary to
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place an issue on the government's decision agenda. In contrast, the Anand government
was unelected and temporary. In this extraordinary period, the Anand government was
granted the authority to pass legislation without having to contend with the obstacles of a
democratically structured system. Moreover, Anand was less dependent on the external
support of interest groups.
Within this political framework, the orientation of government participants helped
shape the national AIDS campaign. The administration was composed of a prime minister
and his appointees who gave the AIDS dilemma high priority. Mechai took advantage of
the window of opportunity to play the role of policy entrepreneur.' As policy
entrepreneur, he was able to join the three streams--problem recognition, policy
alternatives (proposals) and politics--together. He used resources, both personal and
institutional, to complete the task.
Chuan Period
In spite of the transfer of power to an elected government, led by Chuan Leekpai,
which must contend with obstacles similar to those that the Chatichai government
confronted, the AIDS issue has remained on the government's decision agenda. The AIDS
issue remains at this level because of the substantial accomplishments of the Anand
period and due to the fact that interest groups have lost their greatest resource for
influencing policy
During the Anand period, notable achievements included: heightened awareness
about the AIDS issue, multi-sectoral involvement, implementation of extensive AIDS
programs, an exponential increase in the AIDS budget, and commitment from key leaders
to address the AIDS epidemic. By the time Chuan came to power, there were too many
vested interests in maintaining the high status of the national AIDS program to make a
1 Although Mechai was the most influential, visible and successful policy entrepreneur, he was by
no means the only one. Other appointed members of the cabinet, such as Chutikul Sairusee,
technocrats, such as Werasit Sittradrai, and numerous other participants were also involved in
entrepreneurial activities.
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policy reversal. In particular, the enormous budget allocated to the AIDS prevention and
control campaign is vigorously coveted by a wide-range of participants.
Additionally, interest groups no longer have their most effective tool; the ability to
block the AIDS issue from achieving higher agenda status at any of the numerous stages
of policy making. Once the issue reached the government's decision agenda during the
Anand period, the interest groups, particularly the business community, were deprived of
the power to block the AIDS issue.
Since the issue remains firmly established on the government's decision agenda,
the only recourse of interest groups is to try to influence policy alternatives. Therefore,
the question is not whether the AIDS issue will remain a decision agenda item, but which
policy alternatives will be chosen and how quickly will policies be adapted?
The fact that agenda status has not altered in the Chuan period should not,
however, be misinterpreted as indicating that policy has continued to develop as it had in
the Anand period. In contrast, the Chuan administration has been relatively ineffectual,
because it is deficient in both institutional and personal resources. There has also been a
shift in the balance of power away from the prime minister to political appointees and
bureaucrats in the MOPH. Without strong leadership, policy development has stagnated
during the Chuan period.
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IMPLICATIONS
Although circumstances vary in each case, the findings of this research have
implications for other nations that are struggling through the earlier stages of the AIDS
policy development process. In particular, it has important lessons for participants who
seek to raise the AIDS issue onto the government agendas. This research has shown that
Kingdon's theoretical model can be a useful tool for analyzing the policy development
process. By using agenda status as a measure, it identifies the conditions which must be
met in order to raise an issue onto the government's decision agenda. By discovering
which conditions have been fulfilled, as well as those that are lacking, one can judge the
progress of an issue in the agenda setting process. This knowledge can assist those
advocating higher agenda status in determining the best strategy to follow for influencing
policy.
In analyzing policy development, the major factors to consider are the political
environment, issue characteristics, policy alternatives and participant involvement. First
of all, it is necessary to have a good understanding of the political environment. All other
variables are dependent, in part, on how conducive the political environment is to change
and policy development. Although it is theoretically possible for participants to initiate
changes that will promote a more suitable environment for policy development, most
participants do not have the capability or opportunity to seriously affect the political
environment. There are, however, more ample, and feasible, opportunities for participants
to influence other participants, and to make an impact in the problem recognition and
policy alternatives streams.
Perhaps the best opportunity for impacting policy is to influence other
participants. The degree and manner that each participant has made an impact and their
potential contributions should be ascertained. Then those pushing for policy development
can try to elicit support from the participants who are not realizing their potential and who
are reachable.
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In the problem recognition stream, participants can indirectly affect policy by
influencing how an issue is perceived by the public and by policy makers. Although
perceptions are not easily changed, activities like mass education are essential. When
perceptions have been altered, participants may then be more successful in promoting
policy changes.
In the policy stream, participants advocating higher agenda status can ensure that
there are sufficient policy proposals available, that the proposals are feasible and that the
proposals are known by the policy makers. Although participants can use seminars or
directly contact policy makers to get out their message out, using the mass media is a very
effective method.
It should be re-emphasized, that although it is helpful to conceptualize the
situation by analyzing the various parts, it is often difficult to predict or determine the
causality between the factors. For example, it may take the majority of policy makers, or
those with the most influence on policy, to realize that action should be taken, before
changes can be initiated by policy proposals and participant involvement. On the other
hand, it may be the policy proposals and participant involvement that influence the policy
makers into changing their beliefs. However, rather than having independent affects on
one another, the variables are most likely interdependent and the process dynamic.
After identifying the needs and opportunities for promoting AIDS policy
development, examples from the Thai case may indicate possible responses to the various
situations. However, lessons from the Thai case should not be viewed in an isolated
manner, but in conjunction with the experiences of other nations. Although conditions
vary in each nation, there are commonalties across nations--especially the factors affected
by the characteristics of AIDS--which may be anticipated.
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LIMITATIONS
The intent of this research is not to provide a final answer to the policy
development puzzle, but rather, to give an indication of the basic processes that are taking
place and the roles of the major participants. The research is limited because it can not
account for all of the aspects and variables. This research applies Kingdon's work on the
policy process and participant involvement. Although Kingdon's process model is very
comprehensive and attempts to explain most of the factors, it can only do so in a broad
fashion. Therefore, each process, variable, and period of time must be investigated in
greater depth. In addition, to arrive at a better understanding of AIDS policy development
in Thailand, research should be conducted from other perspectives. Some of the
alternative approaches include applying issue characteristics models, power models and
motivational models.
For example, Kingdon takes in account the nature of the issue in his problem
recognition stream. However, applying Cobb and Elder (1984) model on issue
characteristics would add value because it indicates the factors that predispose an issue to
be placed on the government's agenda. This model is also based on the assumption that
the process and outcomes of policy-making vary in systematic ways depending on the
type of issue or policy alternative under consideration.
Kingdon's research provides a comprehensive breakdown of the various
participants' roles in policy making, but it does not explore the relationships between
participants in detail. Relationships between participants such as the members parliament
(MPs) and the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), MPs and bureaucrats, MPs and
parliamentary staff, bureaucrats and the OPM, the OPM and political appointees, political
appointees and bureaucrats, etc., must be analyzed more closely. Another type of
relationship that needs to be identified and investigated is the policy "sub governments"
or "policy networks" (Palumbo 1988). Policy sub governments are informal groups of
professionals, administrators, parliamentary staffers and other participants who form
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together for a common cause and whose influence on agenda setting becomes very
powerful. Palumbo explains that sub governments may involve just about anyone
interested in the many benefits that flow from a policy domain, including bureau chiefs,
administrators of line agencies, university academicians, consultants, representatives of
resource suppliers, and members of state and local governments (Palumbo 1988, 51). The
relationships between government and non-government participants also need further
attention. One such special relationship is called an iron triangle. It is composed of
bureaucrats, parliamentary committees and interest groups. In Thailand there are
numerous cases of networks between various government and non-government
participants involved in anti-AIDS activities. One example is the cooperative efforts of
representatives from the OPM, NGOs and international organizations, to promote non-
discriminatory legislation.
Furthermore, the amount of influence each participant has on the process is partly
dependent on the power relationships between participants. The power models cover the
contrasting degrees of influence over policy decisions by different social strata and the set
of participants expected to dominate the policy process. The concepts range from the
elitist models (see Crenson 1971) to the pluralist models (see Dahl 1961). Additionally,
the coalition models investigate the scope and range of political negotiations that occur
between politicians and may provide a useful framework for understanding the forming of
political behavior. Finally, the motivational models focus on the factors that explain why
decision-makers choose certain policies over others.
A limitation to applying Kingdon's research--as well as other models--to the Thai
case is the lack of both primary and secondary research materials.2 There has been very
little research completed on the policy making and agenda setting processes in Thailand.
Furthermore, since the Thai political system has just recently begun to transform into a
2 Factors that this research did not take in account because of a lack of information are the affects
of public opinion, elections and the role of the parliamentary staff.
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more democratic system--in the Western sense--the majority of research that has been
conducted in Thailand is based on a political system dominated by the military and
bureaucratic elite. Therefore, to validate the applicability of Western based models to the
Thai case additional basic research is necessary.
Another inherent limitation to analyzing policy from an agenda setting perspective
is that the actual implementation of policy is not used as a gauge of policy development.
For a truly successful national AIDS campaign, it is necessary to have a great deal of
political commitment which can be measured by the level of political agenda that an issue
reaches. However, it is not sufficient. To have a comprehensive and effective campaign,
the policy must be successfully implemented. Research utilizing program evaluation
methods needs to be conducted in order to gauge the achievements of policy
implementation. Then a comparison between the agenda setting and implementation
stages can be conducted.
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